

Muslims in Europe

A Report on 11 EU Cities

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List of Definitions

Discrimination: The term “discrimination” is used throughout this report; it includes harassment and direct and indirect discrimination. Articles 1 and 2 of the EU Race Directive expressly prohibit both “direct” and “indirect” discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs “where one person has been treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin”. According to the Directive, indirect discrimination occurs “where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage when compared with other persons unless that provision, criterion, or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”.

Ethnic or racial profiling: Describes the use by law enforcement officers of race, ethnicity, religion or national origin rather than individual behaviour as the basis for making decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity.

Ethnicity: Membership of a group which may share language, cultural practices, religion or common identity based on a shared history.

EU-born: In the context of this report, a distinction is made between foreign-born and EU-born respondents. The latter refers to participants in the OSI research who were born in the country where the research was undertaken. Therefore, a participant in the research on Paris who was born in Poland would be identified as foreign-born.

Harassment is conduct which creates “an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”.

Integration: The definition used in this report is “A dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the European Union” as stated in the Common Basic Principles (CBPs). In the Explanation to the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration 2004 (CBPs), “Integration is a dynamic long-term and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident. The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should create opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural and political participation. Accordingly, Member States are encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in integration policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and responsibilities.”

Islamophobia: Irrational hostility, fear and hatred of Islam, Muslims and Islamic culture, and active discrimination towards this group as individuals or collectively.

Marginalised: Marginalised groups can be part of an ethnic or racial minority and a sub-category of minority groups. They can also be characterised and distinguished

from other groups by suffering socio-economic disadvantage and a powerless position in society or in a group. This report defines marginalised groups as those who experience social exclusion, be they part of a minority or majority group in society.

Migrant: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) definition refers to a “Person who has moved temporarily or permanently to a country where he or she was not born **and** has acquired significant social ties to this country”. This includes students and children, as well as family dependents. A distinction is made in which this term does not include asylum seekers, refugees and stateless person. However, in some countries “migrant” also refers to those who are born in the country where their parents migrated to.

Minority: Under international law, there is no agreed definition of this term. Some countries define a minority as that which is recognised as such by national laws. In this report, the term refers to ethnic and religious groups who are not the dominant group in society.

Muslim: This group is diverse and although there are common belief systems and possible experiences as Muslims, this report relies on its Muslim respondents’ identification of themselves as Muslims. Furthermore, this term includes Muslims who view themselves in a cultural rather than a religious context.

Nationality: Country of citizenship.

Non-Muslim: For the purpose of this report, a non-Muslim is anyone who does not define himself or herself as belonging to the Islamic faith.

Race: The term “race” is used in the content of discrimination on the grounds of race, which occurs where people face discrimination because of their presumed membership of groups identified by physical features such as skin colour, hair or physical appearance. References to race in this report should not be taken to suggest that there are distinct human races.

Racism: Where used in this report, “racism” will be defined as “racial discrimination” which according to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination “shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction of preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social or cultural or any other field of public life”. Racial discrimination can also be based on markers of visible difference due to membership of a cultural group.

Social inclusion: The provision and promotion of equal rights and access in the field of education, employment and decision-making. Overcoming discrimination is implicit throughout policies and practices to realise inclusion.

Third-country national: An individual who is not a national of an EU Member State.

List of Abbreviations

BHD	British Hajj Delegation
BME	Black, Minority and Ethnic
CBP	Common Basic Principle
CCPNC	Citizenship Council of non-European Parisians (Conseil de la citoyenneté des Parisiens non communautaires)
CLIP	Cities for Local Integration Policy
CREAM	Curriculum Reflecting the Experiences of African Caribbean and Muslim Pupils
DG	Directorate-General
DP	Development Partnership
ECRI	European Commission on Racism and Intolerance
EEO	Equal Educational Opportunities
EES	European Employment Strategy
EPPE	Effective Provision of Pre-School Education
EU	European Union
EU-MIDIS	European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey
FRA	Fundamental Rights Agency
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs Council
JLS	Justice, Liberty and Security
MJD	Young Muslim Germans
NCP	National Contact Point
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PAGRI	Police Advisory Group on Racial Incidents
PCSO	Police and Community Support Officers
SDSA	Schools Development Support Agency
TCN	Third-Country National

TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
YIAG	Youth Independent Advisory Group

Executive Summary

There are estimated to be 15–20 million Muslims living in the EU; this population is expected to double by 2025. Muslims in Europe are a diverse population of citizens, as well as newly arrived migrants. Most live in capital cities and large industrial towns. Though the majority of Muslims are a long-standing and integral part of the fabric of their cities, many experience discrimination and social and economic disadvantages. Muslims in Europe today are also under heightened suspicion and scrutiny. This complex situation presents Europe with one of its greatest challenges: how to effectively ensure equal rights and social cohesion in a climate of political tension, economic uncertainty and rapidly expanding diversity.

There are very little data available on Europe's Muslim and minority populations. What does exist is extrapolated from ethnic and country-of-origin data, which provides a limited picture of the lives, experiences and needs of Muslims in Europe.

The increasingly visible ethnic, religious and cultural diversity of Western Europe has triggered debates on social cohesion and integration. Muslims are often at the centre of these debates. Policies to support integration and promote cohesion are developed at the European, national and local levels. The European Union defines integration as a two-way mutual process. This report focuses on public policies at the city level, in the context of national and European interpretations of the concept of integration, and how they are played out in the everyday lives of Muslims and non-Muslims across Europe.

On the whole, people from different backgrounds in the 11 cities studied by the Open Society Institute said they got along well together and were willing to help each other. Yet, though both Muslims and non-Muslims believed that similar values were an important part of belonging to a country, the majority did not believe that people in their own neighbourhoods shared similar values. Muslims identified respect for religion as a more important national value than did non-Muslims. These results present a complex picture, suggesting that a sense of shared values is not as necessary for people from different backgrounds as trust and a willingness to help neighbours.

For Muslims, feelings of belonging to their neighbourhood and city are stronger than belonging to the nation. For non-Muslims, national belonging is greater than (or the same as) city or community belonging. Half of Muslims who identified culturally with their country (i.e. saw themselves as Belgian, French, Dutch, etc.) did not feel that others viewed them in the same way. Cultural identification increased with integration in other areas such as employment and education. Muslims with a visible religious identity did not differ from other Muslims in their sense of cultural identification, belonging, or levels of trust.

The OSI research suggests that religious discrimination against Muslims remains a critical barrier to full and equal participation in society. The findings of this report are consistent with other research and suggest that levels of religious discrimination

directed towards Muslims are widespread and have increased in the past five years. European-born Muslims, particularly women, were more likely to perceive higher levels of religious discrimination than Muslims born abroad. European-born Muslim men identify the police as a key source of unfair treatment and discrimination. For Muslims, the persistence of discrimination and prejudice affects their sense of national belonging.

OSI found significant levels of interaction between people from different backgrounds, with European-born Muslims reporting the most. Frequent contact occurred at work, schools, shops, in public spaces such as transport and parks, and (more surprisingly) in the home. The majority of European-born Muslim women (51 per cent) had frequent contact at home with people outside their ethnic group.

The results run contrary to the view that Muslims live parallel or segregated lives, or do not feel a sense of belonging or attachment to the city and country where they live. It suggests that discrimination remains an important barrier to belonging, but one that many are overcoming.

The picture on educational attainment for minorities is mixed. In some countries, once socioeconomic background is taken into account, minorities are doing well. For some Muslims, religion plays an important role in supporting and encouraging education. Parental support, particularly in the early years, is also a strong predictor of future educational attainment. Across all cities, there is increasing recognition of the importance of pre-school education in ensuring that pupils from minority and other disadvantaged backgrounds do not start formal schooling underprepared. There is also growing evidence that education systems which place pupils into different education streams too early are disadvantaging young people from minority groups, who need more time to develop the linguistic skills to excel in education.

A desire for more ethnically mixed schools emerged consistently and strongly in the focus group discussions involving Muslim parents across the different cities. Parents were anxious about the adverse impact of segregation on their children's education and future prospects. Policymakers must find ways to overcome segregation, ways that result from a mixture of residential settlement patterns and parental and school choices.

Some Muslim pupils continue to suffer racism and prejudice at schools and are confronted by low expectations from teachers. Teachers need appropriate training and support to ensure that they can be effective in classrooms that are increasingly diverse, both ethnically and religiously. At the local level, many schools are responding positively to the needs of Muslim pupils, finding imaginative ways to work positively with their cultural heritage.

The settlement patterns of the majority of Muslims in the 11 cities in the OSI survey reflect the nature of the migration process in their country. Workers and their families mostly settled in the poorer districts of large industrial cities. This geographical

concentration produced networks of support and the development of goods and services to meet cultural needs.

The OSI survey, however, shows that most Muslims want to live in mixed communities, challenging the claims that the geographical concentration of Muslims reflects their desire to live among their own kind. Discrimination in housing confronts many Muslims and restricts their choices. Policymakers must find ways to maintain areas that are ethnically and religiously mixed, and to ensure that Muslims are able to choose where to live in a city unrestrained by discrimination and prejudice.

Muslims are not integrated into the mainstream labour market. They face higher unemployment rates and higher poverty rates than the general population. Those who are employed are often in marginal and low-paid jobs, this carries a greater risk of unemployment. Low-paid jobs also lead to segregated or parallel working lives.

Human capital accounts for some of this disadvantage in employment. Other factors include the lack of social networks, knowledge about the labour market, and language fluency. Some Muslims, particularly women who wear the veil, face penalties in the labour market based both on their ethnicity and their religion. Muslim women are also influenced by cultural preferences regarding family and childcare. Across the 11 cities, different measures are being taken to provide support for labour market participation; these include working with Muslim communities to ensure that advice and information reaches those who are furthest from the labour market. Some cities, as major employers, are taking steps to ensure that their workforce reflects the full diversity of the local population.

There are high levels of satisfaction in the health care that individuals receive. Reports of discrimination and unfair treatment are low, and most respondents felt that doctors and health clinics respect the needs of people of different faiths. Nevertheless, accommodating the needs of Muslim patients – in particular, the provision of *halal* food and, where hospitals provide chaplaincy services, access to imams – remains an issue that needs to be addressed. The need for appropriate care services for first-generation migrants who are growing older is an emerging issue of concern for many Muslims. Across the cities, there are examples of effective service delivery and provision that takes the cultural and religious needs of Muslims into account.

It is critical to ensure the accurate reporting and recording of hate crimes. The high levels of trust in the police provide a good base from which to develop initiatives to improve reporting. However, it needs to be recognised that these overall high levels of trust exist alongside low levels of trust among young European-born Muslim men, who experience the greatest amount of discrimination and unfair treatment at the hands of the police. The situation in Marseille suggests that over time, even the most complex and fraught relations between the community and the police can improve. Some cities are developing imaginative ways to improve engagement with communities, as well as effective strategies for recruiting and retaining police officers from minority communities.

The enormous media scrutiny of Muslims in different European countries has involved the negative reinforcement of stereotypes and prejudices. However, as the research also suggests, Muslims are aware of differences between the approach and agenda of different media organisations. The generally negative media coverage has also provided the impetus for individuals, civil society, and public entities to respond with greater engagement in media discussions, and to focus on the need to encourage and support more Muslims working in the media.

The OSI research points towards some encouraging trends, as well as the persistent challenge to ensure political and civic participation for Muslims.

Many Muslims who are not EU citizens remain disenfranchised, particularly in Germany and France, where they do not have the right to vote in local elections (even though many are long-term residents). Those who vote are more likely to feel that they can effect change in their city than those who do not. However, Muslim voters remain less likely than non-Muslim voters to feel that they can influence decisions affecting their city. Young Muslims, with more education and familiarity with political institutions, have greater confidence in their ability to effect local change than the older generations. Muslims are active in mainstream political parties. Parties based on ethnic and religious identity have not gained the support of Muslim voters. Increasing numbers of Muslims are standing for political office, but face additional scrutiny and questions because of their ethnic or religious background.

Muslims and non-Muslims share similar views in relation to their level of trust in the city council and government. Trust in local political institutions is higher than national institutions. The difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in their levels of trust in Parliament is significant and should be of concern.

The majority of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents are involved in mixed ethnic and religious organisations. The OSI research finds many positive initiatives taken by officials at the local level to engage with ethnic and religious organisations in their city. These initiatives may account for one striking finding from the OSI survey: respondents involved in same-ethnic/religion civic organisations are significantly more likely to trust their city councils than those involved in mixed organisations. In engaging with Muslim civil society organisations, policymakers and practitioners always need to ensure that they include women, young people, and others who may be marginalised by existing community organisations.

Recommendations

Based on the results of this study, the 'At Home in Europe' project has developed a comprehensive set of recommendations for policymakers at the European, national, and local levels. The following is a summary of the recommendations found at the end of this report. These recommendations provide the first steps and initial ideas to support Muslim and non-Muslim communities strengthen their trust in each other and increase their ability to work together to achieve common goals.

European Union policymakers

Improve efforts to address discrimination

- Policymakers should promote equal treatment that addresses discrimination based on religion and belief in education, housing and the provision of goods and services.
- Equality bodies should be empowered to promote good community relations.
- The European Commission and Council should provide guidelines for national data protection commissions to establish safeguards against ethnic and religious profiling.
- The European Commission and Council should use technical guidance and programme funding to support the development of anonymous statistical data on ethnicity and law enforcement. Such data are essential to detect, monitor, and address ethnic profiling practices at the national and local levels in Member States.
- The European Commission must provide financial support for pilot projects, research, and dissemination of best practices for the recruitment of more diverse police forces.

Improve and reform policies on integration and minorities

- EU statistical agencies and projects should collect accurate data on minorities in order to support evidence-based policies to facilitate integration and fight discrimination.
- The EU should expand efforts to increase the knowledge of civil society groups and local officials about the EU's Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration.
- EU cultural programmes should include a greater acknowledgement of Muslims' shared heritage with Europe, their contributions to European society, and endorse multiple religious and ethnic identities as a benefit to European society.
- The EU should treat integration efforts as a genuine two-way policy process that includes majority societies and communities.
- The EU's Integration Fund should prioritise supporting initiatives that provide diversity training for public service workers.
- The Council of Europe and other organisations should continue and expand research efforts, focusing on the impact of media coverage on Muslims, and its effects on social cohesion at the local level.

Recognise that religion is not a barrier to integration for Muslims

- EU Member States should respond to the study's findings that most people are not threatened by visible displays of religion, by focusing instead on the discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping directed by a few against those who visibly display their religious identity.

Address diversity and discrimination issues in the workplace

- The European Commission's Directorate General for employment, social affairs and equal opportunities should compile and share examples of good practices used by European cities to increasing diversity in the workplace.
- The EU should support city governments in developing local employment monitoring bodies to establish and evaluate objectives to increase Muslim and ethnic minority employment and economic integration.

Make education more accessible and responsive to a diverse student body

- The EU should work on developing a forum among cities for exchanging information and best practices about collecting educational data on minority students.
- The European Commission's Directorate General for Education and Culture should devise programs and activities that allow educators and communities to share information about best practices for harnessing students' cultural heritage and diversity to improve learning.

National and Local policymakers

Increase awareness about discrimination

- National officials should use public information campaigns and national advertisements to make sure legislators, administrators, other officials, and the general public are clearly aware of existing legal protections and mechanisms seeking redress against discrimination based on religion or belief.

Recognise the benefits and challenges of ethnically mixed neighbourhoods

- National officials, taking into account the results of the OSI research which shows a general preference for mixed neighbourhoods, should ensure that discrimination does not present a barrier to a free choice of where to live. Officials should pursue urban regeneration policies that ensure access to housing for all, and neighbourhoods with a good mix of ethnicities.

Recognising Muslim civil society bodies as legitimate participants in community consultation and engagement

- National and local engagement with Muslim civil society bodies must acknowledge the full diversity of Muslim communities and recognise that no single body or organisation can reflect that diversity. Where city and district officials have worked with Muslim community and civil society organisations, there has been greater confidence and an increased sense of integration in the city. Muslim civil society bodies are able to support access to parts of the community which public bodies may otherwise find hard to reach, and provide advice and information that ensures the effective and efficient delivery of services, taking the needs of local communities into account.

Consider reforms to definitions of nationality and voting rights for non-citizens

- Where necessary, national officials should consider reforms to nationality for long-term settled third-country nationals, so that naturalisation is the desired goal of settlement (as it is in the United States, Canada, and Australia); also that dual citizenship should be possible.
- National officials should consider giving voting rights for those without citizenship in local elections in order to address concerns about democratic legitimacy amongst policymakers in areas with large disenfranchised populations.
- In the absence of voting rights, local governments should create mechanisms to allow third-country nationals to express their views.

Promote opportunities for interaction

- Local policymakers should respond to this study's findings that show a desire for greater interaction between various groups. Education and employment are key areas for providing cohesion and a sense of belonging to an ethnically diverse community. Local policymakers must examine schools, businesses, and workplaces for opportunities to increase interaction between various ethnic and religious groups within the community.

Develop and promote inclusive civic identity

- Local policymakers should develop municipal campaigns that emphasise a common and inclusive city identity as an effective way to increase cohesion and belonging.

Engage with communities to ensure awareness of rights

- Local policymakers and representatives from Muslim and other minority communities should work to ensure that members of their communities are aware of, and can access, existing legal protections against discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief.
- Local policymakers and representatives from Muslim and other minority communities should work together to ensure that public sector agencies and enterprises have staff that reflect the diversity of their city.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Open Society Institute’s “At Home in Europe: Muslims in EU cities” project sets out to understand the everyday experiences of ordinary Muslims living in 11 cities across Western Europe. The 11 cities covered by the research are: Antwerp, Amsterdam, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Leicester, London, Marseille, Paris, Rotterdam and Stockholm. The research focuses on the impact of public policies aimed at improving integration and social inclusion. Integration here is understood as “a dynamic two way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the European Union”.¹ Social inclusion is defined as positive action taken to ensure the provision and promotion of equal rights in socio-economic spheres and greater participation in decision-making.

Although this report focuses on 11 cities in western Europe, there is a particular concentration on select neighbourhoods within the cities.² A focus on action at the local level allows for a closer examination of the interaction between residents and policymakers and politicians in areas where Muslims form a higher proportion of the population than in the city or state as a whole. By monitoring at the local level, the report also examines whether population concentrations of Muslims at the district and neighbourhood level have encouraged the development of practical solutions to social policies that respond to the needs and views of local Muslim populations.

1.1 Religion and identity

For this report the focus on Muslims as a group faces the challenge that Muslims are not a fixed group with defined boundaries, but rather a diverse set of individuals with different religious practices and attachments, who are currently defined and marked as such mainly from outside. Thus, it can include those who adhere to the religion of Islam as well as those who, because of their cultural or ethnic background, are

¹ Council of the European Union, Common Basic Principles on Integration, 2004, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf (accessed November 2009). In the Explanation to the CBPs, “Integration is a dynamic long-term and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident. The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should create opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural and political participation. Accordingly, Member States are encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in integration policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and responsibilities.”

² The districts/neighbourhoods studied are: Borgerhout, Antwerp; Slotervaart, Amsterdam; Kreuzberg, Berlin; Norrebro, Copenhagen; Hamburg-Mitte, Hamburg; Evington, Spinney Hills and Stonegate, Leicester; 3rd arrondissement, Marseilles; 18th arrondissement, Paris; Feijenoord, Rotterdam; Jarvafeltet, Stockholm; and the London Borough of Waltham Forest.

perceived as Muslims by others in society, even though they may be atheists or followers of other religions.

The identification of a person, whether by themselves or by others, as “Muslim” is not a neutral matter, as it can entail identification with a group that is at times stigmatised and demonised in public discourse. In social and public policy Muslims are increasingly viewed as a potential security threat or a group that is unwilling or unable to integrate.

In the context of the OSI research the identification of a person as “Muslim” has been left to the self-perception of the interviewee and has not been associated with any pre-fixed religious or cultural definition. In part this is because the primary focus of this report is not on issues of religious practice or belief but instead on the everyday experiences of those who define themselves as Muslim, in four areas of life that are crucial for social integration: education, employment, health, and civic and political participation. The report examines the effects of marginalisation and discrimination and explores the different ways in which local policies address issues of integration.

1.2 Structure of the report

This overview report provides an analysis of findings emerging from different OSI city reports as well as analysis of the overall data set of 2,200 questionnaires and 66 focus groups. These data have been gathered in 11 cities in the EU and is a combination of qualitative and quantitative research. They include questionnaires, focus groups, stakeholder interviews and a review of available and current policy and academic literature. This report seeks to place the findings emerging from this research within the wider European policy framework. The key findings from each city will be published in separate reports.

Chapter 2 examines the European contexts which shape and affect initiatives and experiences of integration at the national, municipal and neighbourhood levels. It focuses on the role of policies at the European level.

Chapter 3 explores issues of social cohesion, belonging, discrimination and interactions.

Chapter 4 looks at key issues arising in education, including those measures that aim to improve the educational achievement of different groups that impact on Muslims, the role of schools, the education system and parents in supporting educational success.

Chapter 5 examines data on labour-market participation. It then examines the role of different barriers that Muslims face in accessing and fully participating in the labour market.

Chapter 6 examines respondents’ perceptions and experiences of housing and their neighbourhood, including the tenure and quality of housing respondents live in and

their experiences of discrimination in accessing housing. The section then looks at respondents' subjective experiences of the local neighbourhoods they live in.

Chapter 7 examines Muslim experiences of health care. It examines data on the health status of Muslims, or in the absence of data on religion, of predominantly Muslim minority-ethnic groups. It notes particular ways in which religion can be relevant to health status, and the experiences of Muslims with health services that are available in the different cities.

Chapter 8 looks at issues of policing and security. It looks at levels of trust in the police and satisfaction with policing, as well as experiences of discrimination. It highlights the challenges faced in increasing the ethnic diversity of police officers and in increasing trust and support in local communities.

Chapter 9 examines the levels of civic and political participation of Muslims, including the electoral processes as voters and candidates. Political inclusion is also measured by the strength of identification with political institutions. It therefore measures the extent to which respondents feel that they can influence decisions affecting their city and their trust in key national and local political institutions. The chapter details some of the ways in which policymakers and politicians in the 11 cities have responded to political participation by Muslim organisations.

Chapter 10 looks at the role of the media in integration, social inclusion and participation. Media can act as both a means towards enhancing citizenship, and as mechanism for exclusion.³

Chapter 11 contains the recommendations. These are aimed at the EU and its Member States. The individual city reports will also contain recommendations directed at city policy officials, Muslim communities and the wider society.

1.3 Methodology

This report sets out to explore the needs and primary concerns of Muslim communities and to assess whether local policymakers have understood and met these needs. Who has defined these needs and how are they understood? Does delivery of essential services encompass cultural and religious requirements? What are the measures taken by local governments that acknowledge diversity and discrimination? Do policy practices and efforts include all groups? What is the state of relations between minorities and the wider society?

The selection of countries to include in the monitoring was based on methodological decisions. Any selection necessarily involves the rejection of many countries and cities. Rather than attempting to capture the full diversity of the various Muslim populations in Europe, the methodology focuses specifically on countries with significant Muslim

³ I.M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990.

populations, whose history dates back to relatively recent waves of migration – in most cases the last 60 years. Emphasis was placed on the older Member States of the EU, in particular the northern European states, as the issues faced by these states are largely similar. This would allow for the findings of the reports to be more directly comparable. The final seven countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This comparison is the subject of this report.

In 2007, a series of background reports reviewing the existing academic and policy literature on Muslims in the seven EU countries were released. It was anticipated that there would be limited literature directly on Muslims as a group and therefore the reports include both literature directly on Muslims, as well as literature on ethnic groups that are from Muslim-majority countries.

In order to allow for the comparison, a common methodology was adopted across all 11 cities. In addition to the review of the existing research and policy literature, fieldwork to gather new primary evidence was carried out in areas within each city that has large Muslim populations. The fieldwork consisted of 200 in-depth, face-to-face interviews with local residents in each city (100 Muslim and 100 non-Muslim).⁴ These questionnaires were then elaborated upon in six focus groups held in each city of local Muslim residents. Interviews were also conducted with local officials, practitioners such as teachers and health workers, community representatives, non-government organisations and experts engaged on anti-discrimination and integration issues.

The research and data for this report were collected from January 2008 until June 2009. The questionnaires and focus groups were facilitated by local researchers and research coordinators.⁵ The latter were responsible for identifying respondents for the questionnaires and participants for the focus groups, together with a team of interviewers composed of people from different ethnic groups and with varied language proficiency. In some instances, the researcher was responsible for carrying out the field research as well as the analysis.

⁴ For the full OSI questionnaire see Annex 3.

⁵ For a complete list of the city teams, please see the acknowledgements section.

Table 1. Characteristics of OSI research respondents

Characteristics	percent	Total Count
Religion		
Muslim	50.5	1110
Non-Muslim	49.5	1089
Gender		
Male	49.1	1080
Female	50.9	1119
Age		
< 20	8.5	187
20 – 29	28.1	618
30 – 39	20.4	448
40 – 49	19.2	422
50 – 59	12.4	272
60 +	11.3	249
Country of birth		
EU country (where person is living)	53.0	1165
Non-EU country	47.0	1034
Highest level of education		
No formal education	5.8	128
Primary education	11.5	252
Secondary education	50.6	1112
University	32.1	705
Employment		
Employed (full/part time)	45.8	1007
Self employed	6.6	145
Unemployed	8.7	192
Other	38.6	849
Neighbourhood mainly consists of:		
Relatives	3.5	76
Same ethnic and religious background	10.6	234
Same religion, different ethnic background	5.8	128
Same ethnicity, different religion	2.5	54
Different ethnicity and religion	12.8	282
Mixture of different backgrounds, ethnicities and religions	64.7	1423

Source: Data collected through OSI research in select neighbourhoods of 11 cities in western Europe. The full data are available at www.soros.org/initiatives/home (hereafter, Open Society Institute data)

Respondents are a non-random cross-section of individuals chosen from specified subgroups of the population within the selected neighbourhood of the city. The characteristics (age, ethnicity and gender) of the selected respondents were extrapolated from the available national population figures for the cities. Recognising that national statistics do not include data on ethnic or religious affiliation, the exact numbers of Muslims in each of the cities cannot be determined.

There are limitations to the research, including:

- recognition that questions answered may be affected by differing understandings of the question (efforts were made to ensure that this was kept at a minimum by translating the questionnaire verbally and ensuring that the interviewer spoke the first language of the respondent);
- the challenges surrounding the categories of Muslim and non-Muslim which do not translate easily across all EU Member States due to the varying national and political contexts of the countries;
- distinctions made by respondents between racial and religious discrimination, which is not always easily differentiated, making it difficult to fully comprehend the nature of the prejudice;
- an awareness that the sampling method means that respondents are not wholly representative of the population.

The findings contained in this report are not intended to be taken as a comprehensive reflection of the Muslim population and their concerns in these 11 cities. They should be viewed as a snapshot of the diversity and opinions of ordinary Muslims and non-Muslims through their concerns and experiences as residents of urban neighbourhoods in the EU.

The characteristics of the sample of the respondents to the 2,200 questionnaires are set out in Table 1.1. The sample is evenly split between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents and between male and female respondents. Just over half the sample were born in the EU state where they live, and 45 per cent were born elsewhere, including other EU states. In terms of education, the majority were educated to secondary-school level and almost one-third had university level education. In terms of economic status, the majority were either employed (46 per cent) or self-employed (7 per cent), while 9 per cent were unemployed. Those in the “other” category included those at home looking after their family, students and those who were retired.

2. POLICY CONTEXT

This chapter examines the European contexts which shape and affect initiatives and experiences of integration at the national, municipal and neighbourhood levels. It begins with an outline of the nature and size of Muslim populations across the EU. It then highlights evidence from three pan-European surveys (the European Values Survey, the European Social Survey and the Eurobarometer Survey) about the views held by Europeans about Muslims and about the ethnic and cultural diversity of European society, as these shape the context in which integration policies are developed and in which Muslims live out their everyday lives. The focus then shifts to the role of different areas of EU policy.

Muslims have long been part of European society, contributing to its economic, social and political development. There have been Muslims living in Europe, from the Baltic coast to the Balkans, and the Iberian Peninsula, Cyprus and Sicily for many centuries. The OSI reports focus on Muslims living in 11 cities in seven EU states (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The majority of Muslims in these states are migrants or the descendants of migrants who arrived during the economic boom of the 1960s. For some states former colonial ties played a significant role. In France, migration was largely from the former colonies and protectorates of the Maghreb, particularly Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In the Netherlands, Muslims arrived from the former colonies in parts of what is today Indonesia. In the UK, Muslim migrants came mainly from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Since the 1980s increasing numbers of Muslims have arrived in Europe as refugees seeking asylum, first from Iran, Iraq and Turkey, and then in the 1990s from the Balkans, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Throughout this period Muslims also arrived as students, professionals and investors.

There are no reliable data on the precise number of Muslims in Europe. Such estimates of course differ depending on the definition of Europe and Muslims that is adopted. In 2006, the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia estimated that there were at least 13 million Muslims in the EU, thus accounting for around five per cent of Europe's population.⁶ It is estimated by some that the population will double by 2025.⁷ These numbers will have increased with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria and will increase further if current candidates for membership are successful. While many Muslims are EU citizens, many are also third-country nationals (TCNs). In fact

⁶ EUMC, *Muslims in the EU: Discrimination and Islamophobia*, European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Vienna, 2006 (hereafter, EUMC, *Muslims in the EU*).

⁷ US National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future*, 2005. Available at: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf> (accessed November 2009).

the “most numerous groups of third-country nationals in the EU come from Turkey (2.3 million), Morocco (1.7 million), Albania (0.8 million) and Algeria (0.6 million)”.⁸

2.1 Surveys

2.1.1 Attitudes towards Muslims

Policies aimed at supporting increased economic, social and political participation of Muslims in Europe take place against a backdrop of growing prejudice and discrimination directed towards Muslims. Some of the prejudice that Muslims face is part of a “generic anti-immigrant” prejudice which is directed at Europe’s postwar non-western immigrants. At the same time there is evidence that they also face a “specific anti-Muslim” prejudice which “has developed as a result of stereotype-generating processes in the last couple of decades”.⁹ Analysis of the 1999–2000 European Values Study suggests that, even prior to 11 September 2001, levels of anti-Muslim prejudice across Europe were higher than anti-immigrant prejudice.¹⁰ The analysis finds that this prejudice is not related to poverty but does decrease with increased levels of education.¹¹ While the level of prejudice directed towards Muslims is greater than that directed at immigrants, the analysis of the European Values Study finds that it is the same type of prejudice as that directed towards immigrants. This means that policies aimed at addressing racial and ethnic prejudice should also lead to lower levels of anti-Muslim prejudice.

The development of integration and social inclusion policies also operate in a context of anxiety about the growing ethnic and religious diversity of European societies. The 2003 Eurobarometer survey asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement that it is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions and cultures; and that the country’s diversity in terms of race, religion and culture adds to its strength. Analysis of response to these two questions suggest that around a quarter of respondents across Europe were “resistant” to multicultural society,

⁸ Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *Third Annual Report On Migration And Integration*, Brussels, 11 September 2007, COM(2007) 512 final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/docs/com_2007_512_en.pdf (accessed November 2009).

⁹ Zan Strabac and Ola Listung, “Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe: A multilevel analysis of survey data from 30 countries”, *Social Science Research* 37, 2008, pp. 268–286, at 274 (hereafter, Strabac & Listung, “Anti-Muslim prejudice”).

¹⁰ Strabac & Listung, “Anti-Muslim prejudice”; the actual question asked in the European Values Survey was “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?” Respondents were given a list of 14 groups, including: “Jews”, “Gypsies”, “People of a different race”, “Immigrants/foreign workers” and “Muslims”.

¹¹ Strabac & Listung, “Anti-Muslim prejudice”, p. 279.

that is a society in which ethnic, religious or cultural diversity is seen as positive.¹² This overall figure hides significant variation across the EU and even across the seven states covered by the OSI research. Over the third of respondents in Belgium (37 per cent) and Germany (34 per cent) indicated resistance to a “multicultural” society, compared with closer to a fifth of respondents in Denmark, France, the Netherlands (22 per cent) and the UK (20 per cent); the lowest figures were found in Sweden (13 per cent).¹³ While only a minority of respondents across the seven states indicated a resistance to a multicultural society, around two-thirds of respondents from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and the UK, and 55 per cent of respondents in Denmark, agreed that there were limits to a multicultural society.¹⁴ Only in Sweden did the minority of respondents (40 per cent) take this view. Analysis of Eurobarometer surveys over time shows a significant increase between 1997 and 2003 in the number of respondents agreeing that the multicultural society had reached its limits.

Analysis of the data from the European Social Survey finds that views about national identity are more significant in explaining differences in attitudes towards immigrants than the size of the immigrant population in the country or the economic circumstances of the country.¹⁵ The greater levels of prejudice directed towards Muslims may in part reflect a perception of Muslims as a cultural threat or at least culturally different from the general population. Ideas about the cultural identity of the nation-state play an important role in shaping people’s views of migration: “popular preferences for cultural unity are powerful influences on attitudes towards immigration, despite elite endorsements of a multicultural society engendered by immigration.”¹⁶ Sides and Citrin suggest that creating positive attitudes towards immigration requires work on re-imagining national identities.

¹² EUMC, *Majorities’ Attitudes towards Minorities: key findings from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey, Summary*, European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Vienna, 2005, p. 12 (hereafter, EUMC, *Majorities Attitudes*). The measure for ‘resistance to multicultural society’ was based on responses to the two statements: [1] it is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions and cultures; and [2] (country X’s) diversity in terms of race, religion and culture adds to its strength.

¹³ EUMC, *Majorities’ Attitudes*, Annex A, p. 29.

¹⁴ The limits of multicultural society was measured by responses to the following two statements: [1] there are limits to how many people of other races, religions and cultures a country can accept; and [2] (country X) has reached its limit; if there are more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems.

¹⁵ John Sides and Jack Citrin “European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information” *British Journal of Political Science* 37, 2007, p. 477 (hereafter, Sides & Citrin, “European Opinion about Immigration”).

¹⁶ Sides & Citrin, “European Opinion about Immigration” p. 488.

2.2 The European Union

The Lisbon Treaty amends the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and provides a clearer vision of the values of the Union, as one that is based on “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”. Furthermore, it emphasises that human rights include the “rights of persons belonging to minorities” and identifies pluralism, non-discrimination and tolerance as part of the central set of values that should prevail in the Union.¹⁷

Securing the social and economic inclusion and civic and political participation of Muslims in Europe involves action across a wide range of areas, from equality and discrimination through to education, employment, health, housing and political participation. While the EU does not have direct competence in all of these areas, it nevertheless shapes, supports and contributes to actions taken by policymakers, practitioners and civic society at the city level, through sharing good practice and the Open Method of Coordination. Work on social inclusion and integration is spread across a number of different directorates within the European Commission. EU policy does not focus action on groups based on religious identity. Action on social inclusion including in relation to employment and discrimination comes within the remit of the Directorate-General (DG) for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. The DG Education and Culture takes the lead in education as well as intercultural dialogue. Primary responsibility for health care lies with the DG Health and Consumer Protection. The DG Regional Policy covers broader urban development, including aspects of housing, urban renewal and sustainable regeneration. In many of these areas policies, initiatives and action can be targeted at ethnic but not religious minorities. As many Muslims who are EU nationals are also from minority-ethnic groups, they are likely to come within the scope of policies that target ethnic minorities.

Distinctions are drawn on the basis of legal status; that is, on the basis of being an EU national or a non-EU national (TCNs). EU policy in relation to non-EU nationals is important to Muslims, since as much as one-third of Muslims may be TCNs.¹⁸ The DG Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS) has primary responsibility for migration and the development of a common policy on immigration and asylum. JLS therefore takes the lead on the integration of immigrants who are TCNs. However, the scope of much of its work does not generally extend to all TCNs, migrants, or the descendants of migrants who are EU nationals.

¹⁷ Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2008/C 115/01), article 2, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0001:01:EN:HTML> (accessed November 2009, hereafter, TEU).

¹⁸ If the estimates in the Commission’s (2007) *Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration* are correct then over 5 million citizens (from Turkey, 2.3 million; Morocco, 1.7 million; Albania, 0.8 million; Algeria, 0.6 million) are TCNs in the EU and are likely to account for a significant proportion of the 13–15 million Muslims in the EU.

In addition to the directorates across the Commission, EU priorities and action in this area of integration and migration are also set by ministerial conferences. The EU integration ministers met for the first time in November 2004 in Groningen, under the Dutch presidency. Their work led to the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) adopting basic common principles on integration (discussed below) on 19 November 2004. A second ministerial conference was held in Potsdam in May 2007 during the German presidency. This called for reflection on intercultural dialogue as a tool for reinforcing integration. In November 2008 a third ministerial council was held in Vichy during the French presidency. The final Declaration of the conference identified six priority areas for action: the promotion of the EU's fundamental values; the integration process; access to employment and the promotion of diversity; the integration of women and the education of children; the use of intercultural dialogue to promote integration; and integration policy governance.¹⁹

2.2.1 Immigrant integration

The Treaty of Amsterdam's provision for the movement of migration and asylum policy from the third (intergovernmental) to the first (communitarian) pillar of the Union (currently DG JLS) provided the momentum for greater harmonisation of EU migration policies.²⁰ After the treaty was ratified, a special European Council meeting was convened in Tampere in October 1999. The Tampere Summit's Conclusions on migration, although driven primarily by the need to address public concerns on illegal immigration, noted the need for a "common approach" to the "integration" of TCNs lawfully resident in the Union.²¹ The Council agreed the need for the "fair treatment" of TCNs as one of the four strands of a common EU policy on immigration and asylum. The Council's Conclusions linked the fair treatment of TCNs to a twin-track approach towards a "more vigorous integration policy". The first track involved granting TCNs' "rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens", and the second developed measures to combat discrimination.²²

To achieve the first aim, the Council's Conclusions recommended that Member States grant long-term legally resident TCNs "a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens". This encompassed "the right to reside,

¹⁹ European Ministerial Conference on Integration, *Declaration approved by the representatives of the Member States*, Vichy, 3 and 4 November 2008, available at: http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1103_Ministerielle_Integration/conference_integration_041108_Final_declaration_EN.pdf (accessed November 2009).

²⁰ Migration policy first entered EU policymaking under the Treaty of Maastricht, which placed it in the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs. In 1996, the Council of Ministers passed its first resolution on TCNs in 1996, OJ C 80/02, 18 March 1996, section III.

²¹ Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, para. 4, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (accessed November 2009; hereafter, Tampere European Council Conclusions).

²² Tampere European Council Conclusions, para. 18.

receive education, and work as an employee or self-employed person”. The Council also endorsed the objective “that long-term legally resident third-country nationals be offered the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they are resident”.²³ These commitments, described as “one of the boldest declarations made at Tampere”,²⁴ have yet to be fulfilled.

Following the Tampere Summit, implementation of commitments for the fair treatment of TCNs was slow. In 2003 Directives were adopted by EU states on rights to family reunification and free movement between Member States.²⁵ Provisions in both Directives point towards an approach to integration that sees secure legal status, strong residents’ rights and equal treatment as vital to integration. When the Council finally produced its Communication on “Immigration, integration and employment” it recognised that of the four strands to a common asylum and immigration policy, proposals for implementing commitments for the fair treatment of TCNs were the last to be produced.²⁶ The need for the fair treatment of TCNs is found in provisions on developing a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), Articles 67 and 79 (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty). The Lisbon Treaty gives the EU competence to develop a common immigration policy through a qualified majority. This includes “conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunification” and “the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States”. Furthermore, it provides that the Parliament and Council can “establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories”.²⁷

²³ Tampere European Council Conclusions, para. 21.

²⁴ Peo Hansen, *A Superabundance of Contradictions: The European Union’s Post-Amsterdam Policies on Migrant ‘Integration’, Labour Immigration, Asylum and Illegal Immigration*, Norrköping, Linköping University Centre for Ethnic and Urban Studies, 2005, available at: <http://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Forskning/Peo%20Hansen%20A%20Superabundance%20of%20Contradictions.pdf> (accessed November 2009, hereafter Hansen, *A Superabundance of Contradictions*).

²⁵ Council Directive 86/2003/EC on the right to family reunification, 22 September and Council Directive 109/2003/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, 25 November 2003.

²⁶ Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Rights Committee and the Committee of the Regions on immigration, integration and employment, COM (2003) 336 Final, p. 3.

²⁷ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 115/47, 9 May 2008, 79(4) (hereafter, TFEU).

The Commission's Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment 2003

The focus on equalising the rights for TCNs with those of EU citizens was soon eclipsed by the Commission's proposal for a more comprehensive "holistic" approach to the matter of integration. The Commission's Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (EC COM (2003) 336 final) argued for measures on integration across a broad range of areas that "takes into account not only the economic and social aspects of integration but also issues related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political rights". It recognised that the "successful integration of immigrants is both a matter of social cohesion and a prerequisite for economic efficiency".

Two aspects of the Commission's proposed approach to integration are of particular importance: the definition of integration and the identification of the target group for integration policies. The Commission defines integration as "a two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third-country nationals and host society which provides for the full participation of the immigrant". The mantra of integration as a "two-way process" has become entrenched in the Union's policy discourse.²⁸ The language of mutual accommodation in a two-way process can, however, conceal the inequality of power in the relations between the two sides, "the receiving society, its institutional structure, and the way it reacts to newcomers is much more decisive in the outcome of the process [...] integration policies are part of the institutional arrangements in a society. Since these are defined politically by majorities in the receiving society, there is the inherent danger of their being lopsided, representing the expectations of society rather than being based on negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups themselves."²⁹

Criticisms have been made of the explanation of the meaning of the "two-way process" found in the Commission's Communication. The Communication argues that a two-way integration process involves both responsibilities on the host society, to guarantee a structure of rights that allow for participation in economic, social, cultural and civil life, and responsibilities on immigrants to "respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process". Hansen argues that "once the question of 'principles and values' enters into the picture, the [...] 'two-way process' quickly yields to an even more disquieting one-way process where integration, in essence, becomes synonymous with an exclusive duty to adapt" placed on migrants alone. Thus he concludes: "the ultimate success or failure of the

²⁸ For example, 2003 Thessaloniki European Council defined integration "...as a continuous, two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally residing third-country nationals and the host societies" Presidency Conclusions, 19–20 June 2003, Bulletin EU 6-2003, Conclusion 31.

²⁹ R. Penninx, "Element for an EU framework for integration policies for immigrants" in Sussmuth and Weidenfeld (eds.) *The European Union's Responsibilities Towards Immigrants*, Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC, 2005.

integration policy that comes into view here still seems to hinge upon the moral stature of the migrants themselves, on their ‘willingness to integrate’, as well as on their ability to adapt to certain prescribed cultural and civic values”.³⁰

In the Commission’s Communication, the definition of integration as a two-way process between TCNs and the host society makes it clear that TCNs are the primary concern of integration policy. Furthermore, the Commission identifies the target group that will benefit from integration measures as composed primarily of “labour migrants, family members admitted under family reunion arrangements, refugees and persons enjoying international protection”. The text does recognise that integration may also be an issue in relation to second- and third-generation children of immigrants who may be nationals of EU states, but does not identify the “host society” as a primary beneficiary of integration measures.³¹

The Commission’s Communication was accepted by the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. The Council invited the European Commission “to present an Annual Report on Migration and Integration in Europe, in order to map EU-wide migration data, immigration and integration policies and practices”.³² The Council also called for a coherent EU framework on the integration of TCNs to be developed by agreement on common basic principles.³³

The Common Basic Principles

In November 2004, the European Council adopted The Hague Programme. This programme sets out the objectives to be implemented in the areas of freedom, security and justice for the following five years. The programme called for EU action on integration to be developed inside a framework based on common basic principles. A set of Common Basic Principles (CBPs) were developed and subsequently adopted by the European Council in November 2004.³⁴ Although non-binding on states, the CBPs provide the cornerstone of EU policy on integration.

³⁰ Hansen, *A Superabundance of Contradictions*.

³¹ Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Rights Committee and the Committee of the Regions on immigration, integration and employment, COM (2003) 336 Final, pp.17–18.

³² Thessaloniki European Council Conclusions, para 33.

³³ Thessaloniki European Council Conclusions, para 31.

³⁴ Endorsed by the November 2004 European Council.

The Common Basic Principles on Integration

1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
4. Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way, is a critical foundation for better integration.
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public-policy formation and implementation.
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, to evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective (European Council, 2004).

Mirroring the holistic approach recommended in the Commission Communication, the CBPs call for action across a wide range of areas including employment, education, access to goods and services, housing and urban policy, as well as civic and political participation.

The CBPs suggest significant shifts in emphasis in the EU's understanding of integration. First, there is a greater acknowledgement of the need for effort and action by all individuals, not just immigrants. Thus, the two-way process is one of "mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States". Furthermore, the CBPs are clear that "this demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident" and that this "involves the receiving society, which should create the opportunities for the immigrants' full economic, social, cultural, and political participation". Second, there is less confrontational language on values. Reference to the need for immigrants to "respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society" has been replaced by a statement that "integration implies the need to respect the values of the Union" and in the explanation of this in the annex there is a more inclusive recognition that all residents in the Union must adapt and adhere to its values. Third, there is recognition of the need for a more targeted and nuanced approach in integration policy that allows for different approaches to different groups. In their preamble to the CBPs, the Council recognises that integration policies may target diverse audiences from "temporary workers to permanent residents and to the children of immigrants; from individuals who wait to be admitted to those who are already residing; from immigrants who have acquired citizenship to long-established third-country nationals; and from highly skilled refugees to individuals who have yet to acquire the most elementary skills".³⁵ Fourth, there is recognition that the targets of integration policies may include citizens and those in the second generation. While the CBPs, in their move away from references to TCNs to using the word "immigrants", imply an endorsement of this broader approach at other points (principle 8), they continue to juxtapose immigrants to EU citizens. There is therefore both the need and potential for greater elaboration on the groups that come within the scope of integration policy and the ways in which their needs differ.

Weaknesses in the text remain. As Professor Marco Martinello notes, despite these positive developments the CBPs continue to see only immigrants as needing support with integration. He suggests a more general approach to building a better integrated and cohesive society and supports defining integration in terms of "fair participation" in the social, economic, cultural and political spheres of European societies. For him the "most problematic" principles are nos. 7 and 8:

Principle 7 refers only marginally to anti-discrimination policies. It should be emphasized on existing legal framework. It does not either acknowledge that urban ethnic enclaves could also favor integration and provides room for ethnic

³⁵ Justice and Home Affairs, 2,618th Council Meeting, Council Conclusions, preamble to CBP para. 6.

entrepreneurship, social cohesion and social mobility. It only describes the “poor urban areas” as dysfunctional for immigrants. As for Principle 8, again the mention of “national and European values” is highly debatable. Rights or legislation must be obeyed, but it is debatable to express the will to impose the respect of indefinite values. Especially, the reference to “*the rights and equality of women and the freedom to practice or not practice a particular religion*” as well as the mention of possible “*legal coercive measures*” should be rephrased in terms of rights and obligations, not in terms of values.³⁶

This should also be understood in the context of integration and nationality tests being developed in some EU states, which appear to be directed at excluding Muslims. The most notorious example of this are the Gesprächsleitfaden (Interview Guidelines) for examining citizenship applicants produced by the German government of Baden-Württemberg. The questions were only asked of applicants from 57 countries, all of which had a predominantly Muslim population. The questions suggested a view of Islam as prescribing or condoning arranged marriage, patriarchy, homophobia, veiling and terrorism; their discriminatory edge consists of “interpreting [...] the liberal-democratic order primarily in opposition to the presumed values of a specific group”, as a legal evaluation of the Gesprächsleitfaden for the city of Heidelberg put it. In other words, such “liberalism” is nothing but a device for excluding a specific group: Muslims.³⁷

Criticism could also be made of Principle 4 which refers to the importance to integration of understanding the host society’s language, history and institutions, without any corresponding recognition of a need to ensure an understanding of the contribution of diverse ethnic, religious and cultural groups to the development of modern European society among all residents in the Union. This may be particularly important for ensuring that there is greater awareness about the contribution that Muslims and other minorities have made to the economic, social and cultural development of European societies.

Such criticism may have influenced the Conclusions to the 2007 Council meeting in Luxembourg, which stated that integration was a “dynamic two-way process involving both immigrants and the host society, with responsibilities for both sides”. In an important shift in emphasis the Conclusions argue that “one of the major challenges to the achievement of successful integration policies and long-term social cohesion” is to involve host societies in this process. Furthermore, the Conclusions emphasise that “all individuals” as well as state institutions, political parties, media, businesses and civil society “must assume responsibility in this integration process”. Finally, the Council frames the role of values with greater neutrality: an “agreed value system” is needed to

³⁶ M. Martinello, *Towards a coherent approach to immigrant integration policy(ies) in the European Union*, 2008, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/38295165.pdf (accessed November 2009).

³⁷ C. Joppe, “Beyond Nationals Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe”, *Western European Politics* 30(1), 2007, p. 15.

underpin the integration process.³⁸ The Commission's Third Annual Report on Migration and Integration recognises that most national integration strategies are directed at immigrants, and that there was a lack of "initiatives targeting the host population to reinforce its ability to adjust to diversity".³⁹ The European Pact on Migration and Integration, endorsed by the European Council in 2008, appears, however, to signal a shift back to more divisive language. It makes reference to the need for a balance between migrants' rights and responsibilities, identifying the latter to have "compliance with the host country's laws". Furthermore, these duties "will stress respect for the identities of the Member States and the European Union and for their fundamental values, such as human rights, freedom of opinion, democracy, tolerance, equality between men and women, and the compulsory schooling of children".⁴⁰

Despite its shortcomings, the CBPs provide an important framework for the development of integration initiatives at the national and local level in Europe. The CBPs were also put into an "operational framework" in 2005 through the Communication for a Common Agenda for Integration. The Council's Conclusions adopting the CBPs make it clear that their role is "to assist Member States in formulating integration policies" by providing "basic principles against which they can judge and assess their efforts". The CBPs could be used by Member States to "set priorities and further develop their own measurable goals". Responsibility remained with each Member State "to determine whether these principles assist them in formulation of policies for other target groups for integration".⁴¹

For the CBPs to operate as a general framework for the development of integration policy across Europe they need to be "embraced, interpreted and owned by local communities, especially in cities and large urban communities".⁴² Eurocities, an organisation of 130 cities across Europe, suggests that greater ownership of the CBPs by local city practitioners and policymakers could be better fostered if the Commission were to develop a consultation framework with large cities and their associations. They

³⁸ Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the strengthening of integration policies in the European Union by promoting unity in diversity, 2807th JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting Luxembourg, 12 and 13 June 2007, para 2, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/94643.pdf (accessed November 2009).

³⁹ Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *Third Annual Report On Migration And Integration*, Brussels, 11 September 2007, COM(2007) 512 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/docs/com_2007_512_en.pdf (accessed November 2009).

⁴⁰ Council of the European Union, *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, 24 September 2008, 13440/08.

⁴¹ Justice and Home Affairs, 2618th Council Meeting, Council Conclusions, preamble to CBP.

⁴² European Policy Centre, *An assessment of the CPB on integration the way forward*, 2005.

support the creation of “a sectoral dialogue in the field of integration, under the umbrella of the Territorial Dialogue between the Commission and European and national associations of Local and Regional Authorities”.⁴³ The Commission’s approach to developing and embedding the CBPs is through the creation of instruments that support greater sharing of experiences and best practice in the area of integration.

Sharing Experiences and Best Practice

The Thessaloniki European Council Conclusions in June 2003 already supported the exchange of information and best practice between Member States through the publication of integration handbooks. The first volume of the integration handbooks published in 2004 looks at practices in relation to newly arrived migrants, refugees, civic participation and indicators; the second volume, published in 2007, looks at mainstreaming integration, housing, economic integration and integration structures. The third volume will examine immigrant youth, education and the labour market; citizenship; public awareness and empowerment; dialogue platforms and coordination mechanisms.

Another mechanism for the exchange of information and best practices is the National Contact Points (NCPs) on integration.⁴⁴ The NCPs provide a forum for the exchange of information and best practice between Member States at EU level. Eurocities has argued for a more structured approach to the transfer of knowledge from the local policymakers to the NCPs; through the creation of reference groups around each NCP, which would consist of representatives of local and regional authorities, including cities, social partners and relevant NGOs.⁴⁵

European Integration Website

While the NCPs allow the exchange of information and best practice by governmental policymakers, a more open forum of information exchange by practitioners is the European Website on Integration,⁴⁶ which aims to facilitate the exchange of best practice among integration practitioners. It is directed at national, regional and local authorities, civil-society organisations and local practitioners.

⁴³ Eurocities, *Response to the Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration*, 2006, available at http://www.eurocities.eu/uploads/load.php?file=EC_Response_integration-ADOS.pdf (accessed November 2009, hereafter, Eurocities, *Response to the Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration*).

⁴⁴ The network of National Contact Points on integration was set up by the Commission as a follow-up to the Justice and Home Affairs Council conclusions of October 2002 and endorsed by the Thessaloniki European Council conclusions in June 2003.

⁴⁵ Eurocities, *Response to the Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration*.

⁴⁶ The European Website on Integration home page is <http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/index.cfm> (accessed November 2009).

Alongside the website, greater participation in policy discussions with civil society is to take place through the mechanism of the European Integration Forum. This was launched in 2009. The purpose of the forum is to provide a voice for representatives of civil society on integration issues, in particular relating to the EU agenda on integration, and for the Commission to take a proactive role in such discussions. This, it is suggested, “will allow the European institutions to promote a comprehensive approach to integration, involving stakeholders at all levels”.⁴⁷ However, effective civil-society participation requires developing the capacity of NGOs and other civil-society organisations to participate in European policy discussions.⁴⁸

The European Integration Fund

The Commission’s financial instruments for supporting integration, the Preparatory Action for Integration of Third Country Nationals and the European Integration Fund, are focused on supporting TCNs in fulfilling conditions of residence and their integration into European societies. The fund is targeted at exclusively at relevant TCNs. Refugees do not come within its scope. Action on the integration of refugees comes within the ambit of a separate European Refugee Fund. And TCNs who are undocumented migrants are also excluded. In the experience of Eurocities’ members, the strict focus of the European Integration Fund on TCNs is problematic: “given that it cannot be combined with other EU funding instruments (e.g. in the field of social inclusion), it does not allow for measures to be adapted to the specific profiles of a particular migrant group, thereby preventing local authorities from providing adequate support”.⁴⁹

The current fund for the period 2007–2013 stands at €825 million. Of this, €768 million will be distributed among Member States on the basis of objective criteria of the number of legally resident TCNs. The remaining 7 per cent (€57 million) is reserved for Community actions. The Fund has identified three overarching priorities for 2009. These are to:

- gather public and migrant perceptions and develop a more comprehensive understanding of the integration processes;
- promote integration measures targeting the youthful population and addressing specific gender issues;

⁴⁷ European Integration Forum Factsheet, available at <http://www.europeanintegration.eu/files/Integration-Forum-Fact%20sheet-EN-web.pdf> (accessed November 2009).

⁴⁸ Eurocities (2009) *From Hague to Stockholm: Eurocities Analysis of the European Framework on Immigration, Asylum and Integration*,

⁴⁹ Eurocities, *Eurocities’ Analysis of the European Framework on Immigration, Asylum and Integration*.

- promote the role of civil-society organisations and the local authorities in shaping integration strategies.⁵⁰

Within this, more specific aims include: promoting the knowledge and understanding of contributions that migrants make to European societies and the benefits of legal migration; improving the capacity of public institutions to adjust to migration-related diversity; removing structural barriers against the empowerment of immigrants and strengthening intercultural competences; promoting respect for diversity in the educational environment and support for teachers and parents.

2.2.2 Discrimination

Effective action in addressing discrimination was identified in the Tampere Council Conclusions as the second element of an effective integration policy. Article 13 of the EC Treaty (now article 19 TFEU), as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides a legal basis for the Council to take appropriate action to combat discrimination on “sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”. In 2000 the EU adopted two Directives on discrimination. The Directives recognise that discrimination undermines the achievement of the objectives of the EC Treaty, including the attainment of economic and social cohesion and solidarity.⁵¹

The first Directive prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin in employment, education, housing, social protection, and access to goods and services (the Race Directive).⁵² The Directive, however, does not cover discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Furthermore, conditions relating to the entry and residence of TCNs are outside its scope. Racial discrimination is said to undermine the Union’s goal of creating “an area of freedom, security and justice” and “to ensure the development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin”.⁵³

⁵⁰ Annual work programme 2009 of the Community actions of the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/integration/docs/awp_integration_2009_en.pdf (accessed November 2009).

⁵¹ Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 180, 19 July 2000, art. 9 (hereafter, Race Equality Directive); Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 303/16, 2 December 2000 (hereafter, Employment Directive), recital 11.

⁵² Directive 2000/43/EC OJ L 180/22, 19.7.2000.

⁵³ Race Equality Directive, art. 12. See M. Bell, “Beyond European Labour Law? Reflections on the EU Racial Equality Directive” in *European Law Journal* 8, 2002, at p. 387 suggests that the Directive marks a “shift towards a broader conception of European social law”.

The second Directive covers discrimination on the grounds of “religion and belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”, but is limited in scope to covering discrimination in employment (the Employment Directive).⁵⁴ The Council proposed a new Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons, irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in 2008.⁵⁵ If adopted, this would extend the protection from discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief, to social protection (including social security and health care), social advantages, education, as well as access to and supply of goods and services, such as housing and transport.

These Directives lie at the core of the protection that European law offers Muslims in addressing the discrimination they experience. While Article 13 is framed in terms of combating discrimination, several aspects of the Race and Framework Directive appear to entail more substantive equality.⁵⁶ Firstly, there is the reference to “equal treatment” in the title of the Directives. Furthermore, they link positive action more clearly to the goal of “ensuring full equality in practice”.⁵⁷ Both Directives require Member States to prohibit both direct and indirect discrimination.⁵⁸ They also deem instructions to discriminate⁵⁹ and harassment to be forms of discrimination. The inclusion of indirect discrimination is particularly important as this covers situations which arise where an “apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put a person having a particular religion or belief [...] at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons”. Indirect discrimination has been identified as the “primary legal tool” for tackling structural inequality.⁶⁰ However, the potential for achieving structural change is circumscribed as a criterion, provision or practice that has a disparate impact on those within the protected group remains open to being “objectively justified” if the

⁵⁴ Employment Directive.

⁵⁵ Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, COM(2008) 426 final.

⁵⁶ The term ‘substantive equality’ is used here to distinguish it from ‘formal equality’, that is equality as consistency of treatment. The term remains ambiguous, as it encompasses different conceptions of substantive equality, including equality of result and equality of opportunity. See generally: S. Fredman, *Discrimination Law*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. For discussion of Fredman’s conceptions of equality see also H. Collins, “Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion”, *Modern Law Review* 66:16, 2003, Bamforth, N., “Conceptions of Anti-Discrimination Law”, *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 24(4), 2004 and Holmes, E., “Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality”, *Modern Law Review* 68(2), 2005.

⁵⁷ Race Directive, Article 5; Framework Directive, Article 7. See Perchal, “Equality of Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Social Policy: Achievements in Three Themes”, *Common Market Law Review* 41, p. 533, 2004.

⁵⁸ Race Directive, Article 2(2)(a); Framework Directive, Article 2(2)(a).

⁵⁹ Race Directive, Article 2(4); Framework Directive, Article 2(4).

⁶⁰ T.K. Hervey, “Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards”, *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law* 12(4), p. 311.

measure is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

The Framework Directive's potential to provide the catalyst for deeper structural changes is further limited by its focus on addressing individual instances of discrimination. There is a limit to how far the individualised discrimination model adopted by the EU Directives can go in achieving substantive equality. First, it is reliant on the individual to bring an action. It therefore places excessive strain on the individual in terms of resources and personal energy. Second, victim-initiated litigation means that the court's intervention is random and *ad hoc*. The remedy is limited to the individual; it does not create an obligation to change the institutional structure that gives rise to the discrimination. Third, the basis in individual fault means that there must be a proven perpetrator. But discrimination that arises from institutional arrangements is not the result of the fault of any one person. Finally, this approach is adversarial and so instead of viewing equality as a common goal to be achieved cooperatively, it "becomes a site of conflict and resistance".⁶¹

An alternative to the individualised approach of the Directives is a proactive model for equality. This can be found for example in the UK, where there is a legal duty on public bodies to promote equality and tackle discrimination.⁶² This places the initiative of addressing discrimination on employers and public authorities, institutions and organisations, rather than the individuals facing disadvantage. They are tasked with taking action because they have the power and capacity to do so, not because they are responsible for the discrimination. It ensures that change is systematic rather than random and *ad hoc*. Action for change does not require the finding of fault or the naming of a perpetrator. The right to equality is available to all, not just those able to complain. Finally, this approach provides for the role of civil society in setting and enforcing norms.⁶³

EU competence on the promotion of equality is only explicitly referred to in relation to gender equality.⁶⁴ The need to focus on tackling discrimination is boosted by the provision of Article 10 TFEU that: "in defining and implementing the policies and activities referred to in this Part, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation".

⁶¹ S. Fredman, "Changing the Norm: Positive Duties in Equal Treatment Legislation", *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law* 12(4), 2005, at pp. 372–373 (hereafter, Fredman, "Changing the Norm").

⁶² Race Relations (Amendment) Act 1998 and Equality Act 2003.

⁶³ Fredman, "Changing the Norm", p. 373.

⁶⁴ TFEU, article 8.

2.2.3 Employment and social inclusion

The social and economic position of Muslims in Europe means that they should benefit from policies aimed at tackling social exclusion and disadvantage, particularly in accessing the labour market. Action on social inclusion is largely the responsibility of DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Action in this area does not address Muslims but does refer to TCNs and ethnic minorities as a vulnerable or disadvantaged group. For example, there is recognition that risk factors associated with poverty and social exclusion include “immigration, ethnicity, racism and discrimination”.⁶⁵

The Amsterdam Treaty allowed for the development of a European Employment Strategy (EES), to be implemented through agreed guidelines and national action plans. The EES is closely tied to the Lisbon Strategy, which set the goal of making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. It calls for a 70 per cent employment rate by 2010 for the overall population as well as rates for special groups, such as women (60 per cent) and the elderly (50 per cent). The Joint Report on Social Inclusion recognises that “immigrants and ethnic minorities” are among the three groups that face particular vulnerability in accessing the labour market.⁶⁶ The specific needs of migrants and ethnic minorities have been a consistent feature of the Commission’s Joint Employment Reports.⁶⁷

The employment guidelines of the re-launched Lisbon Strategy make reference to the need for an inclusive labour market for job seekers and disadvantaged people. The measures identified for this include “early identification of needs, job search assistance, guidance and training as part of personalised action plans, provision of necessary social services to support the inclusion of those furthest away from the labour market and contribute to the eradication of poverty”. The absence of an explicit reference to ethnic

⁶⁵ Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs, *Joint Report on Social Inclusion*, 2004, p. 32, available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/docs/social_inclusion/final_joint_inclusion_report_2003_en.pdf (accessed November 2009, hereafter *Joint Report on Social Inclusion*). The other factors identified are “long-term dependence on low/inadequate income, long-term unemployment, low quality or absence of employment record, low level of education and training and illiteracy, growing up in a vulnerable family, disability, health problems and difficult living conditions, living in an area of multiple disadvantage, housing problems and homelessness”.

⁶⁶ *Joint Report on Social Inclusion*, p. 33. The other two groups are older male and female workers whose skills became redundant, and young men and women in the 16–25 age group without formal competencies.

⁶⁷ See Mary-Anne Kate and Jan Niessen, *Guide to Locating Migration Policy in the European Commission (2nd Edition)*, Migration Policy Group (MPG) and the European Programme for Integration and Migration of the European Network of European Foundations (EPIM), 2008, available at: http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/137.GuidetoLocatingMigrationPoliciesintheECII_31.10.08.pdf (accessed November 2009).

minorities in the guidelines has led to criticism that “ethnic minorities are simply not taken into account in the pursuit of economic growth”.⁶⁸ However, the Council decision adopting the Guidelines notes the need for “particular attention [...] to significantly reducing employment gaps for people at a disadvantage, including [...] between third-country nationals and EU citizens”. It also makes clear that “combating discrimination [...] and integrating immigrants and minorities are particularly essential”.⁶⁹ The 2005 Joint Report on Social Inclusion urged Member States to give priority to “overcoming discrimination and increasing the integration of [...] ethnic minorities and immigrants” in developing national action plans.⁷⁰

Migrants have been an important focus of the EU’s Social Inclusion Strategy and the Open Method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social Inclusion. The Renewed Social Agenda includes a commitment to the economic and social inclusion of migrants and includes €1.2 billion to support migrants’ participation in the labour market and socially. Unlike the European Integration Fund, the money here is not restricted to TCNs. Financial support for initiatives addressing social exclusion is available from the European Social Fund, one of the EU’s four Structural Funds set up to promote economic and social cohesion. The fund identifies “reinforcing social inclusion by combating discrimination and facilitating access to the labour market for disadvantaged people” among one its four key areas for action. Support for projects supporting migrant and ethnic-minority participation in the labour market was also made available through the EQUAL initiatives which funded Development Partnerships (DPs) designed to facilitate immigrant integration largely through employment. The “Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity (PROGRESS)” also provides financial support for analysis to improve social policy and for exchanges of information and good practice.

2.2.4 Education

Education remains largely a matter within the competence of Member States. The focus of EU action in this area is on supporting the development of policy and exchange of good practice. The 2005 Communication, “A Common Agenda for Integration”, recognises the importance of education for the integration of migrants and the children of migrants. In 2008 the EU published a Green Paper on migration and education. Among the issues that it addresses is how to prevent the creation of segregated school settings, so as to improve equity in education, and how to accommodate the increased diversity of mother tongues and cultural perspectives and

⁶⁸ T. H. Malloy, *The Lisbon Strategy and Ethnic Minorities: Rights and Economic Growth*, European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, 2005.

⁶⁹ Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (2005/600/EC), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 205/25, 6 August 2005.

⁷⁰ *Joint Report on Social Protection and Inclusion*, p. 10.

build intercultural skills. It also asks what role the EU can play in helping to adapt teaching skills and build bridges with migrant families and communities.⁷¹

The Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training identifies four key objectives for EU education policy for 2020. They include “promoting equity, social cohesion and active citizenship”. The Framework provides that “Education and training systems should aim to ensure that all learners – including those from disadvantaged backgrounds, those with special needs and migrants – complete their education, including, where appropriate, through second chance education and the provision of more personalised learning”. Furthermore, education should “promote intercultural competences, democratic values and respect for fundamental rights and the environment, as well as combat all forms of discrimination, equipping all young people to interact positively with their peers from diverse backgrounds”.⁷²

The European Social Fund can be used to for action to increase access and participation of groups at risk of exclusion, specifically immigrants and ethnic minorities, in compulsory, higher and adult education. Furthermore, the “Comenius” programme aims to promote understanding of cultural diversity among teachers. It covers training courses for teachers, as well as the exchange for information and best practice. The priorities of the current Comenius programme include teaching diverse groups of pupils and early and pre-primary learning.

2.2.5 Intercultural dialogue

The development of the EU agenda on intercultural dialogue also comes within the responsibility of DG Education and Culture. This relatively new area of EU activity has developed significantly with the adoption of 2008 as the Year of Intercultural Dialogue. According to the Decision of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008), intercultural dialogue is crucial to “strengthen respect for cultural diversity and deal with the complex reality in our societies and the coexistence of different cultural identities and beliefs”. Furthermore, “it is important to highlight the contribution of different cultures to the Member States’ heritage and way of life and to recognise that culture and intercultural dialogue are essential for learning to live together in harmony.”⁷³ Support for intercultural dialogue is located in the wider EU Culture programme for 2007–2013 entitled “Crossing Borders – Connecting Cultures”. The aim of the programme is to

⁷¹ Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper *Migration & mobility: challenges and opportunities for EU education systems*, COM(2008) 423 final, Brussels, 3 July 2008, available at http://ec.europa.eu/education/school21/com423_en.pdf (accessed November 2009).

⁷² Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (‘ET 2020’) (2009/C 119/02).

⁷³ Decision No. 1983/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008).

“contribute to the emergence of a European citizenship through the promotion of cultural co-operation in Europe, by bringing to the fore the cultural area Europeans have in common, with its shared heritage and rich cultural diversity”.

Developing the use of intercultural dialogue as a tool for integration was considered by the EU Ministerial Meeting on integration in Potsdam in May 2007. The subsequent Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 2007 in its Conclusions called on States to “begin a regular exchange [...] on their experience in the field of intercultural dialogue as an instrument for fostering the successful integration of citizens of different origin, culture and religion in Europe”. It called for a report looking into establishing “a flexible procedure capable of reacting to intercultural problems or conflicts with a potential cross-border dimension”.⁷⁴ It also recommended that one of the three meetings of the NCPs on integration be dedicated to intercultural dialogue.

2.2.6 Urban policy

The areas with large Muslim populations are often areas that experience high levels of deprivation and are therefore likely to be the focus of EU policies coming within the ambit of DG Regional Policy. Its policies focus on deprived areas and recognise the need to focus attention on particular disadvantaged groups, including ethnic-minority groups. Its Communication on Cohesion Policy and Cities, for example, provides guidelines on action that cities should take in addressing cohesion. In respect of access to services, the guidelines recognise that “certain groups may need help in accessing healthcare and social services”. This includes “immigrant and disadvantaged populations” who may “face barriers in accessing [...] services”. The guidelines recommend “increased participation of persons with different backgrounds and of different ages, in the planning and delivery of these services”, as needed to prevent discrimination and ensure that services take account of cultural barriers.⁷⁵ On improving employability by raising levels of educational achievement and training, the guidelines note that “cities can target support at those groups which disproportionately suffer disadvantages in the labour market (e.g. early school leavers, low-skilled young people, older workers and certain groups of immigrants and ethnic minorities)”.⁷⁶

DG Regional policy supports the exchange of information and best practice through several mechanisms, including an urban action programme, URBACT, the European network Cities for Local Integration Policy (CLIP) and Integrating Cities. Priorities for the current URBACT programme include developing “attractive and cohesion cities”. The CLIP network brings together city practitioners, and through common

⁷⁴ Conclusions of Justice and Home Affairs Council 12/13 June 2007, Conclusion 10.

⁷⁵ Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament, (2006) *Cohesion Policy and cities: the urban contribution to growth and jobs in the regions*, COM(2006) 385 final (hereafter, Communication on Cohesion Policy and Cities).

⁷⁶ Communication on Cohesion Policy and Cities.

methodology explores with them how they address particular issues relating to integration. Previous CLIP reports have covered equal opportunities in employment and housing. While CLIP focuses on learning across cities, the Integrating Cities programme aims to increase communication and dialogue between, local, national and European practitioners. The range of issues that it has covered include: housing; implementation of the CBPs; migrant entrepreneurs; supporting migrant children; and catering for multicultural dietary requirements in public services.

2.2.7 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The Charter of Fundamental Rights was first proclaimed in 2000. While the Charter exists separately from the EU treaties, the Lisbon Treaty amends article 6 TEU, and provides that the Charter has the same legal value as the other EU treaties. The Charter contains 54 articles grouped into seven chapters: dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens' rights, justice and general provisions. With the exception of chapter five (citizens' rights), the Charter applies to all individuals in the EU irrespective of nationality. The rights in the Charter apply to both the actions of the European institutions and to Member States when they are acting to give effect to EC law. The Charter does not extend the competences of the EU but instead provides a framework to protect individual rights within the Union and its Member States in those areas where the EU has competence. Of particular relevance in the context of social inclusion and integration of Muslims is the Charter's prohibition of discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of religion and race (article 21). Furthermore, article 10 recognises the right to "freedom of thought, conscience and religion", which includes the right "to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance". This is further reinforced by article 22, which places an obligation on the Union to "respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity". However, article 53 allows for restrictions on the exercise of rights and freedoms in the Charter, where a restriction is "necessary and genuinely meet[s] objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others".

2.2.8 Counter terrorism

As well as in integration, DG Justice, Liberty and Security (DG JLS) has taken responsibility in the area of policing and security, including counter terrorism. The initial focus of EU action was in developing judicial and police cooperation. Measures adopted included the creation of the "European Arrest Warrant"⁷⁷ and the "Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism"⁷⁸ and measures to combat terrorist funding and enhance transport safety.

⁷⁷ Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA).

⁷⁸ Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism.

Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 the European Council adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism and created a European “Counterterrorism Coordinator” (CTC).⁷⁹

The Declaration set out seven strategic objectives and called on the EU to develop an action plan to combat terrorism. Strategic objectives six called on the Action Plan “to address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism”. Measures identified as falling within this included: the identification of factors which contribute to recruitment to terrorism; investigating the links between extreme religious or political beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other factors, and support for terrorism; and developing and implementing a strategy to promote cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and the Islamic World.

The involvement of European-born Muslims in the attacks that took place in London in 2005 contributed to an increased focus on preventing radicalisation and terrorist recruitment within Europe. In September 2005 the Commission published a Communication on addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation. This noted that the “main threat currently comes from terrorism that is underlined by an abusive interpretation of Islam”. The Communication notes that a European Strategy on violent radicalisation would include a focus on employment, social exclusion and integration issues, equal opportunities and non-discrimination and inter-cultural dialogue as well as broadcast media, the internet, education and youth engagement. The Communication goes on to argue that the failure to integrate provides “fertile ground for violent radicalisation to develop”. Furthermore, “alienation from both the country of origin and the host country can make it more likely for a person to look for a sense of identity and belonging elsewhere such as in a powerful extremist ideology”.

The June 2009 report of the Counter Terrorism Coordinator notes that a Radicalisation and Recruitment Action Plan – Implementation Plan has been drafted. It proposes action in six areas, including mapping the current situation across EU Member States on Imam training to be led by Spain, and work on the role of local authorities in preventing radicalisation led by the Netherlands. Sweden is taking the lead on examining the role of police officers in recognising and countering radicalization, which will focus on the key role of community policing.

⁷⁹ Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, 24 March 2004
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf>

3. COHESION, BELONGING, DISCRIMINATION AND INTERACTIONS

Later chapters of this report examine integration in specific policy areas (employment, education, health, housing and policing) or spheres of activity (civil and political participation), but the focus here is on more general experiences and measures of integration. This chapter, using data from the OSI survey, begins by examining levels of cohesion in the 11 cities. It then looks at respondents' sense of personal identity and belonging to the neighbourhood, city and state. These are important elements, as an individual may be integrated into the labour market but may not identify with the area, city or country in which he or she lives.⁸⁰ The chapter then turns to perceptions and experiences of discrimination and unfair treatment. The CBPs recognise that unfair treatment and discrimination can be a barrier to full participation. The chapter concludes by looking at interactions of respondents with people from a different ethnic or religious group to themselves. The CBPs refer to the importance of "frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens" as a "fundamental mechanism for integration". There is also evidence that meaningful contact and interaction between people of different ethnic and cultural groups can help overcome prejudice and challenge the stereotypes that form the basis of discrimination.⁸¹ The results from the questionnaires are analysed to see where the views of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents coincide and where they differ. In some instances, differences in the Muslim sample are explored further: in particular, differences between male and female respondents, and those born in the EU state where the research is carried out and those born abroad. In asking the questions, a distinction was made between a person's "neighbourhood", that is the few streets immediately around where they live, and their "local area", the area within 15–20 minutes walking distance of their home. The questionnaire data are supplemented by insights from the focus groups, and interviews with key stakeholders that were carried out across the 11 cities.

3.1 Cohesion

Research suggesting that ethnic diversity undermines social cohesion remains controversial.⁸² Several questions from the OSI questionnaire explore levels of social cohesion in a neighbourhood and local area. These includes questions about the extent

⁸⁰ F. Heckmann, and W. Bosswick, *Integration and Integration Policies*, an INTPOL feasibility study for the IMESCO Network of Excellence, 2005, available at <http://www.imiscoe.org> (accessed November 2009).

⁸¹ T. F. Pettigrew and L. R. Tropp, "A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), 2006, pp. 751–783.

⁸² See R.D. Putnam, "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century. The 2006 Johan Skytte prize lecture", *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2), 2007, 137–174; N. Letki, "Does diversity erode social cohesion? Social capital and race in British neighbourhoods", *Political Studies* 56(1), 2008, 99–126.

to which people feel that others in their neighbourhood are willing to help and support each other and the extent to which it is felt that people of different backgrounds get on well together in their local area.⁸³ Other indicators of cohesion covered by the questionnaire are the perceptions of close bonds, trust and shared values among people in the neighbourhood. The picture to emerge from the OSI survey is mixed. There are both positive indications of high levels of social cohesion as well as signs that further efforts to develop and support cohesion may be needed.

The most positive indicators of cohesion are in response to the questions of whether people in a neighbourhood are willing to help each other and whether people from different backgrounds get on well together in the local area. Three-quarters of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents across the 11 cities “agree” or “strongly agree” that people in the neighbourhood are willing to help each other.⁸⁴

A significant majority of Muslim (69 per cent) and non-Muslim (67 per cent) respondents also “agree” or “strongly agree” that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together.

⁸³ The two questions measure similar attitudes and views, however, the first focuses on the *neighbourhood* level (where it may be more realistic to expect to give and receive support and help from others); the second probes the respondent’s more general perception of relations between people of different backgrounds in their wider *local area*.

⁸⁴ See Table 2 for more detailed tables of OSI research.

Table 3. Do people from different backgrounds get on well together here? (D2)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Strongly agree		13.3%	11.4%	12.3%
Agree		55.7%	55.3%	55.5%
Disagree		18.1%	19.0%	18.6%
Strongly disagree		3.6%	4.0%	3.8%
Don't know		7.9%	8.6%	8.3%
Too few people in this local area		0.8%	0.9%	0.9%
People in this area are all from the same background		0.5%	0.7%	0.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1089	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

Among both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, a greater proportion of those born in the country compared with those born abroad agreed that their local area was one where people from different backgrounds got on well together.

Table 4. Do people from different backgrounds get on well together here? (D2)

	Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non- Muslims born in the EU state	Non- Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Strongly agree	13.2%	13.3%	11.7%	10.4%	12.3%
Agree	62.4%	52.4%	56.1%	53.2%	55.5%
Disagree	15.3%	19.5%	18.3%	20.9%	18.6%
Strongly disagree	2.4%	4.2%	3.7%	5.1%	3.8%
Don't know	5.6%	9.1%	8.7%	8.4%	8.3%
Too few people in this local area	0.5%	0.9%	0.9%	1.0%	0.9%
People in this area are all from the same background	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%	1.0%	0.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	372	737	792	297

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, on questions whether the local community is “close-knit“, whether people can be trusted or have shared values, the answers are generally less positive and differences emerge in the views of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. A closer examination of the number of respondents who “agree” or “strongly agree” that they live in a close-knit neighbourhood reveals that this view is supported by a greater proportion of Muslim respondents (50 per cent) than non-Muslim respondents (41 per cent).⁸⁵

In Leicester, Berlin and Rotterdam the majority of both Muslims and non-Muslims hold this view. Marseille was the only city where non-Muslim respondents were more likely than Muslims to feel that the neighbourhood was close-knit. Amsterdam had the highest proportion of Muslims (61 per cent) who viewed the neighbourhood as close-knit. Along with Antwerp, it was the city where the views of Muslims and non-Muslims differed the most. In Amsterdam, Muslims from a Moroccan background were more likely than those from Turkey to think the community was close-knit.

⁸⁵ See Table 5. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Levels of Trust

Levels of trust also appear to be high. There are, however, differences between the views of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Over half of all respondents felt that either “many” (29 per cent) or “some” (45 per cent) people in their neighbourhood could be trusted.

Table 6. Interviewees’ level of trust in local population (C9)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	21.4%	35.8%	28.5%
Some can be trusted	45.9%	44.0%	45.0%
A few can be trusted	26.3%	17.4%	21.9%
None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	6.4%	2.7%	4.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1093	2165

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, a greater proportion of non-Muslims (36 per cent) than Muslims (21 per cent) hold that “many” people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. Non-Muslims are 1.7 times more likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood (36 per cent non-Muslim respondents compared with 21 per cent of Muslim respondents), while Muslims are more likely to feel that “a few” can be trusted, and more likely to feel that “none” can be trusted (6 per cent Muslim, 3 per cent non-Muslim). These finds appear to be consistent with findings from the UK’s Home Office Citizenship Survey that Muslims (as well as Hindus and Sikhs) were significantly less likely than the general population to say that people in their neighbourhood could be trusted.⁸⁶ Responses do not differ greatly by gender, or place of birth for Muslims. However, among non-Muslim respondents, those born in the country are more likely (39 per cent) than those born abroad (26 per cent) to say that “many” people in the neighbourhood can be trusted.

⁸⁶ S. Kitchen, J. Michaelson, and N. Wood, *2005 Citizenship Survey: Community Cohesion Topic Report*, Department of Communities and Local Government, London, 2006, Table 17.

Table 7. Interviewees' level of trust in local population (C9)

	Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non- Muslims born in the EU state	Non- Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	18.7%	22.8%	39.5%	26.2%	28.5%
Some can be trusted	48.1%	44.9%	42.9%	46.9%	45.0%
A few can be trusted	28.3%	25.2%	16.5%	20.1%	21.9%
None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	4.9%	7.1%	1.2%	6.8%	4.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	364	729	778	294

Source: Open Society Institute data

Age is an important factor when it comes to determining levels of trust, particularly among the non-Muslim respondents. In general, the older age groups are more likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood than the younger age groups. Muslim respondents aged over 60 are 2.5 times more likely than those aged less than 20 to feel that “many” people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. For non-Muslims, they are three times more likely to do so.⁸⁷

This suggests that more may need to be done to support the development of trust among younger people.

Visible religious identity does not appear to have any significant impact on whether Muslims and non-Muslims trust their neighbours. In the Muslim group, respondents who display religious symbols are fractionally more likely to feel “some” people in the neighbourhood can be trusted, and fractionally less likely to feel a “few” or “none” can be trusted, in comparison with Muslims who display no religious symbols.

⁸⁷ See Table 8. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Table 9. Interviewees' level of trust in local population (C9)

		Yes	No	Total
Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	21.4%	21.5%	21.4%
	Some can be trusted	48.5%	44.4%	45.9%
	A few can be trusted	24.9%	27.0%	26.2%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	5.2%	7.1%	6.4%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	402	689	1091
Non-Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	37.0%	35.9%	36.0%
	Some can be trusted	41.3%	44.0%	43.9%
	A few can be trusted	15.2%	17.5%	17.4%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	6.5%	2.5%	2.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	46	1022	1068

Source: Open Society Institute data

When looking at all the cities, we find that levels of trust are high in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Leicester and Stockholm. In these cities over a quarter of Muslim and non-Muslim residents felt that “many” people in the neighbourhood could be trusted. Levels of trust are particularly low in Marseille and the London, where close to one-third of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents said that “few” people in their neighbourhood can be trusted.

Looking at employment we see some clear patterns emerging within the Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Within the Muslim group, respondents who displayed the highest levels of trust in their neighbours were those who were retired. This fits with earlier findings in which Muslims in the oldest age group tended to be those who trusted their neighbours the most. Muslims who displayed the lowest levels of trust tended to be

employed in a family business, be self-employed, or else were at home looking after the family.⁸⁸

In the non-Muslim group, respondents who felt “many” people could be trusted outnumbered those who only felt “a few” could be trusted in all groups barring those who were unemployed, at home looking after the family and permanently sick or disabled.

The views of both Muslims and non-Muslims are fairly similar on the question of whether people in the neighbourhood would work together to improve the neighbourhood. A majority of Muslim respondents (51 per cent) and 46 per cent of non-Muslim respondents did not think they would. Only 37 per cent of Muslim and 39 per cent of non-Muslim respondents agreed or strongly agreed that people would work to improve the neighbourhood.⁸⁹

For both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, the sense of trust in their neighbours increases the longer they have lived in the area. In the Muslim group, those who have lived in the area for 31+ years are over twice as likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood than those who have lived there for less than a year. In the non-Muslim group, the linear relationship is initially distorted by the very high proportion of respondents who trust “many people” in the area, but who have lived in the area for less than a year. Similarly, the proportion of respondents who trust “none” of their neighbours does not fall in accordance with the length of time lived in the area, as it does with the Muslim respondents. This suggests that length of residence impacts more directly on Muslim respondents’ sense of trust than non-Muslims.⁹⁰

The ethnic and religious composition of the neighbourhood also appears to affect levels of trust. Muslim respondents who see the local population as consisting mainly of their relatives, or of people sharing the same ethnicity and religion, are those most likely to trust “many people” in the neighbourhood. Muslim respondents who see the population as consisting of a mix of ethnicities and religions, or of people with a different ethnicity and religion from their own are least likely to trust any of their neighbours. In the non-Muslim group, those who see the local population as consisting mainly of people from a different ethnic and religious background are the group least likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood. Those who see the population as consisting mainly of people who share their ethnic and religious background, or just ethnic background, are those most likely to trust “many people” in their neighbourhood. This may indicate that the ethnicity of the neighbours plays an important role in Muslims’ and non-Muslims’ sense of trust. Further analysis shows that the sense of trust increases substantially if respondents feel that others in the

⁸⁸ See Table 10. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁸⁹ See Table 11. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹⁰ See Table 12. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

neighbourhood share the same values as them. This variable shows the clearest correlation yet with respondents' sense of trust in their neighbours.⁹¹

Shared Values

The CBPs provide that integration “implies respect for the basic values of the European Union” and that “everybody resident in the EU must adapt and adhere closely to the basic values of the European Union”. The TEU makes it clear that “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”.⁹² The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum also invites Member States to develop policies that stress respect for the fundamental values of the union.⁹³

In the OSI questionnaires, findings on whether respondents felt that people in their neighbourhood shared the same values are the least positive. The majority of respondents, both Muslim (50 per cent) and non-Muslim (55 per cent), do not think that people in the neighbourhood share the same values.

Table 14. Do people in this neighbourhood share the same values? (C10)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Strongly agree		4.0%	3.1%	3.6%
Agree		34.8%	25.0%	29.9%
Disagree		39.3%	41.8%	40.6%
Strongly disagree		10.6%	13.4%	12.0%
Don't know		11.4%	16.6%	14.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1088	2197

Source: Open Society Institute data

When looking at all the 11 cities, some differences emerge. Leicester emerges as a city with the highest proportion of Muslim (53 per cent) and non-Muslim (34 per cent) respondents agreeing that people share the same values. In Marseille, two-thirds of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents agreed that people in the neighbourhood do not share the same values.

⁹¹ See Table 13. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹² TEU, article 2.

⁹³ Council of the European Union, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, document 13440/08, 24 September 2008, available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st13/st13440.en08.pdf> (accessed November 2009), p. 6.

While many respondents do not feel that people in their neighbourhood share the same values, the data from the questionnaire do indicate that the respondents identify similar values as important to the country where they live. Furthermore, these values correspond to those that are identified as core European values, such as respect for the law, freedom of expression and equality of opportunity. Respondents were asked to identify the four values that they felt were the most important national values for the country in which they lived. Muslims and non-Muslim agree that freedom of expression, respect for the law and equality of opportunity are key national values, although for Muslim respondents respect for the law (64 per cent) was identified more frequently than freedom of expression (50 per cent), while for non-Muslims, freedom of expression (62 per cent) came ahead of respect for the law (54 per cent). A similar proportion of both Muslims (41 per cent) and non-Muslims (44 per cent) cited equality of opportunity. A significant difference between the two groups emerged in relation to respect for faiths and tolerance towards others. For Muslims, “respect for all faiths” came second, after respect of the law, as a key national value. It was identified as an important national value by 52 per cent of Muslim respondents but only 29 per cent of non-Muslim respondents. In fact the gap between the two groups is greatest for this value. Of non-Muslim respondents 50 per cent identified “tolerance towards others” as an important national value compared with 37 per cent of Muslim respondents.

Table 15. Most important national values of living in the country (D8)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Respect for the law	64.3%	54.0%	1300
Tolerance towards others	37.4%	49.9%	956
Freedom of speech and expression	49.5%	61.5%	1217
Respect for all faiths	51.6%	29.1%	889
Justice and fair play	28.7%	36.9%	719
Speaking the national language	33.0%	31.4%	707
Respect of people of different ethnic groups	31.2%	28.5%	655
Equality of opportunity	41.3%	44.1%	937
Pride in this country/patriotism	8.5%	12.4%	229
Voting in elections	19.2%	21.4%	445
Freedom from discrimination	27.7%	27.4%	605
Total	1110	1085	2195

Source: Open Society Institute data

When country of birth is taken into account, differences emerge in the views of Muslims born in the country and those born abroad. In particular, 48 per cent of Muslims born in the country identify equality of opportunity as a key value, compared with 38 per cent of those born abroad.⁹⁴

Further analysis which controls for religion, country of birth and gender shows that Muslim men born in the country are more likely than women or respondents born abroad and non-Muslims to cite freedom from discrimination as a key value.⁹⁵

Another difference that emerges once religion, gender and country of birth are taken into account is the high proportion of Muslim women born overseas (41 per cent) who identify learning the national language as a key national value, compared with Muslim men born abroad, those born in the country and non-Muslims.

The results present a complex picture, suggesting that a sense of shared values is not needed for people of different backgrounds to get on and help their neighbours. However, there appears to be a greater correlation between levels of trust and perceptions of whether people are willing to work together to improve the neighbourhood as well as a belief that people in neighbourhood share the same values. While freedom of expression, respect for the law and equal opportunities are values that are identified as important national values by Muslims and non-Muslims, a greater divergence exists in relation to respect for faiths.

3.2 Belonging

Belonging to the local area

The OSI survey asked respondents about their sense of belonging to their local area, the city and the country. The results show that a sense of belonging to the local area is strong and does not differ by religion.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ See Table 16. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹⁵ See Table 17. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹⁶ 28% of Muslims and non-Muslims felt a “very strong” sense of local belonging, while 43% felt a “fairly strong” sense of belonging, 20% “not very strongly”, and 6% “not strongly at all”.

Table 18. How strongly do you feel you belong to local area? (D4)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Very strongly	28.1%	27.8%	27.9%
Fairly strongly	42.5%	44.0%	43.3%
Not very strongly	19.7%	20.4%	20.1%
Not at all strongly	7.3%	6.0%	6.6%
Don't know	2.3%	1.8%	2.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1088

Source: Open Society Institute data

There is some difference between the response by gender and place of birth. Men were more likely than women to express a “very strong” sense of local belonging.⁹⁷

Those born in the country were more likely than those born abroad to have a “very” or “fairly” strong sense of local belonging.⁹⁸

The sense of belonging to the city was generally very strong. This supports the recent emphasis at the European level on the integration strategies of cities. In Antwerp over 90 per cent of respondents expressed a “very strong” or “fairly strong” sense of local belonging. This was also true for over two-thirds of respondents in all the other cities except Paris, Marseille and Stockholm. These results reflect the strong sense of submunicipal identity that exists in many cities, reflected in for example, the *kriezdenken* (neighbourhood culture) in Berlin.

Belonging to the city

Several observations can be made about the sense of belonging to the city. First, over three-quarters of Muslims and non-Muslims share a “very strong” or “fairly strong” sense of belonging to their city.

⁹⁷ See Table 19. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

⁹⁸ See Table 20. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Table 21. How strongly do you feel you belong to the city? (D5)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Very strongly		29.9%	36.6%	33.2%
Fairly strongly		42.3%	39.7%	41.0%
Not very strongly		19.0%	18.7%	18.8%
Not at all strongly		6.7%	4.0%	5.3%
Don't know		2.1%	1.1%	1.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1087	2197

Source: Open Society Institute data

For Muslims the pattern of belonging to the city is consistent with their attachment to the local area. Non-Muslim respondents, however, identify more intensely with the city than the local area. A breakdown by city finds that in seven of the 11 cities, Muslim respondents have a greater sense of belonging to the local area than the city. In Amsterdam, for both Muslims and non-Muslims, a strong sense of belonging to the local area is supplemented by an even stronger sense of belonging to the city. This may be one effect of a municipal campaign that emphasises an inclusive common city identity. In Stockholm, Paris and Marseille, the sense of belonging to the city was higher than for the local area. However, for the two French cities, the sense of local belonging was particularly low and compared with other cities, city-level belonging among both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents is low.⁹⁹ Furthermore, for both Muslims and non-Muslims, a greater proportion of those born in the country have a “very strong” sense of belonging to the city compared with those born abroad.

⁹⁹ In Marseille, 55% of Muslim and 68% of non-Muslims respondents said they have a “very” or “fairly strong” sense of belonging to the city, in Paris this response was given by 54% of Muslim and 62% of non-Muslim respondents.

Table 22. How strongly do you feel you belong to the city? (D5)

		Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non- Muslims born in the EU state	Non- Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Very strongly		35.1%	27.3%	39.4%	29.3%	33.2%
Fairly strongly		45.0%	41.0%	38.7%	42.1%	41.0%
Not very strongly		13.7%	21.7%	17.6%	21.5%	18.8%
Not at all strongly		3.5%	8.3%	3.0%	6.4%	5.3%
Don't know		2.7%	1.8%	1.3%	0.7%	1.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	373	737	790	297	2197

Source: Open Society Institute data

National Belonging

When it comes to the question of a sense of national belonging, a more complex picture emerges. A majority of both Muslim (61.3 per cent) and non-Muslim (73 per cent) respondents shared a “very” or “fairly” strong sense of national belonging.

Table 23. How strongly do you feel you belong to the country? (D6)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Very strongly		24.4%	35.9%	30.1%
Fairly strongly		36.9%	35.6%	36.3%
Not very strongly		25.1%	20.4%	22.8%
Not at all strongly		10.1%	6.4%	8.3%
Don't know		3.4%	1.7%	2.5%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1088	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, Non-Muslim respondents (36 per cent) are more likely than Muslim respondents (24 per cent) to say they have a “very strong” sense of national belonging; 36 per cent of Muslim respondents said that their sense of belonging to the country is “not very” or “not at all” strong, compared with 27 per cent of non-Muslim respondents. Country of birth and gender also affect outcomes for a sense of belonging. When looking at the Muslim and non-Muslim groups, in each group women born in

the country have a greater sense of national belonging than male respondents or respondents born abroad.¹⁰⁰

It is clear from the data for all 11 cities that for Muslims local and city-level belonging is stronger than national belonging. For non-Muslims, the levels of national belonging are greater than, or around the same as, city or local belonging. The three exceptions to this are Berlin, Hamburg and Stockholm. In the case of Hamburg, a greater sense of national belonging was found among Muslim respondents (52 per cent) than non-Muslim respondents (36 per cent).

National and Cultural Identification

The OSI survey also examined cultural identification: the extent to which respondents see themselves and feel others see them as nationals (that is, British, French, German, etc.). The survey found that 49 per cent of Muslim respondents expressed cultural identification with the state (saw themselves as British, French, etc.).

Table 25. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.]? (D9)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Yes		49.0%	77.1%	63.0%
No		51.0%	22.9%	37.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1105	1087	2192

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, only 24 per cent felt that others saw them as nationals.

Table 26. Do most other people in this country see you as [British, French, etc.]? (D10)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Yes		24.5%	74.8%	49.5%
No		75.5%	25.2%	50.5%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1101	1084	2185

Source: Open Society Institute data

¹⁰⁰ 69% of Muslim and 75% of non-Muslim women born in the country felt a “very” or “fairly” strong sense of national belonging compared to 73% of non-Muslim men and 63% of Muslim men born in the country. See Table 24. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

The gap identified by these findings should be of particular concern to policymakers, as it suggests that there are a significant group of Muslims in these cities who see themselves as nationals but do not feel others see them in this way.

Results in the 11 cities differ substantially.¹⁰¹ Cities where the majority of Muslim respondents saw themselves as nationals included Leicester (82 per cent), the London (72 per cent), Amsterdam (59 per cent), Marseille (58 per cent) and Antwerp (55 per cent). Cities where only a minority of Muslims saw themselves as nationals were Hamburg (22 per cent), Berlin (25 per cent), Copenhagen (40 per cent), Paris (41 per cent), Stockholm (41 per cent) and Rotterdam (43 per cent).

The two English cities, London and Leicester, had the largest proportion of Muslim respondents who saw themselves as nationals (82 per cent in Leicester and 72 per cent in the London) as well as the highest proportion of Muslim respondents (40 per cent) who felt that they were likely to be seen as nationals by others in their country. However, these are also the cities where difference between how respondents perceived themselves and how they felt others perceived them was greatest.

Comments in the focus groups also reveal how the desire to be seen as belonging, combined with the anxiety that one will never be accepted, can be a source of frustration:

No, no they don't see us as British. Not only that, even our children's children and no matter how many generations will go, I am fearful they will never see us as British [...] in some cases I think they are just tolerating us as opposed to accepting us and there's a big difference. (OSI focus group participant, Leicester)

Few Muslim respondents in the two German cities, Hamburg and Berlin, saw themselves as German (25 per cent in Berlin and 22 per cent in Hamburg) and even fewer felt that they were seen as German by others (11 per cent in Berlin and 11 per cent in Hamburg). At the same time, for these two cities, the gap between how the respondents' sense of cultural identification and how they anticipated others seeing them is among the narrowest.¹⁰²

As may be expected, the country of birth correlates with a sense of national identification: just over two-thirds of European-born Muslims felt a sense of national identification, compared with less than 40 per cent of those born abroad.¹⁰³

In most cities a majority of Muslims born in the country expressed a sense of national cultural identification. This was not, however, true for Hamburg and Berlin.¹⁰⁴ In Berlin, only 35 per cent of German-born Muslims identified themselves as German; in Hamburg,

¹⁰¹ See Table 27. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹⁰² Antwerp 35%; Amsterdam 28% Paris and Marseille 25%; Rotterdam and Stockholm 18%; Copenhagen 15%.

¹⁰³ See Table 28. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹⁰⁴ See Table 29. and Table 30. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

this figure was 46 per cent. By contrast, 94 per cent of Leicester’s UK-born Muslims said they saw themselves as British. Although the majority of Muslim respondents did not believe others saw them as British, Muslims born in the EU states were 2.2 times more likely to respond positively in comparison with those born elsewhere.

There is a clear correlation amongst Muslim respondents between educational achievement and cultural identification, whereby those with higher levels of education are more likely to see themselves as nationals.

Table 31. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.], Muslim respondents by highest level of education completed (I11)

	Yes	No	Total
No formal education	30.8%	69.2%	100.0%
Primary	42.0%	58.0%	100.0%
Secondary	51.9%	48.1%	100.0%
University	54.1%	45.9%	100.0%

Source: Open Society Institute data

The data suggests that increased levels of education correlate with a greater sense of cultural identification with the state. For example, while less than one third (30.8 per cent) of those with no formal education see themselves as nationals, over half (54.1 per cent) of those with a university degree see themselves as nationals. A similar pattern can be seen when figures for respondents who felt they are viewed by others as being British, French, or German, etc. are examined.

Table 32. Do most other people in this country see you as [British, French, etc.], Muslim respondents by level of education completed (D10)

	Yes	No	Total
No formal education	15.4%	84.6%	100.0%
Primary	19.4%	80.6%	100.0%
Secondary	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
University	29.9%	70.1%	100.0%
Total	Per cent	24.5%	75.5%
	Count	269	830

Source: Open Society Institute data

The data also indicate that employment, particularly full-time employment, is a key factor for whether or not a person culturally identifies himself or herself as a national of the country, and whether he or she feels others see them in the same way.¹⁰⁵

Of Muslims in full-time employment, 55.3 per cent culturally identify themselves as nationals, as do 55.1 per cent of Muslims in full-time education. By contrast, only 34.8 per cent of Muslims who are retired and 41.5 per cent of Muslims who are at home looking after house and family do the same. Muslims in full-time employment, training or education are the only groups where the majority of people see themselves as being nationals. Those who are in part-time employment, or are unemployed and looking for work are almost equally divided over whether or not they feel themselves nationals. Aside from those working unpaid in family businesses (too few numbers to be statistically significant), the groups with the lowest proportions of respondents who see themselves as nationals are those who are self-employed, retired or at home looking after the family. Those in full-time and part-time employment and students are most likely to feel that others consider them to be nationals of the country. In contrast, those who are permanently sick, are at home with the family or self-employed are only half as likely as the first three groups to feel the same way.

In the context of increased hostility to visible manifestations of religious identity, one important finding from the survey is that neither visible religious identity nor active religious practice makes any significant statistical impact on respondents' cultural identification).¹⁰⁶

**Table 37. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.],
Muslim respondents by display of visible religious identity (D9)**

		Yes	No	Total
Yes		48.2%	51.8%	100.0%
No		49.6%	50.4%	100.0%
Total	Per cent	49.0%	51.0%	100.0%
	Count	541	562	1103

Source: Open Society Institute data

¹⁰⁵ See Table 33. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹⁰⁶ This is consistent with analysis of the British Home Office Citizenship survey which finds that "religious practice" makes no difference to identification with Britain among South Asian and Caribbean groups, Rahsaan Maxwell, "Caribbean and South Asian identification with British society: the importance of perceived discrimination", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, forthcoming in 2009 (hereafter, Maxwell, "Caribbean and South Asian identification with British society"). Also see Table 34., Table 35. and Table 36. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

The OSI survey indicates differences between levels of national belonging and national cultural identification. In most cities, a greater proportion of Muslim respondents indicated a sense of belonging to the country than a cultural identification of themselves as nationals. For example, in Amsterdam, 79 per cent of Muslim respondents felt a “very” or “fairly” strong sense of belonging to the Netherlands, but only 59 per cent identified themselves as Dutch. The qualitative data from focus groups also indicate that it is possible for a person to have a sense of belonging to the country without culturally identifying himself or herself as a national: “Being German means ethnicity, that’s why I can’t be German, but I can be a German citizen.” The exceptions to this are the French and British cities, particularly Paris and Leicester, where levels of cultural identification as French or British were higher than respondents’ sense of belonging to France or the UK. In Paris a majority of Muslim respondents (58 per cent) regarded themselves as French, but only a minority (40 per cent) felt they belonged to France. In Leicester, 73 per cent of Muslim respondents had a sense of belonging to the UK while an even higher proportion, 83 per cent, saw themselves as British.

Barriers to National Belonging and Identification

The research findings suggest that the focus on acquiring the skills to speak the national language in the CBPs and the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum is shared by Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims (21 per cent) and non-Muslims (34 per cent) share the view that not speaking the national language is the most significant barrier to being seen as nationals.

Table 38. What is the main barrier to being [British, French, etc.]? (D13)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Not speaking the national	21.0%	34.3%	27.6%
Being born abroad	10.1%	6.2%	8.1%
Being from an ethnic	20.8%	13.0%	16.9%
Accent/way of speaking	3.1%	3.6%	3.4%
Not being Christian	5.9%	0.5%	3.2%
There aren’t any barriers	5.4%	7.1%	6.3%
None of these	3.3%	7.0%	5.1%
Don’t Know	3.7%	4.3%	4.0%
Other	26.8%	24.1%	25.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1102	1072

Source: Open Society Institute data

For non-Muslims, the results for the effect of the country of birth are that those born in the country (40 per cent) are twice as likely to view a lack of competence in the national language as a barrier to belonging as those born outside the country (20 per cent).¹⁰⁷

Muslim and non-Muslims held similar views on the importance of speaking the national language and that this was an important national value. When asked what they considered to be the most important national values, 366 Muslim respondents and 341 non-Muslim respondents chose “speaking the national language” as one of their four options at 33 per cent and 31.4 per cent of the total for each group.¹⁰⁸

Further analysis of the respondents showed that Muslims and non-Muslim women born outside the EU state were those most likely to select language as a key value, while Muslims and non-Muslims aged 20–29 years was the age group most likely to consider national language an important value.

Table 40. Importance of national language as a cultural value (D8)

	Speaking the national language is one of the most important national values
Muslim Male born in the EU state	29.60%
Muslim Female born in the EU state	30.90%
Muslim Male born outside the EU state	28.30%
Muslim Female born outside the EU state	41.10%
Non-Muslim Male born in the EU state	28.30%
Non-Muslim Female born in the EU state	31.90%
Non-Muslim Male born outside the EU state	33.30%
Non-Muslim Female born outside the EU state	36.10%
Total count	707

Source: Open Society Institute data

The distribution of educational qualifications among the language respondents mirrors that of the entire sample. In terms of economic status, Muslims who are employed part-time, retired, unemployed or at home looking after the family are slightly more likely than the average to consider language a key national value.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ See Table 39. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹⁰⁸ For more information see Table 15.

¹⁰⁹ See Table 41. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Far fewer non-Muslims (13 per cent) than Muslims (21 per cent) see ethnicity as a barrier to national belonging.¹¹⁰

However, the views of non-Muslims differ by country of birth, with those born outside the country (18 per cent) more likely than those born in the country (11 per cent) to feel that ethnicity or race exclude people from national belonging.

The views of non-Muslim respondents born abroad are closer to those of Muslim respondents. Among Muslim respondents, the perception of ethnicity as a barrier to national cultural identification differs by gender and country of birth. Men and those born in Europe are more likely to see ethnicity as a barrier to inclusion, and almost a third (32 per cent) of European-born Muslim men feel that “ethnicity/not being white” is the main barrier to being seen as nationals.¹¹¹

This is expressed by one respondent from Hamburg in the following terms: “It doesn’t matter where I come from. As long as I am black I am an African.” Thus, for Muslims and non-Muslims having been born abroad and not speaking the national language, although it is an important factor of exclusion or inclusion, sits alongside being from an ethnic minority or not being white. Very few non-Muslims (1 per cent) and Muslims (6 per cent) think that not being Christian is a barrier to national belonging.

The findings in the OSI survey are consistent with the analysis of the European Social Survey, which suggests that alongside education and employment, language and cultural values are important symbolic boundaries for national belonging in Europe:

As second generations of non-white and non-Christian immigrants come of age, racial and religious distinctions may not only become less conspicuous but also less politically tenable. While public discourse necessarily shifts from the accommodation to the integration of immigrant populations, natives may become more concerned about the longevity of their linguistic and cultural identity. Or, natives may realize that language and culture guarantee the privileges of group status that were previously “protected” by race or religion.¹¹²

Of course, such boundaries may provide a mask for racial and religious discrimination.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ For more information see Table 38.

¹¹¹ See Table 42. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹¹² Christopher Bail, “The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries Against Immigrants in Europe”, *American Sociological Review* 73, 2008, pp. 37–59, p. 55 (hereafter, Bail, “The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries”).

¹¹³ Bail, “The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries”, p. 56.

3.3 Discrimination

The Fundamental Rights Agency's European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS)¹¹⁴ provides the most comprehensive and coherent set of data on Muslim experiences of discrimination. A preliminary analysis of data from 14 countries¹¹⁵ finds that "discrimination in employment and private services tend to dominate people's experiences of everyday discrimination".¹¹⁶

Understanding the nature of discrimination Muslims face is important, as EU Directives only require states to protect against discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in relation to employment, while ethnic and racial discrimination is prohibited in a wider range of areas, including housing, education and the provision of goods and services. This may reflect the fact that across Europe ethnic discrimination is viewed as the most widespread form of discrimination. In the Eurobarometer Survey, 62 per cent of respondents agreed that ethnic discrimination was widespread.¹¹⁷ Similar findings emerge from the OSI survey, where 75 per cent of respondents said that there was either "a lot" (30 per cent) or a "fair amount" (45 per cent) of racial prejudice in the country; 17 per cent felt there was "a little" and 2 per cent thought there was no racial prejudice.

In the Eurobarometer survey, 48 per cent felt that racial prejudice is now more widespread compared with five years ago. In the OSI survey, the views of Muslims and non-Muslims differ on changes in the level of racial prejudice compared with five years ago.¹¹⁸

Muslims are more likely (55 per cent) than non-Muslims (43 per cent) to think that levels of racial prejudice had increased, while non-Muslim respondents (34 per cent) were more likely than Muslim respondents (24 per cent) to think the levels had stayed the same. In both groups a similar proportion (11 per cent of Muslims and 15 per cent of non-Muslims) felt that levels of racial prejudice had decreased over the previous five years.

¹¹⁴ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*, Vienna, FRA, 2009, available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/EU-MIDIS_MUSLIMS_EN.pdf (accessed November 2009, hereafter, FRA, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*). 23,500 immigrant and ethnic minority people were surveyed across all EU Member States in 2008. 5,000 people from the majority population living in the same areas as minorities were also interviewed in 10 Member States, to allow for comparisons of results concerning some key questions.

¹¹⁵ The analysis covers data from all the states covered by the OSI research with the exception of the UK. It also includes Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Slovenia, and Spain.

¹¹⁶ FRA, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*, p. 7.

¹¹⁷ European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer 296, Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Attitudes and Experiences*, Brussels, European Commission, 2008 (hereafter, Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*).

¹¹⁸ See Table 43. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

In the OSI survey, respondents were asked to identify the group most likely to be the target of racial prejudice.¹¹⁹ Although this was asked as an open question, 60 per cent of Muslim respondents and 40 per cent of non-Muslim respondents identified “Muslims” among the groups most likely to face racial prejudice. Almost half (45 per cent) of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents identified “black people” as the primary target of racial prejudice.

In the Eurobarometer survey, 42 per cent of respondents said that they felt discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief was widespread.¹²⁰ However, there was variation across countries. Discrimination based on religion/belief is seen as most widespread of all in Denmark (62 per cent), followed by France (57 per cent) and the UK (56 per cent).¹²¹ Overall, 38 per cent of respondents felt that religious discrimination was more widespread than five years ago.¹²² However, there are several countries where a majority of respondents consider religious discrimination to be more widespread than five years ago: the Netherlands, Denmark (66 per cent), the United Kingdom (53 per cent), France (51 per cent) and Belgium (51 per cent).¹²³

Table 45. How widespread is discrimination on the basis of religious belief?

	Very widespread	Fairly widespread	Fairly rare	Very rare	Non-existent	Don't Know	Count
Belgium	14%	39%	30%	14%	2%	1%	1012
Denmark	18%	44%	26%	11%	–	1%	1032
Germany	6%	28%	38%	24%	2%	2%	1562
France	12%	45%	32%	6%	1%	4%	1054
The Netherlands	12%	43%	34%	10%	–	1%	1023
Sweden	8%	43%	37%	9%	–	3%	1007
United Kingdom	14%	42%	34%	5%	1%	4%	1306
EU 27	9%	33%	34%	17%	4%	3%	26746

Source: Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Attitudes and Experiences*, 2008

¹¹⁹ See Table 44. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹²⁰ Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p.7.

¹²¹ Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p.66.

¹²² Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p.7.

¹²³ Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p.68.

Perceptions of the level of religious discrimination and prejudice were higher in the OSI survey, where 70 per cent of non-Muslim respondents felt that there was either “a lot” (29 per cent) or “a fair amount” (41 per cent) of religious prejudice in the country.

Table 46. Current level of religious prejudice in the country (H4)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A lot		42.7%	29.3%	36.1%
A fair amount		37.1%	41.1%	39.1%
A little		11.8%	18.3%	15.0%
None		2.0%	4.1%	3.0%
Don't know		6.4%	7.2%	6.8%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1089	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

The majority of Muslim respondents (56 per cent) also said that religious prejudice had increased compared with five years ago.¹²⁴

Respondents were almost unanimous in identifying Muslims as the main target of religious prejudice. A quarter of non-Muslim respondents and 15 per cent of Muslim respondents also identified Jews as a target of religious prejudice.¹²⁵

The identification by respondents in the OSI survey of “Muslims” as the target of both racial and religious prejudice is an indication of the difficulties of disentangling ethnic from religious discrimination and suggests that Muslims face multiple or intersectional discrimination.¹²⁶ The FRA analysis for the EU-MIDIS data finds that in the preceding 12 months, a third of Muslims had reported experiencing discrimination based on ethnicity alone, while 10 per cent had identified religious discrimination alone.¹²⁷ However, the largest group, 43 per cent, encountered discrimination on the grounds of both race and religion.¹²⁸ Similarly, although a large proportion of Muslims

¹²⁴ See Table 47. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹²⁵ See Table 48. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹²⁶ The Eurobarometer survey finds that those who experience discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief are also the most likely to experience discrimination on multiple grounds, Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p. 15.

¹²⁷ In the Eurobarometer Survey, 12% of respondents who said they belonged to a religious minority reported experiencing discrimination on the grounds of religion in the preceding 12 months, Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p. 14.

¹²⁸ FRA, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*, p. 6.

in Europe are also migrants, the prejudice about Muslims is not the same as the prejudice towards migrants. Analysis of data from the European Values study shows that “aggregate levels of anti-Muslim prejudice were clearly higher than the levels of anti-immigrant prejudice”.¹²⁹

The OSI data also suggest differences in the perception of racial discrimination in the Muslim sample when gender and country of birth are considered. The data show that European-born Muslims are the group most likely (34 per cent) to feel that there is “a lot” of racial prejudice in the country, and Muslim men born abroad are the group least likely (26 per cent) to think there is “a lot” of racial prejudice in the country.¹³⁰

There were also differences in the Muslim sample in their perceptions of religious prejudice when gender and country of birth were considered. Half of European-born Muslims thought there was “a lot” of religious prejudice, compared with 40 per cent of Muslims born abroad.

Table 50. Current level of religious prejudice in the country (H4)

		Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non- Muslims born in the EU state	Non- Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
A lot		49.7%	39.2%	29.2%	29.6%	36.1%
A fair amount		36.8%	37.2%	42.4%	37.7%	39.1%
A little		8.1%	13.7%	17.8%	19.5%	15.0%
None		1.6%	2.2%	3.8%	5.1%	3.0%
Don't know		3.8%	7.7%	6.8%	8.1%	6.8%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	372	737	792	297	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

As for gender, European-born Muslim women are the most likely (51 per cent) to say there is “a lot” of religious prejudice in the country, and Muslim men born abroad are the least likely (38 per cent) to feel that there is “a lot” of religious prejudice. Among Muslim respondents, 75 per cent of European-born Muslims felt levels of prejudice had increased, compared with 65 per cent of Muslims born abroad.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Strabac & Listhung, “Anti-Muslim prejudice”, p. 281.

¹³⁰ See Table 49. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹³¹ See Table 51. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Respondents were asked about the frequency with which they had experienced different forms of discrimination in the preceding 12 months.¹³² Across each of the different “categories” of frequency, Muslims were more likely than non-Muslims to have experienced both racial and religious discrimination.

Table 52. How often have you experienced racial discrimination? (H7.3)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Almost all of the time		3.2%	1.8%	2.5%
A lot of the time		12.4%	4.5%	8.5%
Sometimes		28.3%	14.3%	21.4%
Rarely		18.1%	14.4%	16.2%
Never		38.0%	65.1%	51.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1108	1085	2193

Source: Open Society Institute data

Table 53. How often have you experienced religious discrimination? (H7.4)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Almost all of the time		5.1%	0.8%	3.0%
A lot of the time		17.9%	2.1%	10.1%
Sometimes		26.7%	5.7%	16.3%
Rarely		15.3%	10.5%	12.9%
Never		35.0%	80.9%	57.7%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1087	2196

Source: Open Society Institute data

Non-Muslims were far more likely than Muslims not to have experienced racial or religious discrimination.

The frequency with which Muslims experience religious discrimination did differ among Muslim respondents. Half of Muslim respondents either did not encounter any religious discrimination (35 per cent) or encountered it rarely (15 per cent); 27 per

¹³² That is, whether they experienced it “almost all” of the time, “a lot” of the time, “sometimes” or “never”.

cent encountered religious discrimination “sometimes”, while 18 per cent experienced it “a lot of the time” and 5 per cent almost all the time. The proportion of Muslim respondents who experienced religious prejudice or unfair treatment “almost all” or “a lot” of the time did not vary by gender and country of birth. However, gender and country of birth was significant for those who reported experiencing such unfair treatment “sometimes”, “rarely” and “never”.¹³³

Among European-born Muslim respondents, men (29 per cent) but particularly women (35 per cent) are more likely than Muslim respondents born abroad to have experienced some form of religious discrimination in the previous 12 months. European-born Muslim women are also the least likely to report not having experienced religious discrimination in the previous 12 months (22 per cent) and Muslim men born abroad are the most likely not to have experienced any religious discrimination or prejudice.

Among Muslim respondents, experiences of racial discrimination are less frequent than religious discrimination, but they are still high.¹³⁴

Although more than half encounter racial discrimination “rarely” (18 per cent) or “not at all” (38 per cent), 28 per cent “sometimes” face racial discrimination while 12 per cent encounter it “a lot” and 3 per cent “almost all” of the time. Muslim men born abroad (19 per cent) are more likely than European-born Muslim men (16 per cent) or women (14 per cent) to be faced with racial discrimination “all” or “a lot” of the time.

A quarter of female respondents reported experiences of unfair treatment or prejudice based on gender at least sometimes in the preceding 12 months.

Table 56. How often have you experienced gender discrimination? (H7.1)

		Muslim male	Muslim female	Non-Muslim male	Non-Muslim female	Total
Almost all of the time		0.5%	0.7%	0.4%	0.7%	0.6%
A lot of the time		1.3%	2.5%	0.8%	6.4%	2.8%
Sometimes		5.9%	12.2%	6.2%	19.6%	11.1%
Rarely		10.5%	18.5%	13.1%	21.4%	15.9%
Never		81.8%	66.1%	79.6%	51.9%	69.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	555	551	520	566	2192

¹³³ See Table 54. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹³⁴ See Table 55. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Source: Open Society Institute data

Muslim and non-Muslim respondents have similar experiences in respect to discrimination based on neighbourhood.¹³⁵

The general public, rather than a particular institution or professional setting, was identified by 28 per cent of Muslim respondents as the source of the religious discrimination they faced.

Table 58. Locations of religious discrimination (H8)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total count
A local doctor's surgery	3.8%	1.2%	55
A local hospital	5.4%	1.2%	72
A local school	6.4%	1.4%	85
A local council	4.7%	0.7%	59
A landlord or letting agent	7.4%	1.3%	95
A local shop	6.3%	2.5%	95
Public transport	13.2%	2.7%	174
Airline/airport officials	7.2%	1.3%	93
The courts (Magistrate Court and Crown Court)	1.5%	0.8%	24
The police	9.2%	3.4%	137
The immigration authorities	3.5%	0.4%	43
A member of the public	27.7%	11.2%	422
None of the above	49.9%	81.8%	1407
Total count	1102	1048	2150

However, members of the general public featured most prominently in discrimination faced by European-born Muslim women; two-fifths (42 per cent) of the discrimination they faced comes from members of the public.¹³⁶

Public transport was identified by 13 per cent of Muslim respondents as a key space in which they encountered prejudice or unfair treatment. The police account for a greater proportion of the discrimination (17 per cent) experienced by European-born Muslim men than that faced by women (6 per cent) or Muslim men born abroad (10 per cent).

¹³⁵ See Table 57. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

¹³⁶ See Table 59. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Not only do expectations and experiences of discrimination undermine integration by limiting access to jobs, housing or education, discrimination also affects national identification¹³⁷ and general life satisfaction.¹³⁸ The European Social Survey shows that migrants and their descendants have a lower level of life satisfaction compared with the general population. While migration research suggests that the displacement that comes from migration accounts for the lower life-satisfaction levels of the first-generation migrants, analysis of the European Social Survey finds that perceptions of discrimination account for the lower life-satisfaction levels of the second generation:

despite the fact that they are born and socialized in host countries, the members of the second generations seem to be at least as dissatisfied with their lives as those of the first generation, when both of their parents are immigrants. This finding illustrates the specific psycho-social experience of second generation immigrants, and the fact, well documented in some qualitative research, that they regard their inferior living conditions as fundamentally unfair, more so than their parents (Handlin, 1966; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) [...] the lasting differences between life satisfaction of ethnic minorities and those of natives shrink (and sometimes disappear) when the perceived discrimination is introduced into the analysis. This is all the more true for Africans, Asians, and Turkish.¹³⁹

The qualitative data from the OSI survey and the focus groups point to the persistence of discrimination and prejudice in corroding the sense of belonging. For example, 13 out of the 59 Muslims who said they did not feel at home in Amsterdam referred to discrimination and racism. Respondents in Paris identified experiences of discrimination as important to making them feel that they did not belong. Discrimination was also cited as the main reason for those who did not want to be seen as French. In Berlin, issues of security, fear of racial attacks and anxiety about being made to feel an outsider were commonly cited by Muslims as barriers to greater identification with the city. The perception that one is not accepted as a real German by ethnic Germans re-emerged as a crucial obstacle to belonging in the focus group discussions in Berlin and Hamburg.

3.4 Interactions

There is renewed public policy interest in the level and nature of contact people have with those outside their own ethnic or religious group. This is underpinned by social contact theory, which suggests that intergroup contact leads to reduced levels of

¹³⁷ Maxwell, “Caribbean and South Asian identification with British society”.

¹³⁸ Mirna Safi “Immigrants’ life satisfaction in Europe between assimilation and discrimination”, *European Sociological Review*, 2009 (hereafter, Safi, “Immigrants’ life satisfaction”). See also M. Verkuyten, “Life satisfaction among ethnic minorities: The role of discrimination and group identification”, *Social Indicators Research* 89, 2008, pp. 391–404.

¹³⁹ Safi, “Immigrants’ life satisfaction”.

prejudice.¹⁴⁰ As well, there is concern that the socio-economic integration of minorities is hindered by their lack of bridging capital, that is, networks and contact outside their own ethnic or religious group. Interest in levels of interaction also feeds into the discussion on whether minorities are living parallel lives, segregated and separate from the wider society. The OSI survey asks several questions that provide a picture not only of the levels of contacts across ethnic and religious boundaries but also the spaces where those interactions occur most frequently.¹⁴¹ Respondents were asked about meaningful contact, that is, contact that involves more than just a greeting and involves exchanges of information.

The OSI survey asked respondents about contact with those from a different ethnic group and religious group in eight different spaces. It also asked about contact with those from a different ethnic group in relation to 10 further areas. In general, in most spaces, levels of frequent contact with religious “others” is slightly lower than contact with ethnic “others”.¹⁴² Educational institutions and the workplace remain the place where Muslims and non-Muslims are the most likely to have “frequent” contact with ethnic and religious “others”. Levels of frequent inter-ethnic and inter-religious contact are highest among Muslims born in Europe. In contrast, a quarter of Muslim women born abroad rarely or never meet ethnic or religious others at work or school. This is likely to be a consequence of their high economic inactivity rates.

Shops come after the workplace and educational institutions as the place where respondents have the most frequent contacts with ethnic and religious “others”. Across all groups, public transport and public spaces such as parks are also important spaces for contact with people outside their ethnic group. For Muslim men born in Europe, sports and leisure facilities emerge as a far more important space for contact with ethnic or religious others than it is for other respondents. For Muslim women born abroad, street markets are a particular important space for inter-ethnic contact. Around a third of Muslim women and a quarter of non-Muslim women have frequent contact with others outside their ethnic or religious group at crèches and nurseries.

Neighbourhood groups and community centres are spaces where the majority of respondents rarely or never have contact with ethnic others. However, further analysis suggests that neighbourhood groups are important for frequent inter-ethnic interactions for a significant proportion of Muslim men born in Europe (23 per cent) and non-

¹⁴⁰ T. Pettigrew, “Intergroup contact theory”, *Annual Review of Psychology* 49, 2008, pp. 65–85.

¹⁴¹ The questionnaire asked respondents whether they met people from a different ethnic or religious background “daily”, “weekly”, “once a month”, “once a year” or “never” in a variety of different spaces. Contact that is “daily” and “weekly” is referred to a “frequent”; “occasional” contact is contact that takes place once a month, while contacts that take place once a year or never are identified as “rarely/not at all”.

¹⁴² The term ethnic or religious “other” is used to refer to a person who is from a different ethnic or religious group from the respondent.

Muslim men born outside Europe (21 per cent). Similarly, 23 per cent of Muslim men born in Europe do frequently meet ethnic “others” in community centres.

Frequent contact with ethnic and religious “others” at work, schools, shops and in public spaces such as transport and parks is to be expected. However, the OSI survey also found that people’s private homes are, for many, an important space for frequent contact with people outside their own ethnic or religious group. This is particularly true for female respondents. Over half of non-Muslim women born outside Europe (51 per cent) and Muslim women born in Europe (51 per cent) had frequent contact with people outside their ethnic group at home. This is also true of 46 per cent of non-Muslim women born in Europe and 43 per cent of Muslim men born in Europe. Among Muslims born abroad there is greater polarisation. Around a third frequently meet ethnic others at home, but around a quarter “rarely or never” do so. For contact with “religious” others, Muslims born overseas are slightly more likely to have contact “rarely/not at all” or occasionally (35 per cent) than to have “frequent contact” (27 per cent).

The OSI research finds that cities are increasingly involved in supporting dialogue between different religious traditions and communities. In Antwerp, the city supported inter-religious dialogue through establishing a working group called Cordoba with representatives from the six recognised faith groups – Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Anglicans and Orthodox – and people of no faith. In Amsterdam, the programme “Wij Amsterdammers” aims at stimulating debate on Islam both in the Muslim community and between Muslims and non-Muslims. Initiatives taken to promote the dialogue between different groups include the creation of the Religious-Secular Circle in Slotervaart, which consisted of a series of meetings during which people of various religious convictions, as well as non-religious people, exchanged ideas and debated issues related to religion and society, in order to enhance mutual understanding and tolerance. In Leicester, the city council supports the Leicester Council of Faiths, which includes in its membership Baha’is, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Jews, Muslims and Sikhs.¹⁴³ There is also an informal Faith Leaders Forum convened by the Bishop of Leicester (and including the police, council representation and other agencies), which provides a crucial platform for the discussion of more sensitive and controversial matters concerning faith communities. Political problems and issues of potential tension between communities have been tackled during the meetings. The presence of a broad range of networks and organisations has meant that when crises have occurred, with a potential for local spill-over (for example after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005, or the rise in Hindu-Muslim tension after ethnic conflict in Gujarat, India), channels of communication have been available for community leaders to meet and discuss issues – even if they agree to disagree.

¹⁴³ See the Council of Faiths website at <http://www.leicestercounciloffaiths.org.uk/index.html> (accessed November 2009).

3.5 Key Findings

The OSI research finds the majority of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents felt that people of different backgrounds got on well together in their local areas and that people were willing to help each other in their neighbourhoods. Muslim respondents tended to feel that their neighbourhood was close-knit – more than non-Muslim respondents. Levels of trust are generally high, but work is needed on increasing trust among younger people.

A shared commitment to the values of the EU is a strong theme in European integration policy. The results from the OSI research are mixed. On the one hand, in responses to the question of whether people in the neighbourhood had shared values, the outcomes are quite negative: the majority of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents did not think this was the case. However, both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents identified similar values as being important to the country they live in: respect for law, freedom of expression and equal opportunities were accorded the highest recognition by both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Among Muslim respondents, respect for all religions was more important than it was for non-Muslims. In light of the obligation in the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the Union to respect religious diversity, there may be a need to focus more attention in this area.

These results present a complex picture, suggesting that a sense of shared values is not needed for people of different backgrounds to get along and help their neighbours. However, there appears to be a greater correlation between levels of trust and perceptions of whether people are willing to work together to improve the neighbourhood, as well as a belief that people in neighbourhood share the same values.

It is clear from the data across all 11 cities that, for Muslims, local and city-level belonging is stronger than national belonging. This supports the approach in the EU of supporting cities' approaches to integration. For non-Muslims, levels of national belonging are greater than, or around the same as, city or local belonging. While there were high levels of cultural identification as nationals, Muslims did not feel that they were viewed as such by others. Cultural identification increases with integration in other areas, such as employment and education. In light of the debate on the headscarf across Europe, particularly in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, it is important to note that the OSI survey found that visible religious identity or level of practice does not affect cultural identification with the state.

Muslim and non-Muslim respondents have similar views about the extent of racial discrimination. However, their perceptions of the levels of religious discrimination differ significantly. Among Muslim respondents, European-born Muslims, particularly women, were more likely to perceive higher levels of religious discrimination than those born abroad. In general this discrimination comes from the public. However, for European-born Muslims, the police are identified as a key source of unfair treatment and discrimination. The persistence of racism and discrimination in the experiences of Muslims and their role as a barrier to belonging – and therefore integration – indicates

that more action is needed to ensure that Europe lives up to its promise of being an area where the values of pluralism and tolerance prevail. Furthermore, the results from this and other research suggest that levels of religious discrimination are increasing and not decreasing in some states.

The results also suggest significant levels of interaction with people of different backgrounds. Among Muslim respondents, levels of frequent inter-ethnic and inter-religious contact are highest among Muslims born in Europe. While frequent contact with ethnic and religious “others” at work, schools, shops and in public spaces such as transport and parks is to be expected, more surprising perhaps, is the finding that people’s private homes are, for many, an important space for frequent contact with people outside their own ethnic or religious group. This is particularly true for female respondents. The majority of European-born Muslim women (51 per cent) had frequent contact with people outside their ethnic group at home. The results run contrary to the view that Muslims live parallel or segregated lives or do not feel a sense of belonging or attachment to the city and country where they live. It suggests that discrimination remains an important barrier to belonging but one that many are overcoming.

4. EDUCATION

The CBPs emphasise the importance of education to integration. The education system provides individuals with the skills and qualifications for participation in the labour market and is a key driver of social mobility. It also plays a formative role in the socialisation of young people in the unspoken rules and values of society and is the first public institution that young Muslims have contact with. The ways in which schools respond to and respect the needs of Muslims are therefore likely to shape their feelings of acceptance in and belonging to wider society. Schools also contribute to integration by providing opportunities for interaction between pupils, parents and teachers of different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

This section looks at the key issues that have emerged in relation to education. Evidence-based policy requires information and data. This section begins by looking at efforts and challenges in data collection in the field of education.

4.1 Data Collection

Across the 11 cities covered in this study, data in education rarely refer to students' religious identities or affiliations. The differing categories used in education statistics, ranging from nationality to ethnicity, migration background and language spoken at home, facilitate the identification of pupils from minority or migration backgrounds, which in turn provides a very imperfect indication of the experiences and performances of some Muslim groups. However, the use of differing categories and definitions limits the potential for cross-national comparative analysis.¹⁴⁴

Robust data are needed for the development of evidence-based policies. In several cities, initiatives are being developed to improve data-collection methods. Leicester aims to have better targeted education interventions for improving achievement through the collection of detailed data on young people in its schools, using a central database called Datanet that enables closer examination of issues at school, local and city levels that can be disaggregated by gender, ethnicity and the number of children entitled to free school meals.¹⁴⁵ The creation of a database that would track the educational careers of migrant students was also included in the joint action plan for improving the education of migrants agreed by French ministers in 2007. Existing data collection methods that developed at a time when migrants were arriving for the first time in large numbers in many states need to be reconsidered in light of the realities and experiences of the second generation. This process is already taking place in some cities. In Antwerp, data were previously collected on the basis of the language spoken at home. There is now

¹⁴⁴ See European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, *Migrants, Minorities and Education. Documenting Discrimination and Integration in 15 Member States of the European Union*, EUMC, Luxembourg, 2004 (hereafter, EUMC, *Migrants, Minorities and Education*).

¹⁴⁵ The Datanet website is accessible at <https://datanet.leicester.gov.uk/aboutdatanet.html> (accessed November 2009).

recognition that for many second-generation children of migrants the languages spoken vary by context, listener and content. The Netherlands Equal Educational Opportunities Decree now asks whether a pupil speaks Dutch with their mother, father or siblings. If the pupil answers no to any two of these, then he or she is registered as having a minority background. In England some local education authorities use “extended ethnic codes”, that is, more detailed categories than those in the 2001 census, to allow for a further breakdown of educational performance data at the local level. In the Pakistani category, distinctions are made between Kashmiri and Mirpuri Pakistanis. Using the extended ethnic categories of black Somali, black Ghanaian and black Nigerian to break down the data in the “black African” ethnic category, it was revealed that in the black African group, the achievement of black Somali pupils is significantly worse than other black African students, while that of black Nigerian and black Ghanaian students was above the average for black Africans.¹⁴⁶

Data on educational performance

The lack of data on religion means that a detailed picture of the educational performance of Muslims in different European states or cities is not possible. In educational research, migration status and the lower economic, social and cultural capital that comes with migration to a new society are seen as relevant to explaining differences in educational performance. There is, therefore, a significant body of research on the experiences of migrants and their children. Since a majority of young Muslims in the 11 cities have a migration background, these studies provide some indication of the position and experiences of significant parts of the Muslim populations in western Europe.

The general picture that emerges from much of the research suggests that pupils from minority backgrounds perform poorly in schools. There is an over-representation of migrant children in lower-level vocational education streams and under-representation in higher-level academic courses which provide opportunities for pursuing tertiary education at university. Migrant children are often also more likely than the general population to leave school with no qualifications.¹⁴⁷ There are, however, indications that after social class and other variables are taken into account, gaps in the attainment of performance of some pupils are found to be reduced. In the UK, for example, when results are differentiated between pupils entitled to free school meals (FSM) (an indicator of poverty), the results show that Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils do

¹⁴⁶ Department for Education and Skills (DfES), *Ethnicity and Education: the evidence on Minority Ethnic Pupils aged 5-16*, London: DfES, 2006, available at: <http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/research/programmeofresearch/projectinformation.cfm?projectid=14955&resultspage=1> (accessed November 2009).

¹⁴⁷ EUMC, *Migrants, Minorities and Education* and F. Heckmann, “Education and the Integration of Migrants Challenges for European Education Systems Arising from Immigration and Strategies for the Successful Integration of Migrant Children in European Schools and Societies”, NESSE Analytical Report 1 for Directorate General Education and Culture, 2008 (hereafter, Heckmann, “Education and the Integration of Migrants”).

significantly better than their white British counterparts.¹⁴⁸ In the Netherlands, the gap in achievement between native Dutch and ethnic minorities is narrowing but persists; 20 per cent of ethnic Dutch enter the highest level of secondary school, compared with 9 per cent of minority-ethnic students. Research on the educational experience of second-generation Moroccan and Turkish young people in Amsterdam and Rotterdam suggests that the pattern may in fact be one of polarisation within ethnic groups: between those who are securing higher education qualifications and those who leave school without qualifications.¹⁴⁹ This pattern also appears to exist in the UK, where Pakistani and Bangladeshi young people are over-represented among those entering higher education and at the same time over-represented among those leaving school with no qualifications.¹⁵⁰

4.2 Ethnicity and Religion as Social Capital

The differences in achievement between different ethnic-minority groups has led to the suggestion that, in the context of education, ethnicity is a form of social capital (that is, resources such as shared networks or cultural norms and values that arise from ethnic group membership which are used in the production of socio-economic advantages and disadvantages). Research in the United States suggests that the success of East Asian Americans rests in part on “a combination of strong shared norms and values about the importance of education, social mobility and social integration, strong parental and community enforcement of these norms and involvement in various ethnic institutions which bind families and individuals to an interlocking network of ethnic relations all combine to produce a form of ethnic social capital”.¹⁵¹ Professor Tariq Modood

¹⁴⁸ Department for Education and Skills, *Ethnicity and education: the evidence on ethnic minority pupils*, London, DfES, 2005, available at http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/ethnicminorities/links_and_publications/EandE_RTP01_05/EandE_RTP01_05.pdf (accessed November 2009, hereafter DfES, *Ethnicity and Education 2005*).

¹⁴⁹ Maurice Crul and Liesbeth Heering (eds.) *The position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam: the TIES study in the Netherlands*, IMISCOE Research, 2008.

¹⁵⁰ 14% of Bangladeshi 16 year olds in the UK are not in education, training or employment, the highest for any ethnic group and twice the level for Whites. See DfES, *Ethnicity and Education 2005*.

¹⁵¹ C. Dwyer, T. Modood, S. Gurchathen, B. Shah, S. Thapar-Bojkert, “Ethnicity as social capital? Explaining the differential educational achievements of young British Pakistani men and women”, paper presented at the ‘Ethnicity, Mobility and Society’ Leverhulme Programme Conference at University of Bristol, 16-17 March, 2006, p. 7, available at <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/sociology/leverhulme/conference/conferencepapers/dwyer.pdf> (accessed November 2009). See also L. Archer, B. and Francis, “Changing classes? Exploring the role of social class within the identities and achievement of British Chinese pupils”, *Sociology*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2006, pp. 29–49 and T. Modood, “Capitals, ethnic identity and educational qualifications”, *Cultural Trends* Vol. 13, 2004, pp. 87–105.

suggests that for some Muslims in the UK, religion also has a positive role in encouraging and supporting educational aspirations:

[For] many young Asians, Islam is appealed to – both by girls and boys – as a source of educational aspirations and the motivation to improve oneself and lead a disciplined, responsible life. It is particularly used by girls to justify and negotiate educational and career opportunities with conservative parents, often of rural backgrounds with little knowledge of the scriptures; and by boys to distance themselves from the temptations of street youth culture, a primary obstacle to an academic pathway [...] Islam in Britain is finely poised between a religion of a ghetto and a religion of social mobility – a kind of “Protestant ethic” – capable of sustaining the hope and discipline that the taking up of opportunities requires. For the latter trajectory to be actualized, mainstream Islam requires encouragement not demonization.¹⁵²

4.3 Pre-school Education

A major pan-European longitudinal study of the intellectual, social and behavioural development of 3,000 young children aged between three and seven years has established the importance of early learning and pre-school education through attendance at playgroups and day nurseries for their subsequent educational outcomes. The study finds that “pre-school can play an important part in combating social exclusion and promoting inclusion by offering disadvantaged children, in particular, a better start to primary school”.¹⁵³ Municipal authorities and national governments regard increasing participation in pre-school education as central to improving the educational attainment of low achieving groups including migrants. This is a key part of the integration strategy in several cities. In Belgium, Flanders provides financial incentives to kindergartens to encourage the enrolment of children from low-income and single-parent families. Despite these efforts, the data indicate that rates of participation in kindergarten are lower for children of Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds. In Rotterdam, the proportion of Turkish and Moroccan children entering pre-school programmes is higher than that of other migrant groups: approximately one-third of Turkish and Moroccan children attend the pre-school programmes.¹⁵⁴ The Berlin integration policy (*Integrationskonzept*) also places emphasis on early-years education and aims by 2011 to extend free kindergarten classes from year one. Pre-school education is also a key feature of the education stream of

¹⁵² T. Modood, “Ethnicity, Muslims and higher education entry in Britain”, *Teaching in Higher Education* 11:2 2006, pp. 247–250 at 250.

¹⁵³ K. Sylva, E. Melhuish, P. Sammons, I. Siraj-Blatchford, and B. Taggart, *Effective provision of pre-school education (EPPE) project: Final Report*, DfES, London, 2004, p. 29 (hereafter Sylva et al., *Effective provision of pre-school education*).

¹⁵⁴ J. Dagevos, M. Gijsberts (eds). *Jaarrapport Integratie 2007* (Annual Integration Report 2007), Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, The Hague, 2007, p. 103 (in Dutch).

Hamburg's integration strategy. A year before commencing primary school, a child's linguistic abilities are assessed in both German and their mother tongue. Where it is found that a child does not have the appropriate level of linguistic skills, they are required to attend special language-support classes delivered through day-care facilities. In addition to this, from the age of three all children have the right to five hours at a pre-school day-care facility (KITA) until they enter school. Since 2007 this provision has been available to children below three years of age. In Leicester, the local council has an early-years support team that aims to enhance language provision and training to help adults to support children better and also supports pre-school activities such as mother and toddler groups.

4.4 Selection and Testing

There is also growing research evidence that educational systems in which decisions about educational career paths are made at an early stage through a process of academic selection operate to the disadvantage of pupils from minority backgrounds. In the Netherlands, 60 per cent of native Dutch pupils study for the higher level HAVO¹⁵⁵ and VWO,¹⁵⁶ compared with 30 per cent of the pupils of non-western ethnic-minority groups.¹⁵⁷ Research undertaken by the TIES (Integration of the European Second Generation) project found that a significant proportion of second-generation Moroccan and Turkish young people who reached higher education did so despite failing to enter the higher-level HAVO courses at school.¹⁵⁸ Displaying persistence and resilience, these young people entered higher education through a longer route, going from the VMBO¹⁵⁹ to the MBO¹⁶⁰ before entering the HBO. This, the report suggests, indicates either that the educational system fails to recognise the talents of second-generation young people or that selection comes too early in their education careers.

The latter hypothesis is supported by evidence that achievement rates for migrant students appear to be better in educational systems with comprehensive schools.

¹⁵⁵ HAVO (*'Hoger Algemeen Voortgezet Onderwijs'*) is secondary-school education offering senior general education for five years.

¹⁵⁶ VWO (*'Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs'*) is the university preparatory education stream. It is for six years.

¹⁵⁷ See the website of the Amsterdam Department for Research and Statistics at <http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/feitenencijfers/> (accessed November 2009).

¹⁵⁸ The TIES project is a collaborative and comparative research project on the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia and Morocco in eight European countries. See the website at <http://www.tiesproject.eu>

¹⁵⁹ VMBO (*voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs* – preparatory middle-level vocational education) is a secondary-school educational stream which is pre-vocational in nature and lasts four years.

¹⁶⁰ MBO – *middelbaar beroepsonderwijs* – (*middle level applied education*) – is an educational stream in high school orienting pupils towards vocational training.

Research in Germany, where comprehensive and selective schools are found across different Länder, has found that migrant students were more likely to obtain medium- or higher-level qualifications in the comprehensive system.¹⁶¹ In the UK, where the vast majority of state schools are comprehensive, research has found a significant acceleration in the achievement of pupils from ethnic-minority groups towards the end of their time in secondary school. Wilson *et al.* look at the difference in exam results actually achieved at the age of 16 compared with what would have been achieved by the group if their performance at age 11 was replicated at 16:

Taking students with Black African heritage, if they had remained in the same position in the test score distribution throughout secondary schooling, then as a group, 39% would have achieved at least 5 passes in the high-stakes age 16 exams. In fact, 48% achieved that level, a difference of nearly one quarter. For ethnic Bangladeshi students, the actual figure of 48% is a third higher than the predicted figure of 36%.¹⁶²

It has also been found that the gain made by Bangladeshi pupils between Key Stage 3 (tests taken at age 13) and the results for their GCSE exams (usually taken at age 16) is particularly strong and equivalent to 10 GCSE points, which is “equivalent to changing five C grades all to A”.¹⁶³ Heckmann’s review of research on migrants and education concludes that “a strong case can be made for the effectiveness of comprehensive schools in raising educational opportunities for migrant students, and against (early) selection for differently demanding tracks with different curricula”.¹⁶⁴ The OSI research finds that at the local level some cities are beginning to address this issue: for instance comprehensive-style schooling is being developed in Berlin.

4.5 Segregation

The interviews and focus groups revealed particular concern about the effect of the low expectations and aspirations of some teachers on shaping the educational paths pursued by pupils. The concentration of pupils from minority backgrounds has led to *de facto* segregation of schools in some cities. There is some evidence that the socio-economic

¹⁶¹ Heike Diefenbach, “Schulerfolg von ausländischen Kindern und Kindern mit Migrationshintergrund als Ergebnis individueller und institutioneller Faktoren” (School success of foreign children and children with a migration background as a result of individual and institutional factors), Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft (Hg.), *Migrationshintergrund von Kindern und Jugendlichen: Wege zur Weiterentwicklung der amtlichen Statistik*, (Children and young people of minority background: pathways to the development official statistics), Bonn and Berlin, 2005, pp. 43–54, cited in Heckmann, “Education and the Integration of Migrants”, p. 22.

¹⁶² D. Wilson, S. Burgess, and A. Briggs, “The dynamics of school attainment of England’s ethnic minorities”, CMPO Working Paper Series No. 05/130, University of Bristol, Bristol, 2005, at p. 22 (hereafter, Wilson *et al.*, “The dynamics of school attainment”).

¹⁶³ Wilson *et al.*, “The dynamics of school attainment”, p. 20.

¹⁶⁴ Heckmann, “Education and the Integration of Migrants”, p. 3.

and immigrant composition of schools has a small but significant adverse effect on the grades of pupils.¹⁶⁵ This emerged as a concern among parents as well as education officials.

A desire for more ethnically mixed schools emerged consistently and strongly in the OSI focus group discussions involving parents across the different cities. Parents were anxious about the negative impact of segregation on their children's education and future prospects. They feared that schools where a majority of students were from minority groups receive less attention from public officials and provide inferior education. They believed mixed schools were needed to support integration. Many regretted the decision of white parents to withdraw their children from schools where there were too many pupils from minority backgrounds.

Finding ways to reverse the processes of segregation is difficult as *de facto* ethnic segregation in schools is often a consequence of a mixture of residential settlement patterns combined with the exercise of parental and school choice. Cities try to address this by a variety of mechanisms. For example, the Antwerp Decree on Equal Educational Opportunities (EEO) restricts the right of schools to refuse admission to a child. It also provides that where the share of EEO pupils (that is, pupils whose primary home language is not Dutch) exceeds the city average by 10 per cent, schools are able to refer pupils to another school. However, as the OSI report on Antwerp notes, schools have been creative in developing new indirect barriers to enrolment. Schools sometimes aim to persuade parents and pupils from minority backgrounds that the school is not appropriate for them, by saying that the curriculum is too difficult, that the school is not trained to provide the help and support needed for minority pupils or do not cater to the pupils' cultural and religious needs. Requiring pupils to buy expensive school uniforms or participate in expensive school trips are also methods used to dissuade pupils from minority and poorer backgrounds from applying to these schools. In the UK, the Education Inspection Act 2006 places a legal duty on schools to promote cohesion. In Leicester, in order to increase interaction between pupils of different ethnic and religious backgrounds, the Schools Linking Network develops links between schools where the students are from different ethnic and religious groups. This involves creating links, for example, between schools where the majority of students are Muslim with schools which have a majority of Hindu or Christian students.

4.6 Linguistic Competence

Linguistic competence is vital for educational success. Across all cities, supporting and encouraging learning the official language used in schools remains a key part of most policies aimed at improving the educational achievement of students with migration

¹⁶⁵ R. Szulkin, and J. O. Jonsson, "Ethnic segregation and educational outcomes in Swedish comprehensive schools: a multilevel analysis", Working Paper No. 2007:2, Sociology Department, Stockholm University, 2005.

backgrounds. In Germany there is a national programme, ForMig, that aims to provide specific literacy support for parents and children of migrant or minority backgrounds. Among the successful projects developed by this programme is the “Rucksackprojekt” in Berlin. Through this, primary schools and nurseries provide parents who do not speak German with information about a subject due to be taught in schools. The parents can use this information to teach their children about the subject in their mother tongue. Some of the parents become “parents’ companions” (*Elternbegleiter*), which means that in addition to supporting their own children, they support other parents and help with the communication between parents and teachers. In France, language support is available in what are called initiation classes for pupils with limited French-language skills.

Research in the UK suggests that the acceleration in performance of students from minority backgrounds that is found in the final three years of the schooling up to the exams taken at 16 is in part due to an increased fluency in English that comes with more intensive use of the language. It is estimated that differences in language skills account for one-third of the improvement in attainment in the course of secondary schooling made by some ethnic groups.¹⁶⁶ The evidence suggests that bilingual pupils who do gain fluency in language outperform their monolingual peers.¹⁶⁷ A report by the Office for Standards in Education in the UK examining the achievement of Bangladeshi pupils places emphasis on the importance of increasing language fluency as a driver for overall improvements in educational attainment.¹⁶⁸

4.7 Expectations and Aspirations

A recurring theme emerging from the OSI questionnaires and focus groups on educational experiences in several cities is the impact of teachers’ expectations. Research shows that students respond to the expectations of their teachers and that such expectations can be mediated by factors such as ethnicity and race. Differing expectations manifest themselves in many subtle ways, from the kind and amount of feedback a student receives to the encouragement and opportunities for participation in

¹⁶⁶ Wilson *et al.*, “The dynamics of school attainment”.

¹⁶⁷ F. Demie and S. Strand “English language acquisition and educational attainment at the end of secondary school”, *Educational Studies* 32(2), 2006, pp. 215–231.

¹⁶⁸ Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), *Achievement of Bangladeshi heritage pupils*, HMI 513, London, HMSO, 2004, available at: [http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/content/download/1465/10377/file/Achievement%20of%20Bangladeshi%20heritage%20pupils%20\(PDF%20format\).pdf](http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/content/download/1465/10377/file/Achievement%20of%20Bangladeshi%20heritage%20pupils%20(PDF%20format).pdf) (accessed November 2009, hereafter, Ofsted, *Achievement of Bangladeshi heritage pupils*).

class.¹⁶⁹ Instances of teachers devaluing a pupil's aspirations resonate years later: "I had a schoolmate in year two. The teacher looks at his hands, he knew that his father was a bricklayer. Yeah, you have bricklayer's hands!"¹⁷⁰ Participants in Hamburg cited instances where the teacher's poor assessment of a pupil's ability was proved incorrect after being challenged by parents. In Berlin, over half the OSI focus group participants reported severe examples of discouragement. In one example, a female participant in a focus group recalled her niece, who wanted to improve on her grade three in German, being told by the teacher not to worry as this was a good grade for a Turkish girl. A Muslim teacher participating in a focus group in Marseille gave an example of how low expectations of pupils from her colleagues led them to mock her attempt at raising aspirations: "We were working on *Dead Poets Society*. Colleagues told me: You'd better show them *Rambo*. It's more their culture. I told them: it's not up to them. We must be ambitious for them. It's too easy to judge them ... I cannot accept that a child leaves school without being able to read and write. The school system should recover its ambition." Interviews with other stakeholders and focus group participants in Marseille revealed how individuals had to struggle at various moments of their education careers against unfavourable assignments imposed by the schools. Few took short cuts to arrive where they are. One has a quite unique trajectory: feeling his teachers' negative judgement of him, especially one maths teacher, he left the school without a diploma and developed a career outside institutions, ending up as an MP's assistant 10 years later. Many others felt that they had to struggle against the unconscious desire of teachers to keep them in their place.

An education official in Leicester cited the importance of high aspirations and leadership in raising standards in schools: "It is about complacency and leadership. I can show you data of similar children in schools in Leicester that are doing well. I think what undermines Leicester is a poverty of aspiration: you have to have aspiration as a city and ambition as a city, you have to encourage aspiration in communities and aspiration in individuals." The official argued that leadership and higher aspiration for the city were in part responsible for its improved educational achievements in recent years.

As mentioned earlier, low expectations can be critical in selective systems when decisions are made about the educational path a pupil should pursue. In the

¹⁶⁹ See Heckmann, "Education and the Integration of Migrants", p. 21. See also: J. E. Farley, *Majority – Minority Relations*, 5th edition, Upper Saddle River, Pearson Prentice Hall, Schofield, 2005 (hereafter, Farley, *Majority-Minority Relations*); Janet Ward, "Migration Background, Minority – Group Membership and Academic Achievement. Research Evidence from Social, Educational and Developmental Psychology", *AKI Research Review* 5, 2006; and Peter A. J. Stevens, "Researching Race/Ethnicity and Educational Inequality in English Secondary Schools: A Critical Review of the Research Literature Between 1980 and 2005", *Review of Educational Research* Vol.77, No 2, 2006, pp. 147–185.

¹⁷⁰ OSI Focus Group, Marseille.

Netherlands, the recommendations made by teachers before the CITO¹⁷¹ test was taken (compared with pupils' achievement in the test) shows that unlike “native” pupils, the advice to non-native children is more likely to be to pursue lower level qualifications than their actual test score implies. In France, 39 per cent of parents of pupils of North African background challenged the teachers' recommendations for the schooling appropriate for their children.¹⁷²

4.8 Discrimination

Discrimination by teachers emerged as an important issue in several cities. There were examples of teachers ridiculing Islam, laughing about religious obligations such as fasting and being unable to cope with culturally diverse classrooms. In the OSI survey, 6 per cent of Muslim respondents reported experiencing religious discrimination from school in the previous 12 months.

Table 60. Location of religious discrimination – school (H8)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A local school	6.4%	1.4%	
Total count	70	15	85

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, once controlled for country of birth and gender it is found that a higher proportion of European-born Muslim male respondents (10 per cent) reported discrimination in schools, compared with Muslim women or Muslim respondents born abroad.¹⁷³

In Germany, the largest number of complaints received by the anti-discrimination association, the ADNB, (Anti Discrimination Network Berlin) concern education. In the Berlin OSI focus group, almost all participants reported a culture of low aspirations and discouragement by teachers grounded in assumptions and stereotypes about students based on their ethnic and cultural backgrounds. One OSI focus group participant in Antwerp recalled an incident which led his son Osama to come “running home in tears”. The young boy was told by his schoolteacher that he would “feel humiliated” if he had the name Osama.

¹⁷¹ CITO (*Cititoets*): A test administered by a vast majority of Dutch elementary schools (ages 4-12) determining what kind of secondary education pupils will follow. The level of education to be undertaken is also determined by teachers' recommendations of pupils' ability.

¹⁷² OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Paris*, forthcoming (hereafter, OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Paris*).

¹⁷³ See Table 61. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

There are some indications that the situation is improving. In general, discrimination was attributed more to older teachers who were not used to the multicultural diversity found in these cities. Younger focus-group participants, those who had recently left school, were more positive about their experiences than older participants. There was, nevertheless, support for increased training for teachers in managing and teaching in multicultural schools. Germany, for example, provides intercultural education as part of teacher training, but this is optional and therefore rarely taken up.

4.9 Valuing and Respecting Identities

The extent to which schools and the education system value a person's sense of self and identity can affect their self-confidence and attitude towards education.¹⁷⁴ The ways in which schools respond to the religious, ethnic and linguistic aspects of a young person's identity is important. There are examples across the 11 cities of schools seeking to develop and work with the cultural heritage of their students. In several colleges in Marseille, there are special bilingual streams which allow students to learn Arabic in parallel with another modern language like English. In Leicester, education officials see bilingualism as an asset; they value students' ability to understand and pick up more than one language as something positive.

Acknowledgement of and respect for religious identities remains controversial across the cities, especially in states where public institutions are expected to retain a separation between religion and the state. What constitutes the right amount of accommodation is mediated by notions of neutrality and the extent to which there is recognition that many existing educational practices are of course shaped by dominant Christian cultural norms. In the OSI survey, a majority of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents said that schools were doing the right amount to respect different religious customs.

¹⁷⁴ Farley, *Majority – Minority Relations*.

Table 62. Do schools respect different religious customs? (G4)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Too much		2.9%	7.7%	5.3%
About right		48.9%	49.7%	49.3%
Too little		31.9%	15.2%	23.6%
Don't know		16.3%	27.4%	21.8%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1088	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

Non-Muslim respondents were more likely to say schools were doing “too much”, while Muslims were more likely say that schools were doing “too little”. In Berlin, for example, practices such as allowing Muslim students time off for religious holidays were approved by those who felt that the schools were respecting the religious needs of pupils but criticised by those who thought the schools were doing too much. In Marseille, the director of a Centre-south *lycée*, aware of the tradition of *laïcité*, argued for schools to develop an “open *laïcité*”: He argues:

state schools [...] have much to do to come back to the values they previously had, the struggle for an open *laïcité*, which allows that pupils live together while respecting their faith. With Islam, religious matters have come back in the debate very strongly, due to the Islamic presence – I am talking of France globally. Now, our schools are sterilised at all levels. It is a kind of free-of-cost standardisation.¹⁷⁵

In some Catholic schools in the Centre-North of Marseille, 80–90 per cent of pupils are from Muslim families, mainly of North African and more recently of Comorian origin. Parents find that these state-funded Catholic schools provide a good model of maintaining *laïcité* while respecting the faith and religion of students and parents. They may hold talks on religions and religious signs are visible in parts of the school. Some heads even send Eid cards to Muslim parents. The Institute for Science and Theology of Religions (ISTR) also provides training sessions on Islam to volunteers and a university diploma was planned to open in autumn 2009. One of the Roman Catholic

¹⁷⁵ Yves Rollin, director of a *lycée*, at the debate organised by the Second Chance School on “Religion in the North district”, Marseilles, 23 April 2009. Mr. Rollin is also one of the leaders of a French union of school directors, “Education et devenir”.

colleges has opened a bilingual Arabic-English first form (16 pupils were enrolled in 2008–2009).

An English teacher and NGO activist of Algerian descent says that he feels bitter at the way the “affair of the veil” was managed in 2003. He perceives it as a citizen anxious not to burden the future:

I found it was a very aggressive period towards Muslims: a time when racists could find an excuse to have it their own way. It was a time to categorise: the good ones (SOS Racisme), the bad ones (the wild guys). I took part in many debates. I'll outline the case of a young child whose mother has been excluded from school: what will these girls convey to their children? They will have nothing positive to say about France. Resentment will flow from them to their children. It is very clear to me that there will be consequences for those for whom it was traumatic. It is devastating for those who could not maintain a distance.¹⁷⁶

In some cities, greater recognition of religious and cultural identities extends to the content of the education curriculum. In Berlin, an integration official argued for greater recognition of the contribution of migrants and Muslim communities as well as Islam to German and European society. In the UK, in Leicester, the local council has partnered with the Schools Development Support Agency (SDSA) to help produce material that is specific to Islam and Muslims. The SDSA supports the development of the Curriculum Reflecting the Experiences of African Caribbean and Muslim Pupils (CREAM), a project that looks at the extent and quality of materials reflecting the experiences of Muslim and African Caribbean pupils that could be used by mainstream schools in the national curriculum. The Comenius Lyceum in Slotervaart, Amsterdam, teaches Arabic as an optional subject.

In many of the cities, schools retain autonomy and discretion in deciding how to respond to the needs of Muslim pupils. In focus groups, however, Muslim parents suggest that the absence of a general policy or minimum standards on accommodation of religious practices makes it harder for them to make decisions about which school to choose for their children. It also increases the potential for segregation, as some Muslim parents are more likely to choose the schools that are more accommodating. In Amsterdam, the mayor of Slotervaart district linked the lack of accommodation of the needs of Muslim pupils by schools with the increased support for Islamic schools.

Whether female students and teachers should be permitted to wear the *hijab*¹⁷⁷ remains the centre of controversy in several cities. In Berlin, half of non-Muslim OSI respondents who wanted schools to show greater respect for religion criticised the ban

¹⁷⁶ OSI stakeholder interview, Marseille.

¹⁷⁷ *Hijab* is the Arabic word for a headscarf worn by Muslim women concealing the hair and neck and usually covers the face.

on teachers wearing a headscarf as a sign of exclusion and stereotyping. The majority of Muslim OSI respondents in Berlin felt that the needs of Muslim pupils were not respected: “In secondary school, we had a teacher who was extremely xenophobic. He treated the girls with headscarves especially badly and told them, they should dress like Germans and adapt.” A Muslim mother in Rotterdam recalled how her daughter “had to change four schools because of her scarf. Wherever we went, the teachers said, ‘We accept it, but the principal doesn’t want it.’”

The OSI research finds a wide range of practice on how to deal with religious holidays. Some schools allow pupils the day off, others celebrate these as part of the school community. In Marseille, being absent from school for the religious festival at the end of Ramadan is seen as legitimate. Furthermore, some schools in Marseille, in acknowledgement of pupils who are fasting, repay lunch charges to families where the children are not eating their lunch during the month. Other issues concerning the accommodation of religious and cultural needs that were raised during focus group discussions include provision of *halal* food and the organisation of swimming classes. In Leicester, the Islam and Education Network, a group of Muslim and non-Muslim education professionals, has produced a booklet providing advice and guidance to schools and colleges on how to engage with Muslim communities and address issues such as physical education, music, drama, art, Ramadan, dress, visiting places of worship and prayer.

The teaching of Islam is also an area where cities are looking at a variety of different approaches. In the Netherlands, there is an official curriculum on Islam that is available for schools to use if they wish to do so. The materials are adapted to the needs of different primary-school years and cover topics such as the life of Mohammed and religious customs and practices. In Antwerp, public schools are required by law to provide a religious course on Islam although this does not extend to Catholic schools, which educate around 65 per cent of schoolchildren in Belgium.

Having a teaching staff that is more diverse and thus better reflects the diversity of the local population can also support students’ confidence and identity by providing positive role models that they relate to. Research suggests that the complete absence of minority teachers harms the self-image and self-esteem of minority pupils. The need for more teachers of minority backgrounds was identified as an important priority in several focus groups and in interviews with education officials. Teachers who share the background of pupils can provide an important bridge for understanding between schools, pupils and schools. However, the interviews also suggested that in some instances such teachers have to be careful navigating these different relationships. In Marseille a teacher was accused of *communautarisme*¹⁷⁸ by his colleagues because he had welcomed in the computer class pupils who were waiting outside at lunchtime

¹⁷⁸ “*Communautarisme*” is a French term to describe self-segregation of communities based on religious, ethnic or other identities.

during Ramadan: “because I was the ‘Arab teacher’ who took the Arab pupils with him during the month of Ramadan”.

4.10 The Role of Parents

After a comprehensive review of the research evidence on the impact of parental involvement, parental support and family education on pupils’ achievement and adjustment, Desforges and Abouchaar (2003) conclude that their “most important finding” is on the impact of “parental involvement in the form of ‘at-home good parenting’ on children’s achievement and adjustment, which remains significant, even after all other factors shaping attainment have been taken out of the equation”.¹⁷⁹ This is consistent with findings from the Effective Provision of Pre-School Education (EPPE) longitudinal study, which suggests that having a quality at-home learning environment is more important than socio-economic background factors: “what parents do is more important than who they are”.¹⁸⁰ Other forms of support, such as school contact, while important, do not have the same level of impact as “at-home good parenting”. In fact, for primary-school pupils, differences in parental support at home have a greater impact on their ability than variation in the quality of schools. Furthermore, “the scale of the impact is evident across all social classes and all ethnic groups”. They find that levels of parental involvement differ by social class, poverty and health and also by the extent to which parents feel confident in fulfilling this role.¹⁸¹

Discussion in OSI focus groups and with education stakeholders indicates that parents who are migrants, because of their limited experience of any education or schooling combined with lack of familiarity with the educational system and difficulties with the language, feel intimidated in meetings with school officials. This lack of familiarity and confidence is sometimes misinterpreted by schools: “Fathers and mothers are barely speaking German, because they are working hard and therefore have no time to develop themselves. They don’t come to such gatherings. The teacher then gets the impression that they are not at all interested in school.”¹⁸² Schools are viewed by parents without the skills and experiences needed to negotiate them as spaces of vulnerability and insecurity which present risks of discrimination.¹⁸³ Schools can be proactive in addressing parents’ apprehensions and fears. In Berlin, parents’ cafes

¹⁷⁹ C. Desforges, and A. Abouchaar, *The Impact of Parental Involvement, Parental Support and Family Education on Pupil Achievements and Adjustment: A Literature Review*, DFES Research Report 433, Department for Education and Skills, London, 2003 (hereafter, Desforges & Abouchaar, *The Impact of Parental Involvement*).

¹⁸⁰ Sylva *et al.*, *Effective provision of pre-school education*.

¹⁸¹ Desforges & Abouchaar, *The Impact of Parental Involvement*.

¹⁸² OSI focus group participant, Berlin.

¹⁸³ See G. Crozier, and J. Davies, “Hard to Reach parents or hard to reach schools? A discussion of home school relations with particular reference to Bangladeshi and Pakistani parents”, *British Education Research Journal* Vol. 33, No. 3, 2007, pp. 295–313.

(*Elterncafés*) have been created to provide a less formal atmosphere where parents and teachers can meet to get to know each other better. In the UK, the Office for Standards in Education has found that “effective work by schools, pursued with persistence and ingenuity, often over a long period, created a growing sense of partnership, based on better understanding between school, families and local communities”. It identified examples of good practice in supporting parents to overcome these barriers. It noted, in particular, the role of bilingual home–school liaison officers and bilingual staff visiting homes and running family learning programmes in schools and local communities:

The project utilises laptop computers to support women from Pakistan and Bangladesh and their families – plus some of the fathers – who need, essentially, to learn English. The laptops are available for use in parents’ rooms in schools, and participants are encouraged to tell their own stories, including researching their families. It is planned to use the finished books with children and to make available the opportunity for participants to progress to other local provision as their children move from primary to secondary school, or from secondary school to college. This initiative has had an encouraging start.¹⁸⁴

Other initiatives noted in the report include setting up City Learning Centres that create spaces in which pupils can do their after-school homework with access to resources not available at home.

Outreach initiatives are not just needed for parents but also for some young people. In Amsterdam, the education and social services have developed an innovative outreach programme for young pupils considered to be at risk of falling out of the education system. Under this programme so called “8 to 8” coaches provide advice, support and direction to pupils from 8 am to 8 pm. The pilot involved 144 young people, including 100 of Moroccan background, and cost around €7,000 per pupil per year. The outcome from the pilot suggests that those involved got better control of their lives and their futures. Other initiatives include weekend academies that provide homework supervision, social skills training and leisure activities for young people. Campus New West is involved with developing career aspirations through work placements, mentoring and coaches. Educational mentoring is also provided by the White Tulip Foundation, which was set up by young university students from ethnic minorities.

Structural changes are being made to the educational system in Rotterdam to address the problem of the high dropout rate in schools. New “neighbourhood schools” are being introduced aimed at young people under the age of 23 with no qualifications. The schools are to provide extensive care and support, including the development of social skills and work experience. The pilot for this is running from 2009 to 2011. They are also developing “top schools”, which will allow progression for those who do not make it to the highest level of a school but are likely to be able to do well academically over time.

¹⁸⁴ Ofsted, *Achievement of Bangladeshi heritage pupils*, pp. 21–22.

4.11 Key Findings

The educational achievement of minorities is mixed. In some countries, once socio-economic background is taken into account, minorities do well. There are indications that for some Muslims, religion plays an important role in supporting and encouraging education. Parental support, particularly in the early years, is also a strong predictor of future educational achievement. School systems with early selection appear to disadvantage pupils from ethnic-minority groups as they are tested and selected too early in their educational careers. Across all cities, there is increasing recognition of the importance of pre-school education in ensuring that pupils from minority and other disadvantaged backgrounds do not start formal schooling at a disadvantage. Projects are being initiated that find ways to combine support for young children with programmes that encourage parental involvement in learning.

A desire for more ethnically mixed schools emerged consistently and strongly in the focus group discussions involving parents across the different cities. Parents were anxious about the adverse impact of segregation on their children's education and prospects. The challenge of policymakers is to find ways to overcome segregation, as this is often a consequence of a mixture of residential settlement patterns combined with the exercise of parental and school choice.

Some pupils continue to suffer racism and prejudice at schools and are confronted by low expectations from teachers. Teachers need appropriate training and support to ensure that they can be effective in the increasingly ethnically and religiously diverse classrooms. At the local level, many schools are responding positively to the needs of Muslim pupils and are finding imaginative ways to work positively with their cultural heritage.

5. EMPLOYMENT

Participation in the labour market remains at the heart of economic integration, which in its turn is a powerful driver of social integration. CBP principle no. 3 underlines this point. It notes that “employment is a key part of the integration process” and is central to participation. Economic integration requires not only opportunities for employment, but employment in the mainstream rather than a segmented or segregated labour market and in jobs that are commensurate with an individual’s skills and qualifications. This chapter begins by looking at data on labour-market participation. It then examines the role of different barriers Muslims face in accessing and fully participating in the labour market. Some of these barriers arise from the position of most Muslims in western Europe as migrants or the descendants of migrants; others, however, relate specifically to Muslims as a group.

5.1 Labour-market Participation

Labour-market participation can be measured in various ways, including economic activity rates, employment rates and unemployment rates. As with education, labour-market data are rarely collected on the basis of religion. Data on ethnic minorities, migrants and foreign nationals provide a limited indication of the position of Muslims by means of data on minority groups that are predominantly Muslim. A review of the labour-market integration of ethnic minorities in Europe, carried out by the Institute for the Study of Labour, collected labour-market data on minority groups in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. These data show that the labour-market participation rate among groups that are predominantly Muslim (Turks, Moroccans, Iraqis, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) is lower than that of the majority population. The review concludes that ethnic minorities “typically have significantly higher unemployment rates, lower labour income, and they are less likely to find and keep their jobs than the majority population”.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ K. F. Zimmerman *et al.*, *Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities*, IZA Research Report No 16, 2008. p. 11 (hereafter, Zimmerman *et al.*, *Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities*).

Table 63. Labour market situation of selected ethnic minorities and natives/total population in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK

Country	Majority/Minority group	Labour Market participation rate ¹⁸⁶	Unemployment rate	Hourly wage ¹⁸⁷
Belgium ¹⁸⁸	Autochthonous Belgians	65	–	–
	New Belgians	52	–	–
	Turks	29	–	–
	Moroccans	29	–	–
Denmark	Total population	76.3	4.5	278.3
	Turks	62.2	17.8	170.7
	Iraqis	37.7	26.9	138.4
	Bosnia-Herzegovinians	57.2	12.9	177.4
	Other non-western	55.8	28	164.8
The Netherlands ¹⁸⁹	Dutch majority	78	9	10.4
	Turks	53	21	7.1
	Moroccans	51	27	6.9
United Kingdom	White majority population	81.8	3.8	11.8
	Pakistani	55.2	12.8	10.2
	Bangladeshi	48.7	19.4	10.1

Source: Zimmerman *et al.*, *Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities*, p. 15.

¹⁸⁶ For the UK, data on economic activity rate are used as indicators of labour market participation.

¹⁸⁷ Hourly wage for Denmark given in Danish Kroner; for the UK in pounds sterling; for the Netherlands in Euros; and indicating disposable hourly labour income including social transfers.

¹⁸⁸ OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*, forthcoming (hereafter, OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*).

¹⁸⁹ See the website of the Amsterdam Department for Research and Statistics at <http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/tabel/8690/> (accessed November 2009).

5.2 Unemployment Rates

Unemployment rates run at twice the national average for second-generation Moroccan and Algerian immigrants in France¹⁹⁰ and for Turkish nationals in Germany.¹⁹¹ In the Netherlands the unemployment rate among Moroccans and Turks is between two and a half and three times the national average.¹⁹² In Belgium, the unemployment rate among Moroccans and Turks, at 38 per cent, is five times the level of the national unemployment rate of 7 per cent.¹⁹³

While unemployment rates remain higher for some Muslim groups compared with the majority population, since the mid-1990s economic growth has in some countries led to a sharper fall in unemployment rates for minorities compared with the majority population. Between 1997 and 2007 the unemployment rate in the Netherlands for non-western immigrants went down from 20 per cent to 10 per cent, while the unemployment rate for native Dutch was 4 per cent.¹⁹⁴ In Belgium there was particular success at reducing the number of Moroccans and Turks facing long-term unemployment. As a proportion of those who were unemployed, long-term unemployment fell from 61 per cent in 2003 to 46 per cent in 2007. However, this

¹⁹⁰ Data from the 1999 Census shows that unemployed among young people whose parents are born in Algeria or Morocco is 40% compared to a national youth unemployment rate of 20% INSEE, *Les immigrés en France* (Immigrants in France), édition 2005, p. 130, cited in S. Tebbakh, 2007, p. 42 note 101). A survey of those French school leavers in 1998 found that after five years unemployment rate among the North Africans in the cohort was double that of young people whose parents were born in France, CEREQ Survey "Generation 98"; R. Silberman and I. Fournier, "Jeunes issus de l'immigration: une pénalité à l'embauche qui perdure..." (Young people descended from the immigrant population: penalisation in the recruitment process that lasts...), Bref, n° 226, janvier 2006, p. 3.

¹⁹¹ Jochen Blaschke, "Tolerated but Marginalised – Muslims in Germany", Edition Parabolis Verlagsabteilung im Europäischen Migrationszentrum (EMZ) (eds.), *State Policies towards Muslim Minorities. Sweden, Great Britain and Germany*, Kempten, 2004, p. 123.

¹⁹² In the Netherlands the unemployment rate among Moroccans is 29% and for Turks it is 21%, this compares to a national unemployment rate of 9% in SCP, Hoge (jeugd)werkloosheid onder etnische minderheden. Nieuwe bevindingen uit het LAS-onderzoek (High Youth Unemployment among Ethnic Minorities. New Findings from the LAS Study), Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, The Hague, 2006 (in Dutch) cited in Demant et al. *Muslims in the EU, City Reports – The Netherlands: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review*, Budapest, Open Society Institute, 2007.

¹⁹³ Okkerse, L., and Termote, A., Etudes statistiques no. 111: Singularité des étrangers sur la marché de l'emploi (Singularity of Foreign Workers in the Labour Market), Brussels: Institut National de la Statistique, 2004.

¹⁹⁴ CBS, *Jaarrapport integratie 2008* (Annual Integration Report 2008), The Hague, 2008, p. 61 (hereafter CBS, *Jaarrapport integratie 2008*) cited in OSI, *At Home In Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*, forthcoming (hereafter, OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*).

figure is still high when compared with the majority population, where 35 per cent of those unemployed faced long-term unemployment.¹⁹⁵

There are, however, indications that minorities are more vulnerable to unemployment during the economic downturn, due to their position in the labour market. In the Netherlands, non-western migrants are twice as likely to be found with “flexible contracts”, contracts with no guaranteed hours of work, than native Dutch.¹⁹⁶ In Belgium, between January 2008 and 2009, the unemployment rate for Moroccans and Turks increased more than that of the labour force as a whole, by 20 percent compared with 8 percent.¹⁹⁷

5.3 Poverty

Data also show that hourly pay rates for Muslim groups is lower than that of the majority population. One consequence of low pay is that even among those in employment, poverty rates are high. In Belgium, the proportion of the population living below the poverty line is 10 per cent for native Belgians, but for Turks it is 59 per cent and for Moroccans 56 per cent.¹⁹⁸ In Amsterdam, 32 per cent of Turkish households and 37 per cent of Moroccan households in 2006 lived on the minimum income compared with 13 per cent of Dutch households.¹⁹⁹ In the UK, data from the 2002/03 to 2004/05 Family Resources Survey showed poverty as particularly high among Pakistani (67 per cent) and Bangladeshi (55 per cent) households.²⁰⁰

The family’s work status is central in household poverty. In the UK, a significant part of the poverty experienced by Pakistani and Bangladeshi households is due to the large number of families with no adults in paid employment. A third of Bangladeshi households and a quarter of Pakistani households have no adults in work. However, the gap in the poverty rates between ethnic-minority groups and the general population is greater when comparing households with adults in paid employment

¹⁹⁵ VDA, *Allochtonen sneller aan het werk (Migrants faster at work)*, VDAB Studiedienst, 2008. cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

¹⁹⁶ OSI, *At Home In Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*.

¹⁹⁷ OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

¹⁹⁸ Van Robaey, B. & Perrin, N., *Armoede bij personen van vreemde herkomst becijferd – Deelverslag van ‘Armoede bij personen van vreemde herkomst’*, (Poverty among persons of foreign origin quantified), UA-OASeS, Antwerp, 2006, available at http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/KBS-FRB/Files/NL/PUB_1635_Armoede_vreemde_origine_becijferd.pdf (accessed November 2009) cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

¹⁹⁹ See the Amsterdam Department for Research and Statistics at <http://os.amsterdam.nl/tabel/9324> (accessed November 2009), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*, forthcoming (hereafter, OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*).

²⁰⁰ P. Kenway and G. Palmer *Poverty among ethnic groups how and why does it differ?* York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation/New Policy Institute, 2007 (hereafter, Kenway & Palmer, *Poverty among ethnic groups*).

(that is “working households”) than those with no adults in work (“workless households”). Among those in working families, around 60 per cent of Bangladeshi and 40 per cent of Pakistani households are in poverty compared with 10–15 per cent for white British households. Differences in pay rates are the major factor in the difference in income poverty rates once demography and family work status is taken into account.²⁰¹

5.4 Explaining Labour-market Disadvantage: Human Capital

A range of explanations are cited to account for the differences in labour-market participation of different groups.²⁰² Much of the labour-market disadvantage experienced by minority groups is attributed to differences in social capital, in particular levels of education and skills. Many Muslims in Europe arrived as guestworkers to do unskilled or low-skilled jobs. The Hamburg integration plan attributes the poor labour-market position of migrants to structural changes in the labour market itself and the decrease in the number of unskilled or low-skilled jobs.²⁰³ Data from Slotervaart in Amsterdam show that unemployment correlates strongly with low education levels. In 2007, of the 1,789 unemployed job seekers in the submunicipality, 1,181 had no basic qualifications.²⁰⁴ By contrast, the employment rate of highly educated Turks and Moroccans (80 per cent) is close to that of their Dutch peers (85 per cent).²⁰⁵

The OSI sample confirms the general link between education and employment.

²⁰¹ Kenway & Palmer, *Poverty among ethnic groups*.

²⁰² The Institute for Labour Studies in its report for the European Commission’s The High Level Advisory Group of Experts on the Social Integration of Ethnic Minorities, identified fourteen key barriers. See Zimmerman *et al.*, *Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities*.

²⁰³ Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg Behörde für Soziales, Familie, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz, *Hamburger Handlungskonzept zur Integration von Zuwanderern* (Hamburg Action Plan on Integration), p. 23, available at <http://www.hamburg.de/contentblob/128792/data/konzept.pdf> (accessed November 2009, hereafter, Hamburg Action Plan on Integration).

²⁰⁴ OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*.

²⁰⁵ CBS *Jaarrapport integratie 2008*, p. 3.

Table 64. Employment type (current or past) (I17)

	No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
Economically inactive	39.1%	18.7%	14.0%	5.7%	13.3%
Modern professional occupations	1.6%	3.6%	12.9%	39.3%	19.7%
Clerical and intermediate occupations	2.3%	6.3%	19.1%	14.3%	15.1%
Senior managers or administrators	0.8%	0.4%	1.4%	7.7%	3.3%
Technical and craft occupations	13.3%	6.7%	10.4%	2.7%	7.7%
Semi-routine manual and service occupations	12.5%	16.7%	15.6%	8.1%	13.2%
Routine manual and service occupations	27.3%	41.7%	19.9%	6.4%	18.5%
Middle or junior managers	1.6%	5.6%	5.1%	5.5%	5.1%
Traditional professional occupations	1.6%	0.4%	1.4%	10.4%	4.2%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	128	252	1112	2197

Source: Open Society Institute data

For example, the majority of respondents employed in modern and traditional professional occupations or who are senior managers are university graduates, while respondents without any formal education tend to be concentrated in routine manual occupations or else are unemployed. The lower the level of qualifications the person possesses, the more likely it is that he or she will be unemployed: respondents with no formal education are 2.1 times more likely to be unemployed as those with primary education, 2.8 times as those with secondary education and 6.9 times more likely as those with a university degree. In terms of percentages, 39.1 per cent of those without any formal education are unemployed, compared with 5.7 per cent of university graduates.

However, separating the responses into religious categories shows a discrepancy between Muslims' and non-Muslims' occupations, whereby Muslims are disproportionately unemployed or over-represented in lower-skilled jobs.²⁰⁶

Referring to OSI data, the following should be considered.

- Muslims are almost three times more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims; 19.8 per cent of Muslims are unemployed, compared with 6.8 per cent of non-Muslims.
- Just under 0.1 per cent of Muslim university graduates are unemployed, compared with just 3.1 per cent of non-Muslims.
- 64.8 per cent of Muslim university graduates are employed in higher skilled positions, compared with 85.3 per cent of non-Muslim university graduates. Proportionally, non-Muslim university graduates are 1.6 times more likely than Muslim university graduates to be employed in modern professional occupations. However, Muslim and non-Muslim graduates also tend to be more equally distributed within traditional professional and clerical occupations, or as senior or middle managers.
- 55.5 per cent of Muslim men are concentrated in low-skill/low-wage jobs and 25.1 per cent alone are employed in routine manual and service occupations.
- Non-Muslim men are 2.3 times more likely than Muslim men to be employed in modern professional occupations (22.4 per cent non-Muslim, compared with 9.9 per cent Muslim).
- Of the 72.1 per cent of Muslim women who are/were employed, significant proportions are concentrated in clerical and intermediate occupations (21.4 per cent), routine manual or service occupations (17.8 per cent), modern professional occupations (15 per cent) and semi-routine occupations (12 per cent). Only 1.8 per cent are middle managers and 1.3 per cent are senior managers.
- Muslims born in a EU state are just as likely to be unemployed as Muslims born outside a EU state, but EU-born non-Muslims are slightly more likely to be employed than non-Muslims born elsewhere.

5.5 Social Networks and Social Capital

Fournier and Silberman suggest that the greater risk of unemployment in France among the second-generation children of non-EU migrants cannot be accounted for by their educational levels. They say that part of the explanation lies in the lower social

²⁰⁶ See Table 65. and Table 66. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

capital and access to employment in the networks of the children's parents.²⁰⁷ The impact of the social network on the employment opportunities of migrants has been examined in greater detail in the United States than in Europe.²⁰⁸ The Swedish integration report, for example, notes the importance of social networks to recruitment into employment,²⁰⁹ which, particularly in small and medium-sized firms, is often based on existing networks of employers and employees. Where the workforce is predominantly of the majority population, such practices constitute a form of indirect discrimination. The ethno-stratification of the labour market, with migrants concentrated in particular sectors, limits the networks they are able to build beyond their ethnic group.

For Turks in Germany, the composition of their friendship networks may account for a significant part of the ethnic penalty they face in the labour market.²¹⁰ Research with Somalis in Copenhagen finds that those with personal relationships with Danes were more likely to take a proactive approach to looking for jobs, because these friendships provided them with the encouragement and advice needed to overcome the fears of discrimination that demotivated others.²¹¹

Networks are important in translating improved education achievement into improved labour-market attainment. Analysis of data on the social mobility of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suggests that they do not attain the level of social mobility in terms of employment that would be expected in light of their improved educational achievements, and that once educational levels are taken into consideration, their social class mobility is substantially worse than a white non-migrant peer in the same cohort.

²⁰⁷ R. Silberman and I. Fournier, "Immigrants' Children and the Labour Market. The Mechanisms of Selective Discrimination. From one generation to another. How do the immigrants and their children see their position on the labour market?", Fourth International MigCities Conference, Lisbon, November 1999.

²⁰⁸ See Elliot and M. Sims, "Ghettos and Barrios: The Impact of Neighborhood Poverty and Race on Job Matching among Blacks and Latinos", *Social Problems* 48(3), 2001, pp. 341–361; R. M. Fernandez and E. J. Castilla "How Much Is that Social Network Worth?", *Social Capital in Employee Referral Networks. Social Capital: Theory and Research*, N. Lin, K. Cook, and R. S. B. Hawthorne (eds.) New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 2001, pp. 85–104; J. Sanders, V. Nee, and S. Sernau "Asian Immigrants' Reliance on Social Ties in a Multiethnic Labor Market", *Social Forces* 81(1) 2001, pp. 281–314.

²⁰⁹ *Rapport Integration 2005* Integrationsverket (Swedish Integration Board), Norrköping, 2006, cited in Roger Andersson, "Ethnic Residential Segregation and Integration Processes in Sweden", Karen Schonwalder (eds.) *Residential Segregation and the integration of immigrants Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden*, Social Science Research Centre Berlin, Berlin, 2007, p. 63.

²¹⁰ F. Kalter, "Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft: Zugleich eine Replik auf den Beitrag von Holger Seibert und Heike Solga", *Z. Soziol.* 354, 2006, pp. 144–60 (in German).

²¹¹ C.B. Jagd, "Breaking the Pattern of Unemployment through Social Networks", paper presented at the 13th Nordic Migration Conference, 18–20 November 2004, available at <http://www.amid.dk/ocs/viewpaper.php?id=93&cf=1> (accessed November 2009).

It is suggested that this in part reflects the differential class impact of ethnic-bonding social capital on social mobility. In other words, for groups such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis concentrated in lower-class positions, the beneficial effects of strong ethnic-bonding social capital in creating high aspirations and a drive for education is countered by the lack of bridging social capital (networks beyond their immediate community) that is needed to turn these aspirations into reality. The research finds that Pakistanis from working-class origins “are less likely than their white non-migrant counterparts to end up in professional or managerial positions”.²¹² Platt finds that “relatively small proportions with no qualifications from the Pakistani, Indian and Caribbean groups end up in the professional or managerial classes compared to the white groups”. From this she argues that “the ethnic penalty [...] seems greater for the least advantaged; and to the extent that any minority group is concentrated among those with no qualifications, they will then suffer disproportionately”.²¹³

Translating educational aspiration and achievement into labour-market participation also requires knowledge of the formal and informal rules that operate in the labour market. Responses from OSI focus group participants and questionnaires suggest there is a need for better careers information and advice. The range of jobs that young people see as potential is limited. A focus group participant who also worked with young people in trying to get them into employment comments on the lack of knowledge about the labour market: “In Germany we have 455 official professions, but the girls here focus on only five, most commonly medical secretary, sales, and hairdressing. For boys it is equally fixed.” Nadia Nagie, an expert working for the Berlin NGO KUMULUS, also argues that there is a lack of knowledge among parents, students and teachers about the complex educational and vocational training system in Germany. Their organisation was trying to explain, for example, that a good vocational qualification like a craft certificate was considered more highly in its profession than a bad or average high-school education certificate.

5.6 Language Fluency

Poor fluency in the national or majority language is often a barrier for first-generation migrants.²¹⁴ Many were recruited to undertake unskilled employment in an ethnically segmented labour market that did not require them to pick up the majority language or other skills that enhanced employment opportunities. Lack of confidence in the majority language limits the ability of individuals to retrain and upskill, limiting their

²¹² L. Platt, “Making education count: the effects of ethnicity and qualifications on intergenerational social class mobility”, *The Sociological Review* Vol. 55, No. 3, 2007, pp. 485–508, at 498 (hereafter, Platt, “Making education count”).

²¹³ Platt, “Making education count”, p. 498.

²¹⁴ H. Esser, “Migration, Language and Integration” *AKI Res. Rev.* 4. Berlin, Wiss. Berlin Sozial (WZB), 2006, available at http://www.wzb.eu/ZKD/AKI/files/aki_research_review_4.pdf (accessed November 2009).

employment opportunities to ethnic employment markets.²¹⁵ Research in the UK has found a positive association between English-language fluency among immigrants and pay.²¹⁶ Improving written skills has a far greater impact on the availability of employment than improved verbal skills. The latter appears to increase employment probabilities by five per cent, while the former improves it by 13 per cent.²¹⁷

5.7 Ethnic Penalty

Language competence and lack of recognition of qualifications is less of an issue for Muslims born and educated in Europe. While their lower education attainment rates shape their labour-market participation, it does not seem to fully account for their position in the labour market.

Labour-market research in the United States has for some time identified an “ethnic penalty” experienced by some minority groups in the labour market. A penalty is said to exist where statistical analysis of data shows differences persist between ethnic groups after common socio-economic variables that are expected affect labour-market participation, such as education and age, have been taken into account.

The limitations in data collection make similar analysis in Europe more challenging. In France, the CEREQ (French Centre for Research on Education, Training and Employment) survey tracks over time cohorts of students from a particular year to follow their integration into the labour market. Analysis of CEREQ data for the class of 1998 shows that when comparing those with the same level of qualifications, labour-market participation rates are lower for young people with foreign-born parents compared with those with French-born parents.²¹⁸ Comparing those with the same level of education also shows that, three years after leaving education, students of North African backgrounds were less likely than their peers to be managers but more likely to be employees or working as lower-level professionals.²¹⁹ Research

²¹⁵ P. Schellekens, *English Language as a Barrier to Employment, Education and Training*, Department for Education and Skills, London, 2001.

²¹⁶ M. A. Shields, and S. Wheatley Price, “The English language fluency and occupational success of ethnic minority immigrant men living in English metropolitan areas” *Journal of Population Economics* Vol. 15, 2002, pp. 137–160.

²¹⁷ C. Dustmann, and F. Fabbri, “Language Proficiency and Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK”, *The Economic Journal* Vol. 113, 2003, pp. 695–717.

²¹⁸ Alain Frickey and Jean-Luc Primon, *Jeunes diplômés issus de l’immigration: insertion professionnelle ou discriminations?* (Young graduates of immigrant descent: occupational integration or discrimination?), La Documentation française, collection Etudes et Recherches, Paris, 2005 (hereafter, Frickey & Primon, *Jeunes diplômés issus de l’immigration: insertion professionnelle ou discriminations?*), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Marseille*, forthcoming (hereafter, OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Marseille*).

²¹⁹ Frickey & Primon, *Jeunes diplômés issus de l’immigration: insertion professionnelle ou discriminations?*

commissioned by the Dutch government found that four per cent of the unemployment experienced by Moroccans and Turks cannot be explained by personal factors relevant to the labour market.²²⁰ Data presented by Heath *et al.* show that even after the difference in education is taken into account, the second-generation groups are significantly more likely than the majority population to face unemployment and less likely to access the salariat. They conclude that for the second generation, after differences in education are accounted for, ethnic penalties appear to remain and that “the most disadvantaged groups are the second generation of Turkish ancestry in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands; of Moroccan or North African ancestry in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands; of Caribbean or Pakistani ancestry in Britain; and of Surinamese ancestry in the Netherlands”.²²¹

5.8 Religion Penalty

In addition, there is the religion penalty. Determining whether Muslims experience this in employment situations is more difficult. The inclusion of questions on religious affiliation in census and labour-market data allows analysts in the UK to examine this issue. Clarke and Drinkwater find “some evidence that, controlling for other factors, Muslims have lower employment rates than individuals with another, or indeed no, religion”. However, they argue that the close correlation between religion and ethnicity for some ethnic groups makes it difficult to separate the influences of ethnicity and religion. Furthermore, “it may be tradition, rather than religious belief *per se*, that influences attitudes to female labour force participation and childcare”. They argue that it could be “misleading to label behaviour, such as presumably voluntary adherence to a particular religion, as a cause of economic disadvantage”.²²² Berthoud and Blekesaune suggest that “religion rather than ethnicity is the characteristic associated with employment disadvantage”.²²³ A cross-referencing of ethnicity and religion shows that “when investigating religious groups within different ethnic groups, we find that all Muslim groups are in a disadvantageous employment position irrespective of which ethnic group they belong to”.²²⁴ Thus, the employment penalty faced by Indian Muslims was greater than that of Indian Hindus, Sikhs and Christians.

²²⁰ K. Andriessen, *Discriminatiemonitor niet-westerse allochtonen op de arbeidsmarkt*. (Discrimination monitor non-Western immigrants on the labour market), SCP, The Hague, 2007 (in Dutch), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*.

²²¹ Anthony Heath, Catherine Rethon, and Elina Kilpi, “The Second Generation in Western Europe: Education, Unemployment, and Occupational Attainment”, *Annual Review of Sociology* 34, 2008, pp. 211–235 at 218 (hereafter, Heath *et al.*, “The Second Generation in Western Europe”).

²²² K. Clarke, and S. Drinkwater, *Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market: Dynamics and Diversity* Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 2007, p. 48.

²²³ R. Berthoud and M. Blekesaune, *Persistent employment disadvantage*, DWP Research Report No. 416, Norwich, Department for Work and Pensions, 2007, p. 72 (hereafter, Berthoud & Blekesaune, *Persistent employment disadvantage*).

²²⁴ Berthoud and Blekesaune, *Persistent employment disadvantage*, p. 76.

When comparing minority groups, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims experience a greater employment penalty than Caribbean or black African Christians.

5.9 Discrimination

The work on ethnic and religion penalties seeks, in part, to identify the role of discrimination in shaping the labour-market participation of minority groups. While statistical analysis can be used to identify the existence of an ethnic or religion penalty, it does not identify the extent to which that penalty is the result of discrimination. As Heath and Cheun stress, “ethnic penalties must not be equated with discrimination *per se*, although discrimination is likely to be one major component of the ethnic penalties”.²²⁵ Expectations and experiences of discrimination shape the employment choices made by those from ethnic-minority groups. Individuals avoid employment in industries where the environment is perceived to be hostile to them.²²⁶

Evidence of discrimination in employment is more difficult to obtain. The clearest examples of discrimination come from cases brought against employers by individuals. In addition to this, so-called situation testing, which is making applications for jobs, citing the same qualifications, but with names that suggest different ethnic or religious backgrounds, can provide evidence of discrimination in recruitment practices. Tests carried out in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands found significant rates of discrimination against migrants and ethnic-minority applicants in all three countries.²²⁷ Situation testing in France found that a person from the Maghreb had five times less chance of receiving a positive reply than other applicants.²²⁸ In Denmark, it was found that chances of an applicant being called for a job interview varied by a ratio of 1:32 depending on whether the applicant used a typically Danish name or one suggesting a Turkish, Arab or Pakistani background.²²⁹ A Muslim

²²⁵ A. Heath and S. Y. Cheung, “Ethnic penalties in the labour market: employers and discrimination”, Research Report No. 341, Department for Work and Pensions, London, 2006, p. 5.

²²⁶ See J. Wrench, and T. Qureshi, *Higher Horizons: A qualitative study of young men of Bangladeshi origin*, Research Studies RS30, Department for Education and Employment, London, 1996; J. Aston, H. Hooker, R. Page, and R. Wilson, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes to work and family*, DWP Research Report 458, Department for Work and Pensions, London, 2007 (hereafter Aston *et al.*, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes*); Iris Andriessen, Jaco Dagevos, Eline Nievers and Igor Boog, *discriminatiemonitor niet westerse allochtonen op de arbeidsmarkt* (Discrimination Monitor non-Western immigrants in the labour market), SCP, The Hague, 2007 (in Dutch).

²²⁷ R. Zegers de Beijl, (ed.), *Documenting discrimination against migrant workers in the labour market. A comparative study of four European countries*, ILO, Geneva, 2000.

²²⁸ EUMC, *Muslims in the EU*, pp. 44–45.

²²⁹ J. Hjarnø and T. Bager, *Diskriminering af unge med indvandrerbaggrund ved jobsøgning* (Discrimination of young applicants with immigrant backgrounds during job applications), Research Paper No. 21, DAMES. Esbjerg, 1997, cited in M. Hussain, *Muslims in EU Cities Report: Denmark Preliminary Research and Literature Review*, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2007 (hereafter, Hussain, *Muslims in the EU Literature Review: Denmark*).

respondent in Leicester recalled securing interviews for jobs when he applied using the name David, where previously he had failed when applying for the same positions with his real name.

Levels of labour-market discrimination may also be gauged from self-reporting surveys, that is, surveys in which people are asked if they think they have faced discrimination. The accuracy of such surveys is difficult to ascertain as individuals may either under- or overestimate instances of discrimination. Research on discrimination in Antwerp has found that when looking for a job, one in ten Moroccan and Turkish people experience discrimination frequently, while a further 33 per cent of Moroccan male and 20 per cent of Turkish male and female employees and Moroccan female employees report experiencing discrimination sometimes.²³⁰ Analysis of the CEREQ generation 1998 data finds that 17 per cent of North Africans felt that they faced discrimination in employment because of their ethnic or religious origins. A far greater proportion (70 per cent) cited discrimination on the basis of their name.²³¹ The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) EU Minorities and Discrimination Survey found that in Germany, 28 per cent of Turks reported encountering discrimination when looking for work, and 23 per cent encountered discrimination at work.²³² In the British Home Office Citizenship Survey 24 per cent of Bangladeshis and 12 per cent of Pakistanis cited racial discrimination as a reason for being refused a job. Religious discrimination was cited by 13 per cent of Bangladeshis and 9 per cent of Pakistanis.²³³ In the Eurobarometer Survey 26 per cent of respondents believed that an expression of a religious belief would put a job applicant at a disadvantage.²³⁴ The results varied across different EU states, with the visible expression of religious identity cited as most likely to disadvantage a job applicant in Denmark (65 per cent) and the Netherlands

²³⁰ V. Vandezande, F. Fleischmann, G. Baysu, M. Swyngedouw, and K. Phalet, *De Turkse en Marokkaanse tweede generatie op de arbeidsmarkt in Antwerpen en Brussel* (Turkish and Moroccan second generation on the labour market in Antwerp and Brussels), Centrum voor Sociologisch Onderzoek, Leuven, 2008, cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

²³¹ A. Frickey, and J.-L. Primon, “Jeunes issus de l’immigration: les diplômés de l’enseignement supérieur ne garantissent pas un égal accès à l’emploi” (“Young People with an Immigrant Background: the Diplomas of Higher Education Do Not Guarantee Equal Access to Employment”), *Formation Emploi*, n°29, 2002 (in French).

²³² FRA, *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*, p. 6.

²³³ H. Green, H. Connolly and C. Farmer, *2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey: People, Families and Communities*, Home Office Research Study 289, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, London, 2004.

²³⁴ The question asked was: In (OUR COUNTRY), when a company wants to hire someone and has the choice between two candidates with equal skills and qualifications, which of the following criteria may, in your opinion, put one candidate at a disadvantage? The expression of a religious belief (for example wearing a visible religious symbol), see Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, p. 26.

(59 per cent) and was least problematic in the UK (21 per cent).²³⁵ Further analysis found that over a third of respondents who were managers (35 per cent) said that a person would experience difficulty in a job interview because of the expression of a religious belief.²³⁶

In the OSI survey 30 per cent of Muslim respondents and 27 per cent of non-Muslim respondents said that they had been turned down for a job in the previous five years.²³⁷

When religion, gender and place of birth are correlated, Muslim women born in the EU are the group most likely to have been refused a job in the past five years (37.3 per cent), while non-Muslim women born outside a EU state are second most likely (34.2 per cent).²³⁸

Muslim men born in the EU also indicate a high rate of refusal (33.7 per cent). Muslim women born outside the EU and non-Muslim women born within the EU are the two groups least likely to have been refused a job in the past five years (25.1 per cent each). Muslim respondents who show visible signs of their religious identity have experienced a fractionally higher rate of refusal than visibly religious non-Muslims (26 per cent and 24.4 per cent, respectively).

²³⁵ There were also results for Germany 43%; Belgium 46%; France 36%; and Sweden 51%. See Eurobarometer, *Discrimination in the EU*, table QA7.

²³⁶ Eurobarometer *Discrimination in the EU*, p. 27.

²³⁷ See Table 67. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

²³⁸ See Table 68. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Table 69. Have you been refused a job in this country in the last 5 years? (H10)

		Visible signs of their religious identity		
		Yes	No	Total
Muslim	Yes	26.0%	32.2%	29.9%
	No	39.5%	48.3%	45.0%
	Don't know	1.0%	2.6%	2.0%
	Not applicable	33.6%	16.9%	23.1%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	408	698	1106
Non-Muslim	Yes	24.4%	27.1%	27.0%
	No	46.7%	51.1%	50.9%
	Don't know	2.2%	1.0%	1.0%
	Not applicable	26.7%	20.8%	21.0%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	45	1039	1084

Source: Open Society Institute data

This difference is more marked between Muslims and non-Muslims who do not show any signs of their religiosity.

Table 70. Have you been refused a job in this country in the last 5 years? (H10)

		Highest level of education completed				Total
		No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	
Yes		7.1%	18.7%	27.2%	37.6%	28.4%
No		48.0%	50.6%	47.9%	47.3%	48.0%
Don't know		4.7%	1.2%	1.3%	1.4%	1.5%
Not applicable		40.2%	29.5%	23.5%	13.6%	22.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	127	251	1112	704	2194

Source: Open Society Institute data

Respondents with higher qualifications tend to experience greater rates of refusal, and Table 70. shows that 37.6 per cent of university graduates had been refused a job in the past five years compared with 7.1 per cent of those with no formal qualifications. At the same time, a far greater proportion of respondents with few or no qualifications answered “Not applicable” to this question, suggesting that they had not applied for a job in the first place. Respondents who obtained their qualifications in another EU country experienced the highest rates of refusal (32.9 per cent), whilst those who had studied in a non-EU state experienced the lowest levels (25.8 per cent).

Table 71. Have you been refused a job in this country in the last 5 years? (H10)

		Where did interviewee study?			
		In this country	In another EU state	In a non-EU state	Total
Yes		30.9%	32.9%	25.8%	29.7%
No		48.7%	44.3%	47.0%	48.1%
Don't know		1.4%	–	1.3%	1.3%
Not applicable		19.0%	22.8%	25.8%	20.9%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1448	79	523	2050

Source: Open Society Institute data

Muslim and non-Muslim respondents differ in how they interpret the reasons for being turned down for a job. In general, Muslim respondents identify discrimination based on ethnicity (15 per cent) slightly more frequently than religious discrimination (12 per cent) as the reason.

Table 72. For what reasons was interviewee refused a job? (H11)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Your gender	0.3%	0.6%	40.0%
Your age	2.3%	4.5%	3.4%
Your ethnicity	4.5%	0.8%	2.7%
Your religion	3.8%	–	1.9%
Your colour	1.9%	1.4%	1.6%
Where you live	0.8%	0.3%	0.5%
Other	12.8%	14.3%	13.6%
Don't know	3.3%	4.5%	3.9%
N/A	70.4%	73.6%	72.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1089

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, among Muslim respondents, Muslim women born in Europe identified religion (21 per cent) as the basis of discrimination more frequently than ethnicity (12 per cent).²³⁹

In interpreting these findings it must be remembered that the nature of the discrimination Muslims encounter, the boundaries between different characteristics, race, ethnicity, religion and gender, are less precise and stable than it might first appear.²⁴⁰ Identifying the grounds of discrimination or even the primary grounds may not be possible where a person has more than one characteristic that makes them a target of discrimination. Furthermore, individuals interpret their experiences in ways

²³⁹ See Table 73. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

²⁴⁰ For a discussion of the racialisation of religion see M. Chon and D. Artz, “Walking While Muslim”, *Law and Contemporary Problems* 68, 2005, at p. 228 where they note that “Religion is not ‘immutable’ in the way we understand skin colour to be. Religious affiliation or identity is always a matter of choice. Yet, especially through the war on terror, Islam is acquiring characteristics of immutability, innateness, inevitability, inheritability and, importantly inferiority. In other words religious differences are being ‘racialised’”.

that allow them to mediate and cope with their experiences.²⁴¹ Muslims face different forms of discrimination and experience differing disadvantages, depending on a wide range of characteristics, including perceptions of race, ethnicity and gender. This is illustrated by a respondent from Marseille, a graduate of Marseille Business School, who was unable to find employment 2.5 years after graduating:

I have had real difficult situations. I've had phone interviews with firms, it went rather well. When I arrived at the office, the face changed. My name is Moussa Saïd, Arab name and first problem. I arrive: I am black. Second problem. "On top of that he is Muslim. And he lives in a rough area. We can't cope any more." I have faced so much difficulty in securing a job that I promise that when a does firm take me, I'll finish at the top. I have had so much trouble that if I must, I will work 65 hours instead of 35 to prove myself to my colleagues, I'll do it!

One area where discrimination on the grounds of religion and gender intersect is in relation to exclusion from the labour market of women who wear the *hijab*. In Germany, the law of state neutrality has been used to exclude Muslim women who wear the headscarf from certain jobs. Although the ban is limited to specific public positions, the interviews with stakeholders and discussion in focus groups indicated that the ban has affected the attitudes of private-sector employers towards women who wear the *hijab*. In the experience of a focus group participant who worked with young people in careers counselling in Berlin, young women who wore headscarves could not secure apprenticeships or internships. Another recalled that during her internship at a local police station she was only given administrative work, whereas her fellow intern who did not wear a *hijab* was allowed to fully participate in all areas of work, including accompanying officers on patrol. The anti-discrimination regional office in Berlin has called for a review of the *Neutralitätsgesetz* in light of implementation of EU Directives on discrimination.

In the Netherlands, 10 per cent of discrimination cases handled by the anti-discrimination bureau relate to the *hijab*. In Antwerp, the municipal authorities introduced a regulation that prevented women wearing the *hijab* in positions that involved direct contact with the public. It was the perception of focus group

²⁴¹ M. Bying, "Mediating Discrimination: Resisting Oppression Among African-American Muslim Women", *Social Problems* 45(4), 1998, at pp. 474–475, "mediation means having the agency to respond to discrimination in ways that resist its power and oppression...human agency is central to mediation: ownership, accountability, self definition, self-determination, and self-evaluation mean that in the face of painful discrimination people maintain their humanity and recognise the humanity of others". Bying finds that the African-American Muslim women she interviewed "were able to resist the oppression of discrimination by a humanist vision that views discrimination as triggered by difference. Even though these women experience classic cases of discrimination, they maintain the ability of self-definition, determination, and valuation. They define the importance of the experience for themselves and their lives, and thereby are able to mediate discrimination... [They] use their membership in the Muslim community as a self defining and safe social space."

participants that the exclusion of women wearing the headscarf has now become normalised in the mainstream labour market. The dilemma women who choose to wear the headscarf are confronted with, of whether to accept their exclusion from mainstream employment or to remove their headscarf, was raised by a focus group participant in Marseille who was urged by her employer to take off her scarf because of comments from the business's clients: "So either we give up, we think that it is not of utmost importance to dress like that, and [give] priority to earning a living and being independent. Or we think, this is to defend freedom, it is a right that has been infringed, they have infringed on my right to dress [how] I like."

Women in focus groups were keenly aware of having to overcome and challenge stereotypes held about Muslim women, in order to show that these stereotypes do not apply to them. In Amsterdam, while women felt it was difficult to reach the positions they wanted to because of their headscarves and cultural differences, they saw themselves as the bridging generation; they expected things to improve over time, so that the third generation would not encounter the same obstacles.

5.10 Muslim Women and Employment

While the ban on the *hijab* is an important issue for many Muslim women who are pursuing employment and integration through participation in the mainstream labour market, a further issue of concern for policymakers is raising the overall level of economic participation of Muslim women. As noted earlier, economic participation rates for some female Muslim groups is below 40 per cent.

Discussions in the focus groups suggested that cultural expectations around child care and other caring responsibilities play a significant part in shaping the choices Muslim women make about labour-market participation. Women were more likely to look for employment in the local area where they lived so that they could reconcile work and family responsibilities. Women did refer to the advantage of employment as well as financial benefits and they talked about paid employment as providing them with "something that is their own", but they wanted to ensure that it left time for looking after their children. Muslim women who were in employment took pride in being equal in exchanges and discussion with employers and colleagues, a position that differed significantly from their mothers'. Women in the labour market, referring to the possibility that they might stay at home once their partners were earning enough, viewed their decision as no different from that made by non-Muslim professional working women.

These findings are consistent with research in the UK which shows that among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, for example, there is a strong emphasis on the importance of

parenting.²⁴² The preference to stay at home with their children combines with having more children to keep women out of the labour market for longer. Having children at a younger age may also mean that women have limited or no labour-market experience prior to becoming parents; this further reduces the likelihood of a woman returning to the labour market after becoming a mother.²⁴³ For those in work, the need for work to fit around family responsibilities also leads to underemployment: “Women with first or postgraduate degrees had chosen to work in jobs that they were perhaps over-qualified for, in order to be able to work part-time, gain flexibility, and balance the demands of their family with their work.”²⁴⁴ The strong cultural expectation of marriage and motherhood reinforces the general correlation between educational qualifications and participation in the labour market. In particular, women without qualifications are more likely to be economically inactive, married and to have had more children at a younger age.²⁴⁵

5.11 Action to Support Labour-market Participation

Across the 11 cities, a range of different measures are being taken to support labour-market participation. Given the position Muslims occupy in the labour market, initiatives aimed at the most disadvantaged should have a disproportionate impact on them. This includes initiatives aimed at improving the opportunities of those leaving education to make the transition to the labour market. In Amsterdam there is networking between local schools and businesses in order to improve opportunities for obtaining apprenticeships. The sports company Nike is, for example, involved in a marketing project with students from the Calvijn Met Junior College. In Marseille the “Youth Challenge” initiative is an example of an initiative developed to bring young people into closer contact with employers and employers in closer contact with youngsters with no qualifications. A local project, in partnership with the Société Générale Bank developed a training programme aimed at youths without qualifications, which would lead to a level 3 diploma after four years, and potentially a job in sales. Sixty youths were pre-selected, 17 were presented to the Bank and finally 12 were selected.

²⁴² See J. Lindley, A. Dale and S. Dex, “Ethnic differences in women’s demographic and family characteristics and employment profile”, *Labour Market Trends*, April 2004, pp. 153–165 ; A. Dale, N. Shaheen, V. Kalra, and E. Fieldhouse, “Routes into education and employment for young Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in the UK”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 25, No. 6, 2002, pp. 942–968; A. Dale, N. Shaheen, E. Fieldhouse and V. Kalra, “The labour market prospects for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women”, *Work Employment and Society* Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, pp. 5–25.

²⁴³ Aston *et al.*, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes*.

²⁴⁴ Aston *et al.*, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes*, p. 88.

²⁴⁵ Aston *et al.*, *Pakistani and Bangladeshi Women’s Attitudes*.

Marseille has also developed “Second Chance Schools”. These are schools targeted at young people who originally left school without a diploma. The Second Chance Schools aim to familiarise students with employers through internships. More than 1,700 firms, for the most part small or very small, are partners in this initiative. The schools and employers provide internships, which are implemented in a progressive manner in order to avoid destabilising both students and firms. The instructors evaluate and follow the students each time they do their internships. Direct experience of the working environment is essential to the project. Training is individualised. Each student has a mentor, who supervises 12–15 students. Each youth is considered a trainee, with a salary of €300–600.²⁴⁶ Assessments from the school have been positive. Almost 2,500 youth have been interns of the Second Chance Schools since their beginning. Statistics reveal that of the 1,600 interns who completed their studies between 1998 and 2006, 66 per cent obtained gainful employment.

Refugees and new migrants are frequently identified and targeted as a group with specific needs. In Berlin, job centres have created a post of *Migrationsbeauftragte*, officials with specific responsibility for addressing the labour-market problems faced by migrants.

There are also initiatives that work with Muslim communities and understand the role they have in ensuring advice and information reaches those who are furthest from the labour market. In Berlin, imams, who are important social actors in Muslim communities, to whom parents or young people may look for advice, are trained by the NGO KUMULUS about the educational and employment opportunities available for young people. In Leicester, the employment advice agency Job Centre Plus took employers to local community centres, temples and mosques, so that they could get a better understanding of the barriers faced in recruiting minorities. When a new shopping centre was being developed, the agency put on a “roadshow” to showcase the new employers to the community. In Amsterdam, employers trying to increase applications from women from minorities participate in a jobs fair hosted by the women’s organisation Nisa for Nisa.

Other initiatives, although not working with community institutions or structures, recognise the importance of employing people who reflect and connect to the groups they are trying to reach. In Berlin, Kreuzberg’s “Kietzlotsen” project, which encourages young people to take up employment training opportunities or to return to education, employs outreach workers who share the same background as the young people they are trying to reach. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the Dutch Foundation for Successful Entrepreneurship is piloting a project to support immigrant women to become economically active and to address the problem of child care. In Leicester, the

²⁴⁶ Mission commune d’information sur le fonctionnement des dispositifs de formation professionnelle, Déplacement à Marseille (Joint Mission Information on the operation of vocational training schemes), 2006, see the French Senate website at <http://www.senat.fr> (accessed November 2009).

NGO RASAP received state support to help improve access to employment for migrants, asylum seekers and Muslim women. In explaining the advantages of this targeted approach, a project director at the organisation, explained that they understand the needs of these different groups: “the employment needs are different, there needs to be a faith friendly environment”.

The city authorities themselves are also significant employers, and several have made efforts to encourage applications from minority groups. In Berlin, the Senate ran a campaign “Berlin braucht dich” (Berlin Needs You)²⁴⁷ to encourage people from minority backgrounds to apply for public administration jobs. The campaign included contacting religious leaders, mosques, associations and other immigrant NGOs. Hamburg began a programme to increase the proportion of trainees it employed with a migration background. This included the campaign “Wir sind Hamburg - Bist Du dabei?” (We are Hamburg! Are you with us?),²⁴⁸ aimed at recruiting young people with migration backgrounds.

There are also initiatives directed at particular barriers to participation. Rotterdam, for example, joined the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, and has a programme aimed at countering discrimination and exclusion, called “Discriminatie? De groeten!” (Discrimination? So Long!).²⁴⁹ It encourages minorities to report discrimination. The Rotterdam initiative also includes programmes to increase skills and qualifications. This includes encouraging vocation streams in schools to place more focus on skills in finding jobs, including application letters and interviews. Employers or small and medium-sized firms are encouraged to increase the diversity of their workforce.

Access to employment for unemployed graduates is another area where initiatives are underway. Recognising that disadvantage in accessing employment can be partly attributed to a lack of networks and knowledge of the labour market, the Young Foundation in London has started a project called *Fastlaners* in an effort to address these barriers.²⁵⁰ The two-week training course for graduates, from ethnic-minority and marginalised background, offers intensive training on CV writing, interviews, job search and strengthening of non-cognitive skills. The objective is to empower graduates, through building skills, to potential work placements and better access to the labour market. It is also linked to supporting the achievement of key local policy targets, including community cohesion as well as employment.

²⁴⁷ See the campaign website at <http://www.berlin-braucht-dich.de>.

²⁴⁸ See the Hamburg city website at <http://www.hamburg.de/bist-du-dabei/62924/bist-du-dabei.html> (accessed November 2009).

²⁴⁹ The text of the programme is available at http://www.vng.nl/Praktijkvoorbeelden/SZI/2007/rotterdamdiscriminatiedegroeten_2007.pdf (in Dutch, accessed November 2009).

²⁵⁰ For more information on this programme, see <http://www.fastlaners.org.uk>.

In general, more non-Muslim respondents (41 per cent) were satisfied with the efforts being made by employers to respect different religious customs than Muslim respondents (37 per cent).

Table 74. Do employers respect different religious customs? (G6)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Too much		1.7%	2.5%	2.1%
About right		36.6%	40.7%	38.6%
Too little		36.0%	23.7%	29.9%
Don't know		25.7%	33.1%	29.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1089	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

In fact, if respondents who said “Don't know” are excluded, then Muslim respondents were evenly split between those who were satisfied with the respect of religious customs shown by employers (49 per cent) and those who felt there was too little respect for different religions and customs (48 per cent). However, further analysis shows that a majority of male respondents (52 per cent) felt employers showed sufficient respect, but a majority of female respondents (52 per cent) felt they showed too little.

Table 75. Do employers respect different religious customs? (by gender) (G6)

		Muslim male	Muslim female	Non-Muslim male	Non-Muslim female	Total
Too much		2.3%	1.1%	2.7%	2.3%	2.1%
About right		39.4%	33.8%	43.1%	38.4%	38.6%
Too little		34.1%	37.9%	23.4%	24.0%	29.9%
Don't know		24.2%	27.2%	30.8%	35.3%	29.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	558	551	522	567	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

5.12 Key Findings

Muslims are not integrated into the mainstream labour market. They face higher unemployment rates and lower employment rates compared with the general population. Those in employment are often in marginal and low-paid work with greater vulnerability to unemployment. Low pay in the jobs they have also leads to higher rates of poverty. Human capital accounts for some of this disadvantage; other factors include social networks, knowledge and understanding of the labour market and language fluency. There is also evidence to support claims that some Muslims face both an ethnic and a religion penalty in the labour market. The research suggests that discrimination on the grounds of religion, particularly for women who wear the veil, is an important contributor to any religion penalty. For Muslim women other factors include cultural preferences concerning family and child care. Across the 11 cities, a range of different measures are being taken to support labour-market participation, including initiatives that work with Muslim communities and recognise the role they have in ensuring advice and information reaches those who are furthest from the labour market. Cities are also major employers and some are taking steps to ensure that their workforce reflects the full diversity of the local population.

6. NEIGHBOURHOOD AND HOUSING

The focus of this chapter is the examination of respondents' perceptions and experiences of housing and their neighbourhood. It begins with an outline of the factors that are relevant to understanding the settlement patterns of Muslims in western Europe. It then looks at housing, in particular tenure and the quality of housing respondents live in and their experiences of discrimination in accessing housing. The section then explores respondents' subjective experiences of the neighbourhoods they live in. It examines aspects such as: the length of time of residence in the locality; the reasons for moving into the area (push-pull factors); the features liked or disliked about the neighbourhood; and viewpoints about policies for creating a greater social mix in areas with significant Muslim populations. The chapter draws on data from the OSI questionnaires, focus groups and stakeholder interviews, as well as referring to other policy and research literature.

6.1 Distinction between the Local Area and the Neighbourhood

The OSI questionnaire draws a distinction between the local area and the neighbourhood that people live in: the local area is defined as the area within 15–20 minutes' walking distance of home, while the neighbourhood is a smaller area, the street in the immediate vicinity of their home. It is possible for a person/respondent to live in a local area that is ethnically or religiously mixed, but within this there may be more or less ethnic and cultural diversity in the neighbourhood. Respondents were asked about the ethnic and religious diversity of their neighbourhood.

Table 76. Ethnic and religious mix of neighbourhood (C4)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Mainly your relatives	4.2%	2.7%	3.5%
Mainly people from your ethnic and religious background	16.0%	5.2%	10.7%
Mainly people who share your religion from other ethnic backgrounds	9.6%	1.9%	5.8%
Mainly people from the same ethnic background but different religion	2.6%	2.3%	2.5%
Mainly people from a different ethnic and religious background	11.1%	14.6%	12.8%
From a mixture of different backgrounds, ethnicities and religions	56.4%	73.3%	64.8%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1088

Source: Open Society Institute data

Almost three-quarters of non-Muslim respondents (73 per cent) and the majority of Muslim respondents (56 per cent) lived in neighbourhoods that were ethnically and religiously mixed; 16 per cent of Muslim respondents lived in neighbourhoods with people mainly from their ethnic and religious background, and a further 10 per cent lived in neighbourhoods where residents were mainly Muslim but from different ethnic backgrounds. This suggests that a quarter of Muslim respondents live in neighbourhoods where their neighbours are mainly Muslim. This is not unexpected, as the research focuses on areas with large Muslim populations.

6.2 Historic Patterns of Muslim Settlement

The settlement of Muslims in European cities and in particular local areas is a result of a variety of processes. Muslims mainly arrived in western Europe as mostly male labour migrants, to undertake low-paid industrial work in the postwar period. Their settlement patterns were initially shaped by the employment and recruitment patterns of their destination country. As families joined Muslim men, access to housing played a greater role in shaping settlement patterns. For Muslims who arrived as refugees, the points of settlement were also dependent on the nature of the refugee settlement programmes. Muslims who arrived during this period, like other migrants, settled mainly in large urban centres.

In the Netherlands, 36 per cent of Turks and 47 per cent of Moroccans live in the four big cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague).²⁵¹ In the UK, around two-fifths of Muslims (38 per cent) live in London, and there are also significant concentrations in the west Midlands, west Yorkshire, Lancashire and around Glasgow in Scotland. In Denmark, two-thirds of the ethnic-minority populations live in municipalities that account for only 10 per cent of the general population.²⁵² In France, 51 per cent of Turks, 44 per cent of Algerians and 41 per cent of Moroccans live in neighbourhoods where a third of households are from a migration background.²⁵³ In contrast, in Germany, Muslims are not found in significant concentrations in a small number of large cities; their more dispersed settlement pattern is shaped in part by the nature of the German industrial base, with factories

²⁵¹ Gideon Bolt, Ronald van Kempen and Maarten van Ham, “Minority Ethnic Groups in the Dutch Housing Market: Spatial Segregation, Relocation Dynamics and Housing Policy”, *Urban Studies* 45(7), 2008, p. 1,364 (hereafter, Bolt *et al.*, “Minority Ethnic Groups in the Dutch Housing Market”).

²⁵² Ministry of Integration Denmark, *Integrations Forskning i Danmark 1980–2002* (Integration research in Denmark 1980–2002) Copenhagen, 2002 (hereafter, Integration research in Denmark 1980–2002), cited in Hussain, *Muslims in the EU Literature Review: Denmark*, p. 24.

²⁵³ Bill Edgar, *Policy Measure to Ensure Access to Affordable Housing for Ethnic Minorities*, Joint Centre for Scottish Housing Research, Dundee, 2004, p. 24 (hereafter, Edgar, *Policy Measure to Ensure Access to Affordable Housing for Ethnic Minorities*).

spread across different small and medium-sized cities.²⁵⁴ Analysis of micro-census data finds that “Germany’s immigrant population is less concentrated in a small number of urban centres than those of Great Britain and the Netherlands”. Further analysis of the concentration of Turkish communities in 1,810 local areas among Germany’s large and medium-sized cities found only 11 units where their share exceeded 20 per cent of the population, whereas one-third live in 121 units where at least 10 per cent of the population are Turkish nationals.²⁵⁵

6.3 Urban Deprivation and Local Areas with Large Muslim Populations

While for many Muslims, employment accounts for the decision about initial points of settlement, poverty, discrimination, fear of racism, housing choice and preference all contribute to the subsequent movement and distribution of Muslim populations. The kind of local area an individual lives in affects their social and economic integration; there are damaging effects of living in areas of deprivation that are not accounted for by individual or household characteristics.²⁵⁶ In areas of high unemployment rates or households with no adult in paid employment, the social networks for finding future employment are weak; there are fewer positive role models for young people and the negative reputation of the area can reduce the chances of employment.²⁵⁷ Significant Muslim populations are often found in areas of acute deprivation. In the UK, for example, Muslims are disproportionately represented in the most deprived urban communities. One-third of the Muslim population lives in the 10 per cent most deprived neighbourhoods.²⁵⁸ In Denmark, half of non-western minorities live in socially deprived areas; a quarter live in socially deprived areas of Copenhagen, compared with 3.6 per cent of the general population.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ Karen Schonwalder and Janina Sohn “Immigrant Settlement Structures in Germany: General Pattern and Urban Levels of Concentration of Major Groups”, *Urban Studies* 46(7), 2009, pp. 1,439–1,460 (hereafter, Schonwalder & Sohn “Immigrant Settlement Structures in Germany”).

²⁵⁵ Schonwalder & Sohn “Immigrant Settlement Structures in Germany”, p. 1,446.

²⁵⁶ J. Goering, and J. D. Feins, *Choosing a Better Life? Evaluating the Moving to Opportunity Experiment*, Urban Institute Press, Washington, DC, 2003; E. Andersson, “From valley of sadness to hill of happiness: the significance of surroundings for socioeconomic career”, *Urban Studies*, 41, 2004, pp. 641–659; R. Andersson, “Spaces of socialization and social network competition: a study of neighborhood effects in Stockholm, Sweden” in H. T. Andersen and R. van Kempen (eds.) *Governing European Cities*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001, pp. 149–188; S. Musterd, R. Andersson, G. Galster and T. Kauppinen, “Are immigrants’ earnings influenced by the characteristics of their neighbours?”, *Environment and Planning A*, 40, 2008, pp. 785–805.

²⁵⁷ Sako Musterd and Roger Andersson “Housing Mix, Social Mix, and Social Opportunities”, *Urban Affairs Review* 40, 2005, p. 764.

²⁵⁸ J. Beckford, R. Gale, D. Owen, C. Peach, P. Weller, *Review of the Evidence Base on Faith Communities*, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London, 2006.

²⁵⁹ Integration research in Denmark 1980–2002.

The close correlation of areas of ethnic concentrations and deprivation makes it difficult to determine whether there is an additional disadvantage that arises from living in an area of ethnic concentration.²⁶⁰ There are also benefits for minorities from living in areas of ethnic concentration, in terms of maintaining ethnic and cultural tradition, mobilising ethnic capital and relying on ethnic support networks.²⁶¹ In Berlin, the limited movement of immigrants away from areas even after their socio-economic situation improves can be viewed as the result of positive identification with local districts and the *Kreuz kultur* (cross culture) found in German society. It suggests that those who do well continue to invest in their area and improve their neighbourhoods.

The concentration of ethnic minorities, especially Muslims, in particular localities is viewed with concern by policymakers and politicians in many countries in western Europe.²⁶² While some view areas of ethnic concentration as a problem of “deprivation” which therefore requires investment in employment training and skills, others see it as a spatial problem, which requires a policy of dispersal.²⁶³ In Denmark in the late 1980s, some mayors of Copenhagen municipalities talked about the “Khominisation” of some areas.²⁶⁴ In England, the official reports into the urban riots that took place during the early summer of 2001 cited segregation as an underlying factor.²⁶⁵ In the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, the head of the then Commission for Racial Equality warned that parts of the UK were in danger of “sleepwalking into segregation”.²⁶⁶ The Dutch government has argued that the spatial concentration of minorities in local areas undermines integration:

²⁶⁰ Susanne Urban “Is the Neighbourhood Effect an economic or immigrant Issue? A Study of the Importance of Childhood neighbourhood for Future Integration into the Labour Market”, *Urban Studies* 46(3), 2009.

²⁶¹ G. Bolt, J. Burgers and R. van Kempen, “On the social significance of spatial location: spatial segregation and social inclusion”, *Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, 13, 1998, pp. 83–95; G. J. Borjas, “To ghetto or not to ghetto: ethnicity and residential segregation”, *Journal of Urban Economics*, 44, 1998, pp. 228–253.

²⁶² See S. Musterd, A. Murie and C. Kesteloot (eds.), *Neighbourhoods of Poverty: Urban Social Exclusion and Integration in Europe*. Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 2006; R. Johnston, J. Forrest and M. Poulsen “The ethnic geography of EthniCities”, *Ethnicities* 2:2, 2002, pp. 209–235.

²⁶³ Patrick Ireland, “Comparing Responses to Ethnic Segregation in Urban Europe”, *Urban Studies* 45(7), 2008, pp. 1,333–1,358, p. 1,339.

²⁶⁴ C.-U., Schierup, *På Kulturens Slagmark* (In the Battlefield of Culture), South Jutland University Publishers, 1993 (in Danish), cited in Hussain, *Muslims in the EU Literature Review: Denmark*, p. 25.

²⁶⁵ See T. Cattle, *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team*, London, Home Office, 2001; and J. Denham, *Building Cohesive Communities: A Report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion*, London, Home Office, 2001.

²⁶⁶ D. Casciani, *Analysis: Segregated Britain?* BBC News, 22 September 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4270010.stm> (accessed November 2009).

Concentration is especially disadvantageous for integration because it results in an accumulation of social problems which may eventuate in a state of affairs that is very hard to handle [...] Concentration is also disadvantageous because it makes the ethnic dividing lines more visible in a more concentrated way. That harms the image of ethnic minorities [...] Finally, concentration is particularly disadvantageous for the possibilities for meeting and contacts between persons from different origin groups [...] the diminishing contacts with native Dutch indirectly influence the social chances of ethnic minorities.²⁶⁷

In Germany, the CDU election manifesto of 2005 stated that “the formation of ghettos and a development of parallel societies, as well as an often deliberate separation of foreign youths from German society, represent alarming signals for social peace in the country”.²⁶⁸ In Hamburg, the Hamburg Action Plan on Integration (HHAP) accepts that a high number of migrants living in one area does not create a problem in itself. However, the consequent lack of opportunities for interethnic and inter-religious interaction is viewed as problematic since it creates a “parallel society”.²⁶⁹

Simpson *et al.*, looking at the demographic profile of the largely Muslim south Asian population of two English towns, suggest that the demographic profile of migrant populations means that, for a period of time, dispersal will occur alongside increased clustering or concentration. The latter is mainly accounted for by natural growth in the younger minority population, thus, “growing concentrations are likely to continue for some decades, until the age structure stabilises and dispersal becomes the main feature”.²⁷⁰ This appears consistent with data from, for example, Rotterdam, where public concern about the concentration of Moroccans and Turks increased at a time when levels of segregation were decreasing.²⁷¹

6.4 Housing Tenure

Across most western European countries (with the exception of the UK), housing data do not include information on the religious identity of occupants. However, the data collected will often capture the ethnic group and nationality, from which it is possible to examine to some extent the position of housing groups that are predominantly Muslim. In general, larger family sizes, high rates of poverty and lower incomes mean

²⁶⁷ Ministerie van Justitie, *Jaarnota integratiebeleid 2005* (Integration 2005 year note), The Hague, Ministerie van Justitie, 2005 (in Dutch), cited in Bolt *et al.*, “Minority Ethnic Groups in the Dutch Housing Market”, p. 1,360.

²⁶⁸ CDU and CSU, *Deutschlands Chancen nutzen. Wachstum. Arbeit. Sicherheit Regierungsprogramm 2005–2009*. Berlin, 2005 (in German), p. 34, cited in Schonwalder & Sohn “Immigrant Settlement Structures in Germany”, p. 1440.

²⁶⁹ Hamburg Action Plan on Integration, p. 33.

²⁷⁰ Ludi Simpson, Vasilis Gavalas and Nissa Finney, *Population dynamics in ethnically diverse towns: the long-term implications of immigration*, CCSR Working Paper 2006–04, 2006, p. 14.

²⁷¹ Bolt *et al.*, “Minority Ethnic Groups in the Dutch Housing Market”, p. 1,365, table 2.

that Muslims, or groups that are predominantly Muslim, are more likely than the general population to be tenants in social housing rather than owner-occupiers and to be found living in overcrowded and poor housing conditions.

In the UK, Muslims are less likely than that general population to be home-owners (51 per cent compared with 69 per cent of the general population). However, “a significant proportion (33 per cent compared with 39 per cent of the general population) are buying with a mortgage or loan, despite concern among many Muslims about borrowing money on interest”.²⁷² The UK government has adjusted tax rules to allow for the development of Sharia-compliant home purchasing services. The Treasury abolished double stamp duty for Muslim house-buyers (an intermediary purchases the property and then sells it on to the buyer, hence the double stamp duty).²⁷³ In early 2005, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister held a consultation on enabling local authority tenants to buy their homes using “non-standard” mortgages.²⁷⁴ For owner-occupiers, *Sharia*-compliant products are available to allow Muslims to participate in schemes that allow loans to be taken against the value of the property for improving its condition. Muslims are also more dependent on social housing than the general population (28 per cent compared with 20 per cent) and on private renting (17 per cent compared with 10 per cent).²⁷⁵ However, there are significant variations within the Muslim group between different ethnic groups. While for Muslims as a group, 28 per cent live in social housing, 68 per cent of Bangladeshi households do so.²⁷⁶

In Belgium, in general, home-ownership predominates over social housing; thus 64 per cent of Moroccans and Turks are owner-occupiers, compared with 80 per cent of the general population.²⁷⁷ According to data from the 1999 census, 12 per cent of non-EU nationals are home-owners in Paris, compared with 32 per cent among those who are French nationals by birth. However, 30 per cent of non-EU nationals who have obtained French nationality by naturalisation are also home-owners. Access to the

²⁷² P. Sellick, *Muslim Housing Experiences*, The Housing Corporation, London, 2004, p.4 (hereafter, Sellick, *Muslim Housing Experiences*).

²⁷³ M. Malik, “British Muslims – discrimination, equality and community cohesion” in T. Choudhury (ed.) *Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens*, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2005.

²⁷⁴ Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, *Non-standard mortgages for purchasing social dwellings: Helping tenants in social housing buy their home using Islamic and other non-standard finance products – A consultation Document*, ODPM publications, London, 2005, available at <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/housing/pdf/142049.pdf> (accessed November 2009).

²⁷⁵ P. Sellick, *Muslim Housing Experiences*, p. 4.

²⁷⁶ H. Mayhew, C. Robinson, A. Humphrey, E. Kafka, R. Oliver and S. Bose, *Housing in England 2001/02*, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London, 2003, p. 15. Figures are given for the Bangladeshi and Chinese households with a warning that the estimates have a large sampling error.

²⁷⁷ K. Levecque, I. Lodewyckx and S. van den Eede, *Gezondheid en gezondheidszorg bij allochtonen in Vlaanderen* (Health and health care among allochthones in Flanders), Steunpunt Gelijkekansenbeleid, Antwerp, 2006 (in Dutch, hereafter Levecque, *et al.*, *Gezondheid en gezondheidszorg bij allochtonen in Vlaanderen*), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

property market is particularly difficult in Paris, so rates of home-ownership are lower for non-EU nationals living in Paris compared with those living in the suburbs (30 per cent) or in the provinces (34 per cent); 50 per cent of non-EU nationals live in the private rented sector.²⁷⁸ Even in Rotterdam, where between 1998 and 2006 there was a rapid increase in home-ownership by Moroccans and Turks, the proportion of Turks (26 per cent) and Moroccans (16 per cent) in owner-occupation is below that of the general population (60 per cent).²⁷⁹

A quarter of Tunisian and Turkish households in Paris live in overcrowded accommodation.²⁸⁰ Half of Moroccan and Algerian households and 45 per cent of Turkish households live in poor-quality housing, compared with 11 per cent of the general population.²⁸¹ In Germany, data from 1998 found that 22 per cent of Turkish nationals did not have central heating (compared with 5 per cent of German nationals) and 39 per cent of Turkish nationals reported living in overcrowded conditions (compared with 16 per cent of German nationals).²⁸² In addition, 12 per cent of Turkish nationals were home-owners, compared with 38 per cent of German nationals. Further analysis reveals that “being a foreign national results in more cramped living conditions even after accounting for variables such as income, home-ownership and urban location”.²⁸³ They find that socio-economic differences between foreign-nationals and Germans do not account for housing inequality, nor can large gaps in housing quality be explained by household decisions to spend a smaller portion of their income on rent.²⁸⁴

In the UK, 42 per cent of Muslim children are living in overcrowded accommodation, compared with 12 per cent of all dependent children.²⁸⁵ This overall figure conceals differences between different predominantly Muslim ethnic groups. While 42 per cent of Muslim children live in overcrowded households, the figure is 56 per cent for Bangladeshi children. In the UK, 32.5 per cent of households live in what are identified as “non-decent” homes; however, for South Asian households this figure is

²⁷⁸ APUR (City Planning Agency of Paris), *La population étrangère à Paris. Eléments de diagnostic à partir des données des recensements. Diagnostic local d'intégration de la Ville de Paris* (The foreigner population in Paris. Diagnostic elements from census data. Local diagnosis of integration of the City of Paris), APUR, Paris, October 2002 (hereafter, APUR, *The Foreigner Population in Paris*).

²⁷⁹ SCP, *Goede bureen kun je niet kopen* (You can't buy good neighbours), SCP, The Hague, 2009, cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Rotterdam*.

²⁸⁰ APUR, *The Foreigner Population in Paris*, p. 96.

²⁸¹ Edgar, *Policy Measure to Ensure Access to Affordable Housing for Ethnic Minorities*, p. 25.

²⁸² A. I. Drever, W. A. V. Clark, “Gaining access to housing in Germany: The foreign-minority experience”, *Urban Studies* 39, 2002, pp. 2,439–2,453, p. 2,444 (hereafter, Drever and Clark, “Gaining access to affordable housing in Germany”).

²⁸³ Drever and Clark, “Gaining access to affordable housing in Germany”, p. 2,446.

²⁸⁴ Drever and Clark, “Gaining access to affordable housing in Germany”, p. 2,448.

²⁸⁵ Sellick, *Muslim Housing Experiences*, p. 12.

46 per cent.²⁸⁶ There are also different reasons for ethnic-minority and white households being non-decent. Ethnic-minority households are almost twice as likely to be non-decent for reasons of disrepair, unfitness or the need for modernisation; 75 per cent of ethnic-minority households living in non-decent homes are in the private sector. While only 28 per cent of white home-owners live in non-decent homes, the figure for ethnic-minority home-owners is 40 per cent.²⁸⁷

6.5 Home-owner and Housing Satisfaction in the OSI Survey

Among OSI interviewees, non-Muslim respondents (24 per cent) were more likely than Muslim respondents (19 per cent) to be owner-occupiers of their property.

Table 77. Housing status – ownership, rental, or other arrangement (C1)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Own outright	8.3%	11.5%	9.9%
Own – with mortgage/loan	9.7%	12.4%	11.1%
Part rent, part mortgage (shared equity)	1.7%	1.1%	1.4%
Rent public/social housing	36.8%	26.5%	31.7%
Rent private landlord	19.9%	29.3%	24.6%
Living with parents/siblings	20.4%	11.8%	16.1%
Living rent free	1.4%	1.7%	1.5%
Squatting	0.1%	0.5%	0.3%
Other	1.8%	5.2%	3.5%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1088
		2198	

Source: Open Society Institute data

Among those who were renting, Muslim respondents (37 per cent) were more likely than non-Muslim respondents (27 per cent) to be living in social housing, while the latter were more likely to rent from private landlords. Both Muslims and non-Muslims had similar views about their levels of satisfaction with social housing.

²⁸⁶ Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, *Building the Picture: the English Housing Condition Survey 2001*, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London, 2003, p. 10 (hereafter, ODPM, *Building the Picture*).

²⁸⁷ ODPM, *Building the Picture*, p. 58.

Table 78. Satisfaction with social housing (G1.3)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Very satisfied		6.6%	3.9%	5.2%
Fairly satisfied		27.7%	23.9%	25.8%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied		18.2%	14.6%	16.4%
Fairly dissatisfied		17.4%	16.5%	17.0%
Very dissatisfied		10.8%	9.2%	10.0%
Don't know		19.2%	31.9%	25.5%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1107	1087	2194

Source: Open Society Institute data

Only a small proportion of both groups (Muslims 7 per cent, non-Muslims 4 per cent) were very satisfied with social housing, while around a quarter of both groups were “fairly satisfied” and a quarter were either “fairly” or very “dissatisfied”. However, Muslims born outside the EU were more likely than those born in the EU to say they were “fairly” or “very” dissatisfied with social housing.

Table 79. Satisfaction with social housing, by birthplace (G1.3)

		Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Very satisfied		6.7%	6.5%	3.2%	5.7%	5.2%
Fairly satisfied		25.8%	28.7%	23.6%	24.7%	25.8%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied		23.1%	15.6%	14.9%	13.9%	16.4%
Fairly dissatisfied		15.9%	18.2%	16.9%	15.2%	17.0%
Very dissatisfied		8.1%	12.2%	8.6%	10.8%	10.0%
Don't know		20.4%	18.6%	32.7%	29.7%	25.5%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	372	735	791	296	2194

Source: Open Society Institute data

The reasons for dissatisfaction varied across the cities. In Paris, the lack of social housing and the long waiting list for access to housing featured prominently among the reasons for dissatisfaction. This frustration was also present in the focus group discussions:

I don't trust the social housing system any more. We've been in the waiting list for 14 years. In all this time, we were offered an apartment only once. And even then they didn't let us move there because they said that our income wasn't sufficient even though my husband was working. And now they keep saying there are too many people in need of social housing. It's really unfair when you are in a local income bracket, you can't have social housing while people with sufficient income can have it. I mean those people can find an apartment anywhere they want with that income. And there are some families that are offered a social house after only waiting 2–3 years. And families that have been waiting for 14 years get nothing, it's just not fair, we should get priority over others.

This issue appears to be a key theme revealed in the European Commission's *Survey on the Perceptions of Quality of Life* (2007), in which over 70 per cent of residents in Paris, Stockholm, Marseille, London, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Antwerp and Rotterdam said that they did not think it was easy to find good-quality affordable housing in the city.²⁸⁸ Waiting lists were also an issue in Amsterdam, where in 2006 the average waiting period for housing was nine years.²⁸⁹ Similarly, the OSI survey respondents reiterated these concerns. For example, respondents in Antwerp cited the need for more affordable housing in the private rental sector. In Hamburg, there was dissatisfaction with the way that housing companies treated their tenants' complaints: "Nobody listens to our complaints, nor does anybody do anything to solve our problems." In Berlin, the dissatisfaction with social housing usually centred on the condition of the housing. Focus groups in Rotterdam highlighted problems with repairs, failure to get repairs for shared facilities and rudeness on the part of those making repairs:

In my building, the doorbells have been broken for three months. When my guests come to my house, they can't get in. We called the housing office three times. They just play with us saying that they'll come. We wait for them for two weeks and then we call again. They say they'll come on such and such a day. We wait and wait. Nobody comes [...] it's been three months now. We have to leave the main door open. Then everybody comes in. Then they put a camera there. But it's useless.

²⁸⁸ European Commission, *Survey on the Perceptions of Quality of Life in 75 European Cities*, European Commission, Brussels, 2007, p.7.

²⁸⁹ Amsterdam Department for Research and Statistics website, <http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/>, cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*.

6.6 Discrimination over Access to Housing

Discrimination is also an important factor in restricting the housing options and choices available to minorities. Research from the Centre for Turkish Studies found that 15 per cent of Turkish people reported experiencing discrimination in housing provision.²⁹⁰ In Denmark, 27 per cent of minority respondents in one survey said that they faced discrimination in housing (Integration Status, 2004).²⁹¹ These complaints centred on being overlooked in housing allocations, especially in private housing corporation waiting lists. Discrimination in housing was also highlighted in the European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report on Denmark.²⁹²

The OSI survey suggests a significant difference between the experience of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents over discrimination in housing: 7 per cent of Muslim respondents reported experiencing discrimination over housing in the previous 12 months, compared with 1 per cent of non-Muslim respondents.

Table 80. Location of religious discrimination – a landlord or letting agent (H8)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A landlord or letting agent	7.4%	1.3%	
Total count	81	14	95

Source: Open Society Institute data

For Muslim respondents, country of birth does not make a difference in the level of discrimination. However, for non-Muslim respondents, those born abroad were slightly more likely than those born in the country to report discrimination.²⁹³

²⁹⁰ A. Goldberg, and M. Sauer, *Konstanz und Wandel der Lebenssituation türkischstämmiger Migranten. Ergebnisse der fünften Mehrthemenbefragung* (Continuity and Change in the Housing Situation of Turkish Migrants: Results from the Fifth Survey) Eine Studie des Zentrums für Türkeistudien im Auftrag des Ministeriums für Gesundheit, Soziales, Frauen und Familie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Essen, herausgegeben von Soziales Frauen und Familie Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Des Ministerium für Gesundheit, 2003, p. 111, cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Berlin*, Open Society Institute, forthcoming.

²⁹¹ IntegrationStatus, *1. halvår* (First half-year report), Catinét Research, Copenhagen, 2004, cited in Hussain, *Muslims in the EU Literature Review: Denmark*, p. 26.

²⁹² European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), *Second Country Report on Denmark*, Strasbourg, ECRI, 2001, available at http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XML/Ecri/ENGLISH/Cycle_02/02_CbC_eng/02-cbc-denmark-eng.pdf (accessed November 2009).

²⁹³ See Table 81. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

The OSI focus group discussions on housing pointed towards particular difficulties in relation to renting. One common experience is of being rejected for housing once a person's foreign-sounding name is given. Discrimination is also manifest in the form of direct verbal comments, through a lack of explanation for refusing to provide accommodation or more intense scrutiny of a person's creditworthiness or social status. In Berlin, a respondent noted how he was asked about his religion when he was looking for a flat. Another said: "The landlord saw me and made remarks about terrorism and violence." "I was (probably) denied a flat because of my wife's headscarf" or "I was denied flats with specious excuses". Memories of housing discrimination during the initial period of settlement remain powerful: "In the early days, I remember, when we were looking for a flat to rent, we went door to door to ask if we could rent it. A woman opens the door, 'Is it free, is it still free?' 'No, no it's already rented out' ... or sometimes it is clear from the start – 'It is not for foreigners,' like that, straight away."

Perceptions of discrimination and unfair treatment can be rooted in a lack of understanding of allocation policies and information about housing. The OSI survey finds that 23 per cent of respondents, Muslim and non-Muslim, had sought advice on housing in the preceding 12 months.

Table 82. In the last 12 months, has the interviewee sought information on housing? (G20.3)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Yes		22.1%	23.6%	22.8%
No		77.9%	76.4%	77.2%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1106	1087	2193

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, further analysis shows that among Muslim respondents, those born abroad (25 per cent) were more likely than those born in the country (17 per cent) to seek advice on housing.

Table 83. In the last 12 months, has the interviewee sought information on housing (breakdown by birthplace)? (G20.3)

		Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Yes		16.7%	24.8%	22.4%	26.6%	22.8%
No		83.3%	75.2%	77.6%	73.4%	77.2%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	372	734	790	297	2193

Source: Open Society Institute data

The OSI focus group highlighted the complexity of dealing with housing issues, and there is a need for housing advice and advocacy support services to help not only with discrimination but access to housing and addressing problems for those renting in both the public and the private sector. The research finds some examples of support for those facing difficulties in housing. In Hamburg, for example, the NGO *Mieter helfen Mieter* (Tenants Helping Tenants) assists tenants to make complaints about their treatment. It has a counselling service for conflict resolution in the neighbourhood and for following up discrimination complaints in the housing sector.

6.7 Length of Residence in Local Area and Satisfaction Levels

One area of interest in the OSI survey was exploring the relationship between the length of time of residence in the local area, and satisfaction levels. This type of exploration helps understand the extent of the impact of problems experienced in everyday life on shaping people's perceptions of quality of life where they live. The OSI survey was carried out across the 11 cities, in areas with significant Muslim populations; Muslims are now an established presence in these areas, albeit those which continue to attract new residents, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Among the respondents, there were significant numbers of both recent arrivals and long-term residents.

Table 84. Years lived in the local area (C2)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
	< 1	2.4%	4.0%	3.2%
	1 – 5	24.2%	26.6%	25.4%
	6 – 10	20.5%	17.2%	18.9%
	11 – 20	30.5%	27.6%	29.1%
	21 – 30	17.0%	12.6%	14.8%
	31+	5.4%	12.0%	8.7%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1102	1087	2189

Source: Open Society Institute data

30 per cent of respondents have only moved to the local area in the past five years. A further 20 per cent have lived in the area for 6–10 years. The majority of respondents have lived in the area for over 10 years, with the exception of those who had lived in the area for over 30 years, which accounts for 5 per cent of Muslims and 12 per cent of non-Muslims, although there are no significant differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. In the Muslim respondent sample, around a third of Muslims born in the EU (39 per cent) had lived in their local area for 11–20 years.

6.8 Satisfaction with the Neighbourhood

A significantly large majority (93 per cent) of respondents were positive about the area in which they lived. Of those, 55 per cent stated they “definitely” enjoyed living in their neighbourhood; a further 38 per cent enjoyed it “to some extent” and a very small proportion (only 8 per cent) said they did not enjoy living in their neighbourhood.

Table 85. Do you like the neighbourhood? (C5)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
	Yes, definitely	50.0%	60.0%	55.0%
	Yes, to some extent	40.0%	34.0%	37.0%
	No	9.9%	6.0%	8.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1107	1085	2192

Source: Open Society Institute data

6.9 Place of Birth and Gender Differences

However, further analysis suggests that the most positive views about living in the area are found among non-Muslim male respondents who are born in the country: 65 per cent of this group “definitely” enjoy living in their neighbourhood.²⁹⁴

In contrast, among female Muslim respondents born in the country, less than half (45 per cent) said they definitely enjoyed living in the neighbourhood. The factors behind this gender difference are not clearly understood. There is evidence in other research which highlights the tensions among second-generation Muslims, particularly women, caused by balancing a desire to stay close to the family and community with a desire to live in more diverse areas as a strategy for increasing independence from the “community”.²⁹⁵ Furthermore, OSI research in Leicester drew attention to the tensions between aspirations (to live in better areas) and generational needs; that is, staying in more deprived areas with large Muslim populations because of the needs of their parents and children to be close to community facilities.

6.10 Muslim and non-Muslim Respondents

Importantly, Muslim and non-Muslim OSI respondents appear to differ in their reasons for moving to the area. For non-Muslim respondents, the top three reasons for living in the neighbourhood were: proximity to work, the affordability of housing and the perception of it being a “nice area”. For Muslim respondents, choice appeared to be more constrained: for 14 per cent of respondents the decision to move into the area was made by their parents; 10 per cent said they did not choose to live in the area; and 6 per cent moved to there because of social housing allocations in the area. Furthermore, for those who chose to move to the area, family ties featured more prominently as the reason for doing so: 10 per cent of Muslim respondents moved to the area to be near their family.

6.11 Cultural Diversity in Localities

The qualitative data from the focus groups and questionnaires suggest that the multicultural nature of these areas is important to Muslim respondents, who feel that the diversity of people and lifestyles in an ethnically and culturally mixed area shields them from the attention and anticipated alienation that would come from living in an area where they stand out for being ethnically and culturally different. The sentiment of a Muslim respondent in Amsterdam, “I do not feel like a foreigner here,” echoes the feelings of many respondents in the other cities. Easy access to cultural goods and facilities in multicultural areas is also important, as noted by a respondent in Paris:

²⁹⁴ See Table 86. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

²⁹⁵ B. Harries, L. Richardson and A. Soteri-Proctor, *Housing Aspirations of white and second generation south Asian British women*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 2008; see also Sellick, *Muslim Housing Experiences*.

Access to foods, clothes and cosmetics is also is, for us, a positive feature of the area. In this area, one can find restaurants where one can eat African food that is not too expensive. There are also shops that allow you to make cheap international calls.²⁹⁶

Importantly, the respondents' viewpoints suggest that the desire to live in mixed areas should not be equated with Muslims' desire to live parallel lives separate from others. In fact, Muslim respondents in several cities expressed regret at the absence of "native" non-Muslims in their areas. Muslim respondents wanted to live in an ethnically mixed, not ethnically homogenous area. This means that high levels of ethnic segregation emerge as an issue of great concern for Muslim respondents. For example, in Rotterdam, while ethnic and cultural diversity is perceived as enriching ambiance and specific quality of the area, the high level of ethnic segregation is a topic of concern to respondents:

Sometimes I overhear the Dutch in the shops complain that they feel submerged by the foreigners. It's not nice to hear them say that but they do have a point.

Similarly, focus group participants in Amsterdam said they did not like living in an area with a large ethnic concentration, with no native Dutch. In several cities, parents were particularly concerned about the effect of areas of ethnic concentration on their children's employment and educational opportunities.

6.12 Housing Diversification in Urban Renewal

Across several cities covered by the OSI research, the response by policymakers to the perceived problems created by areas of ethnic concentration include urban renewal or regeneration programmes. These aimed to create greater diversity in terms of housing tenure and stock, which in turn was expected to create a greater social and ethnic mix.

In Copenhagen, the city's integration policy states that its aim is to combat the problem of vulnerable housing areas by tackling unemployment and social problems and making public housing more attractive: "The positive side-effect will be a great demand for public housing, including from high resource families". HHAP calls for improvement to the quality of housing and the image of the area as a way of encouraging more affluent households to settle in the area and thus ensure a "balanced neighbourhood".²⁹⁷ These urban renewal programmes involve "the demolition, upgrading or sale of council or social rented housing and the construction of new, more costly owner-occupied or private rented housing. These efforts result in more

²⁹⁶ Translation taken from OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Paris*.

²⁹⁷ Hamburg Action Plan on Integration.

variation in housing sizes, forms, quality, prices, and above all tenures within a certain area.”²⁹⁸ However, the evidence in existing research for these positive effects is limited:

existing studies on mixed developments do not justify the optimism concerning the social interaction between (ethnic) groups, let alone the possibilities for social mobility that should arise from that. Moreover, the idea that people with a higher social status might act as positive role models is patronising and based on unfounded assumptions with regard to differences in values between ethnic and socioeconomic categories.²⁹⁹

Changing the housing mix and thereby the social and ethnic mix in an area does not necessarily lead to greater positive interaction. This is because underlying differences in tenure are founded on lifestyle, income, age, education and household composition.³⁰⁰ Social mixing can in fact lead to negative interaction (conflict). A study of a social mixing project in the Transvaal area of Amsterdam reported that:

Differentiation has led to a forced living together of (well-to-do) natives and (poor) migrants. The newcomers have tried to create more interaction with other residents in the street, but despite many initiatives, contacts between residents tend to be limited to neighbours. The newcomers tend to develop an inward-looking attitude after finding that contacts with residents of other backgrounds appear to be difficult and many initiatives have not been successful. The community policeman remarked that “It is the tune that makes the music, but the residents do not seem able to find the right tune [...] Moreover, to a large extent, the problems of different ethnic groups living together coexist with intergenerational conflicts.”³⁰¹

A common concern found in several cities by the OSI research is the feeling that renewal projects will lead to the displacement of the existing communities. In Berlin, for example, the research notes concern among some interviewees that what is taking place is a process of gentrification which is leading to the displacement of those living in social housing by private renters: “Because many people in this district are living within poor conditions, it is important, that public support through social housing is not reduced, but further extended in order to counter gentrification and prevent social marginalisation, segregation and exclusion.”

²⁹⁸ Kleinhans, “Social implications of housing diversification in urban renewal: A review of recent literature”, *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment* 19, 2004, pp. 367–390 (hereafter, Kleinhans, “Social implications of housing diversification in urban renewal”).

²⁹⁹ Bolt *et al.*, “Minority Ethnic Groups in the Dutch Housing Market”.

³⁰⁰ Kleinhans, “Social implications of housing diversification in urban renewal”.

³⁰¹ Peer Smets and Marion den Uyl “The Complex Role of Ethnicity in Urban Mixing: A Study of Two Deprived Neighbourhoods in Amsterdam”, *Urban Studies* 45(7), 2008, pp. 1,439–1,460, p. 1,456.

In Hamburg, OSI respondents also felt that the public authorities were engineering the rise in rents to price migrants out of social housing and bring in “native” German families. Interviewees felt that the redevelopment was being undertaken for the benefit of more affluent residents, and was destroying the existing diversity and tolerance. Research in France suggests that the policy of social mixing is used as a basis for excluding the poorest from access to housing. The idea of social mixing was first developed by public housing bodies during the debates on the housing crisis in the 1980s. In order to avoid being “landlords to the poor” alone, they argued for a “universal conception” of social housing, and were opposed to associations defending the right to housing. This led them to identify “high risk categories”, whose access to social housing had to be filtered. Among these high-risk categories were immigrants.³⁰² The OSI research in Marseille suggests that the municipality does not use social mixing to balance “specialised” neighbourhoods but to prevent minorities from moving into less segregated areas.³⁰³

The experience of some respondents was more positive and they welcomed the changes brought about by the renewal programmes. In Antwerp, respondents noticed the composition of the neighbourhood was changing, but felt that the more educated “native” Belgian couples moving into Borgerhout would be more open-minded about ethnic cultural and religious diversity. In Paris, it is argued that the 18th *arrondissement* is experiencing early signs of gentrification in certain parts, like Saint Bruno. For most interviewees this appears to be a superficial form of gentrification as it is limited to middle classes coming back to specific parts of the neighbourhoods. In Berlin, focus group participants wanted a more diverse ethnic mix, but argued that this required investment in social infrastructure particularly in local schools, as the quality of local schools was perceived to play a critical role in decisions about moving into or out of an area.

6.13 Key Findings

As a majority of Muslims in the 11 cities in the OSI survey are migrants or the descendants of migrants, their initial settlements patterns reflect the nature of the migration process. Workers and their families settled in large industrial centres. Working in low-paid, unskilled jobs, most settled in the poorer districts of the cities. This geographical concentration provided the basis for networks of support and the development of goods and services to meet cultural needs. Policymakers have expressed

³⁰² See Patrick Simon, “Le logement social en France et la gestion des ‘populations à risques’” (Social Housing in France and the management of populations at risk), *Hommes et Migrations* (1246), nov-déc. 2003, pp. 76–91; Patrick Simon, Thomas Kirsbaum, “Les discriminations raciales et ethniques dans l’accès au logement social” (Racial and ethnic discrimination in access to social housing), *note 3 GELD*, Paris, 2001.

³⁰³ See Valérie Sala Pala, “La politique du logement social est-elle raciste? L’exemple marseillais” (Is social housing policy racist? The case of Marseille), online review *Faire Savoirs* (6), May 2007 (in French).

increasing concern about such ethnic and religious concentration. The OSI survey shows that Muslims want to live in mixed areas. It therefore challenges the claims that the concentration of Muslims in local areas reflects a desire among Muslims to live segregated or parallel lives. The OSI research shows that discrimination in accessing housing remains an issue that confronts many Muslims and restricts their choices. The challenge for policymakers is to maintain areas that are ethnically and religiously mixed, since small differences in preferences can lead to segregation, and to ensure that Muslims are able to choose where to live in a city unrestrained by discrimination and prejudice.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁴ T.C. Schelling, "Models of segregation", *The American Economic Review* 59, 1969, pp. 488–493.

7. HEALTH CARE

This chapter examines Muslim experiences of health care. Access to adequate health care is important to social inclusion. Long-term illness affects people's opportunities for economic and social participation and employment, thus reducing income levels, which in turn have the effect of hindering people's opportunities for social and leisure activities. The chapter begins with an overview of the data on Muslims' health status. In the UK, these data are available on the basis of religion; in other states, in the absence of data on religion, the data on predominantly Muslim ethnic-minority groups are explored. The ways in which religion can be relevant to health status are examined before looking at the experiences of Muslims in the health services that are available in the different cities. The OSI survey and focus group findings are used to understand levels of satisfaction with health-care services among respondents. The OSI research across the 11 cities also provides an insight into the ways in which doctors and hospitals in local areas with large Muslim populations respond to the needs of Muslim patients, focusing in particular on the provision of *halal* food and the inclusion of imams in hospital chaplaincy services. Finally, the chapter gives examples of good practice across the different cities in ensuring health services are effectively accessed by Muslims.

7.1 Health Status

For many Muslims, poverty remains the most significant influence on their health status. The *Joint Report on Social Protection* notes: "despite overall improvements in health there remain striking differences in health outcomes not only across Member States but also within each country between different sections of the population according to socio-economic status, place of residence and ethnic group, and gender."³⁰⁵ However, for Muslims who are migrants, the emotional impact of uprooting and resettling in a new social context also affects mental health.³⁰⁶ There may be very specific pressures on Muslim women who are migrants:

Women migrants are a main source of physical and emotional support for older and younger family members. As such, women have additional responsibilities, whether they migrate with their families or leave them behind, and additional

³⁰⁵ Council of the European Union, *Joint report on Social Protection and Inclusion*, 7274/08 Brussels, 2008 p. 11, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st07/st07274.en08.pdf> (accessed November 2009).

³⁰⁶ R. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man", *The American Journal of Sociology*, 33, 1928, pp. 881–893.

stress that can strain the fabric of their lives. The cost to their families and communities may not be completely quantifiable, but it is none the less real.³⁰⁷

Furthermore, experiences of Islamophobia, racism and discrimination affect people's mental health, as "societal forces of marginalisation and 'faith-blind' health policies challenge the health of Muslim families and their access to culturally appropriate care".³⁰⁸

The UK is the only state in the OSI research where data on health care can be disaggregated by religion. Questions about health, asked in the 2001 Census, show that Muslims in the UK had the highest rates of reported ill-health. Age-standardised rates of "not good" health were 13 per cent for Muslim males and 16 per cent for Muslim females. These rates, which take account of the difference in age structures between the religious groups, were higher than those of Jews and Christians, who were the least likely to rate their health as "not good". Females were more likely than males to rate their health as "not good" among most groups. The gender difference was most notable for Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus. Among females, 16 per cent of Muslims, 14 per cent of Sikhs and 11 per cent of Hindus rated their health as "not good". These rates were 3–4 percentage points higher than their respective male counterparts.³⁰⁹

Ethnicity or nationality data on groups that are predominantly Muslim provide a limited but nevertheless important insight into the experiences of Muslims in other EU states. Research in Belgium found that 30 per cent of Turks and Moroccans perceive their health as average, bad or very bad, compared with 20 per cent of the general population.³¹⁰ The Rotterdam Health Survey also found that around a third of Moroccans and half of Turkish respondents reported their health status as moderate or bad.³¹¹

³⁰⁷ UN Population Fund and International Organization on Migration, *Female Migrants: Bridging the Gaps throughout the Life Cycle*, Selected Papers from the UNFPA-IOM Expert Group Meeting, May 2006, p. 3, available at http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib_pub_file/658_filename_migration.pdf (accessed November 2009).

³⁰⁸ L. Laird, M. Amer, E. Barnett, and L. Barnes, "Muslim Patients and Health Disparities in the UK and US" *Archives of Disease in Childhood* vol. 92, 2007, at 924; see also K. Bhui, S. Standfeld, K. McKenzie, S. Karlsen, J. Nazroo and S. Welch, "Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and Common Mental Disorders Among Workers: Findings from the EMPIRIC Study of Ethnic Minority Groups in the United Kingdom", *American Journal of Public Health* Vol. 95, 2005, No. 3, p. 496.

³⁰⁹ Office of National Statistics, *Focus on Religion*, 2004, p. 8.

³¹⁰ Levecque *et al.*, *Gezondheid en gezondheidszorg bij allochtonen in Vlaanderen cited in OSI, At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

³¹¹ L.P. van Buren, E. Joosten-van Zwanenburg, *Gezondheidsenquête Turken en Marokkanen*, GGD Rotterdam en omstreken, December 2006 available at: <http://www.ggd Kennisnet.nl/kennisnet/paginaSjablonen/raadplegen.asp?display=2&catoom=41944&catoomsrt=17&cactie=2>, (accessed November 2009, hereafter, van Buren & Joosten-van Zwanenburg, *Gezondheidsenquête Turken en Marokkanen*).

In addition to differences in self-reported levels of poor health, rates of illness for particular conditions also vary between different ethnic or national groups. Diabetes appears to be one illness that affects Turks, Moroccans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to a greater extent than the general population in Europe. In Belgium, one in five Turks and Moroccans have diabetes.³¹² In the UK, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are five times more likely to have diabetes than whites.³¹³ In the Netherlands, higher levels of obesity are found among Turks and Moroccans than the general population; in Rotterdam, 55 per cent of Moroccans and 60 per cent of Turks are obese.³¹⁴ In Amsterdam, Turks (66 per cent) and Moroccans (57 per cent) are also more likely than the city's general population (45 per cent) to be overweight.³¹⁵ In the UK, among those over the age of 40, one in four Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have been diagnosed with heart disease or severe chest pain, the highest for any ethnic group.³¹⁶

7.2 Impact of Long-term Illness

Long-term illhealth not only affects individuals but also families that bear the primary caring responsibility for the sufferers. Research in the UK, for example, found that individuals with long-term health conditions were more likely to be found in Bangladeshi (44 per cent) and Pakistani (39 per cent) households than in white British (29 per cent) and black African (15 per cent) households. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, as a consequence of limited language skills and the confidence required to negotiate the health service among first-generation migrants, relied more on their children taking time off from work or school to accompany them to medical appointments. The research found that these individuals had to alter work patterns, work part-time or take work closer to home to accommodate this situation. They also found that in Pakistani and Bangladeshi households, even when long-term illhealth was affecting the primary income earner, there was no impetus for women to enter the labour market; instead there was pressure on them to provide the necessary care. The effect was therefore to make take-up of paid work more difficult and a lower priority. Long-term health conditions lead not only to reduced earning and income but also to increased costs and expenditures. The reduction of spending on other items can further reduce the quality of life, for example, when housing falls into disrepair.³¹⁷

³¹² Levecque et al., *Gezondheid en gezondheidszorg bij allochtonen in Vlaanderen*, cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

³¹³ J. Nazroo, *Ethnicity, Class and Health*, Policy Studies Institute, London, 2001, pp. 74–76 (hereafter, J. Nazroo, *Ethnicity, Class and Health*).

³¹⁴ van Buren and Joosten-van Zwanenburg, *Gezondheidsenquête Turken en Marokkanen*.

³¹⁵ Amsterdam Health Monitor, 2004, cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*.

³¹⁶ J. Nazroo, *Ethnicity, Class and Health*, pp. 74–76.

³¹⁷ S. Salway, L. Platt, P. Chowbey, K. Harriss and E. Bayliss, *Long-term Ill Health, Poverty and Ethnicity*, The Policy Press/Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Bristol/York, 2007.

7.3 Religion and Health

Aspects of life influenced by religion can affect health. For example, it has been suggested that lower than average levels of alcohol consumption contribute to lower than average risks of some heart and vascular diseases.³¹⁸ There have been studies into the links between theological and spiritual influences and group experiences. Some religious practices can also affect the health of individuals adversely. For Muslims this includes the impact of fasting during the month of Ramadan on the management of chronic diseases such as diabetes.³¹⁹

Another example of a religious activity that has implications for health care is participation in the Muslim pilgrimage, the *Hajj*. Every year large numbers of Muslims from across Europe go to Saudi Arabia to perform the *Hajj*. Participation in the *Hajj* entails risks exposure to infectious diseases and heat: “The severe congestion of people means that emerging infectious diseases have the potential to quickly turn into epidemics.”³²⁰ Furthermore, “Extended stays at *Hajj* sites, extreme heat, and crowded accommodation encourage disease transmission, especially of airborne agents. Traffic jams, and inadequately prepared or stored food are added health risks. The advanced age of many pilgrims adds to the morbidity and mortality risks.”³²¹ The potential for the *Hajj* to be an epidemiological “amplifying chamber” was seen during an outbreak of *Neisseria meningitidis* W135 in 2000 and 2001. The outbreaks in those two years affected 1,300 and 1,109 pilgrims respectively, in total. During this period, there were 79 cases of UK pilgrims returning with W135 meningococcal disease, of whom 18 died.³²² In response to these health risks, the British government in partnership with the Muslim communities established the British Hajj Delegation (BHD) in 2000; the UK became the first predominantly Christian country to have such a delegation. The core of BHD’s work is in the provision of medical and consular support. In 2006, the delegation provided both medical and consular services in Makkah and Mina.

7.4 Satisfaction with Health Services

In general both Muslims and non-Muslim respondents share similar levels of satisfaction with health services in their local area.

³¹⁸ *Jaarrapport integratie 2008*, p. 42.

³¹⁹ A.G. Naeem, “The role of culture and religion in the management of diabetes: a study of Kashmiri men in Leeds”, *The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health* Vol. 123, No. 2, 2003, pp.110–116.

³²⁰ Q. A. Ahmed, Y. M. Arabi and Z. A. Memish, “Health risks at the Hajj”, *The Lancet*, 2006: 367, pp. 1,008–1,015, p. 1,008 (hereafter, Ahmed, *et al.*, “Health risks at the Hajj”).

³²¹ Ahmed, *et al.*, “Health risks at the Hajj”, p. 1008.

³²² *British Medical Journal*, 2 February 2002, 324: 301. See also: “Returning Pilgrims Fight Meningitis”, BBC News 12 April 2000 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/710437.stm>

Table 87. Satisfaction with health services (G1.6)

	Frequency	Percent
Muslim	95	80.5
Non-Muslim	23	19.5
Total	118	100

Source: Open Society Institute data

The majority is either “fairly” (18 per cent) or “very” (48 per cent) satisfied, and a far smaller proportion are “fairly” (9 per cent) or “very” (6 per cent) dissatisfied. A further 14 per cent are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. When religion, gender and country of birth are taken into account, Muslim women born abroad (10 per cent), are slightly more likely than others to be “very dissatisfied” with health services in their area.³²³

The OSI survey data are consistent with the focus group discussions from across the 11 cities, which indicate that, in general, there are high levels of satisfaction with the quality of the health care that people receive. Among Muslim who are migrants, this high level of satisfaction is often amplified when they compare the health care they have access to in Europe with what is available in their countries of origin. As a focus group participant in Berlin noted, “Health services are excellent in Germany [...] we couldn’t find these kinds of services in Turkey.” Discussion of health-care services generally elicited very positive comments. In the Hamburg focus group, for example, Muslims frequently answered that they had “never experienced something bad”, people were “happy when they have been in hospital“, “all patients are treated equal, irrespective of their religion or ethnicity” and “treated equally friendly”. “The doctors do their work, without looking at the religion or the appearance”, “medical treatment is in the foreground”. Some referred to additional training that is given to doctors concerning the needs of Muslims. A focus group participant in Berlin noted the experience of one of her relatives, who had been in hospital: “She was on the fourth, or fifth floor. The doctors and nurses there were very nice and said that we could always visit, even at midnight. And when we had to pray they even cleared the room for us.”

Satisfaction with health care was low in London, where 50 per cent of Muslim OSI respondents were “fairly”, or “very” satisfied with local health services and 30 per cent were “fairly” or “very” dissatisfied. However, discussions with Muslim participants in a focus group in London suggested that though perceptions of health care were lukewarm, weaknesses in service provision were on the whole seen as generalised shortfalls, not specific to Muslims.

³²³ See Table 88. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Health, I think I get a good service, better than before. At least I get my GP in an emergency basis on the same day and I can make an appointment beforehand after a week if I have to make an appointment, but a lot of our friends don't share my view, they think it's gone worse.

It's gone worse I think, especially the doctor. If we want to see a doctor we have to wait. Either today you want to see a doctor, you can't see a doctor on this time, cancellation etc. or they give you 2 days, 3 days later [...] if you have more than one problem it's difficult to explain it in 10 minutes and get a solution and what the doctors are doing they just say please try to shorten it down but people is waiting so can you come again. So you are losing more time seeing a time than before if you are [...] you know, if you have more than one problem its difficult to see a doctor on the same day...

7.5 Respect for Religious Needs in Health Care

A majority of Muslim (60 per cent) and non-Muslim (50 per cent) respondents feel that hospitals and health clinics sufficiently respect the customs of people belonging to different religious traditions.

Table 89. Do hospitals and medical clinics respect different religious customs? (G8)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Too much	4.6%	3.3%	4.0%
About right	60.3%	49.5%	55.0%
Too little	14.1%	7.1%	10.6%
Don't know	21.0%	40.1%	30.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1088

Source: Open Society Institute data

Only 11 per cent of respondents (234 in number) felt that hospitals and health clinics did too little to respect different religious customs. Further analysis found that Muslims are twice as likely as non-Muslims to feel hospitals do too little (14 per cent Muslims, 7 per cent non-Muslims), and those who display visible signs of their religious identity are 1.7 times more likely to be dissatisfied with the treatment compared with those who are not.

Table 90. Do hospitals and medical clinics respect different religious customs (by display of visible religious identity)? (G8)

		Visible signs of religious identity		
		Yes	No	Total
Too much		4.0%	4.0%	4.0%
About right		65.5%	52.2%	55.0%
Too little		15.8%	9.3%	10.7%
Don't know		14.7%	34.5%	30.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	455	1737	2192

Source: Open Society Institute data

Women are marginally more likely than men to feel hospitals do not sufficiently respect religious customs (12 per cent women, 9 per cent men), as do those born outside the EU in comparison with those born inside the EU (12 per cent non EU-born, 10 per cent EU-born).³²⁴

It was found that university graduates (14 per cent) were more likely than respondents with primary, secondary or no formal education (9 per cent) to feel this way.³²⁵

If gender, religion and country of birth are taken into account, then Muslim women born in Europe (17 per cent) are the group most likely to feel that hospitals and health clinics do too little to respect different religious customs. Muslim women born abroad are the most likely (64 per cent) to say that they do the right amount.

A significant proportion of Muslim (20 per cent) and non-Muslim respondents (40 per cent), however, were unable to answer this question.

7.6 *Halal* Food

Respect for Muslim dietary requirements emerges as an important part of respecting patients' cultural needs. Even though a large proportion of patients at the Catholic Saint Lucas hospital in Slotervaart, Amsterdam, are Muslim, it was only in 2005 that it became the first in the Netherlands to serve *halal* meals.³²⁶ The OSI research in Marseille found that the accommodation of religious needs in terms of food in many hospitals extended only to recognising that Muslims cannot eat pork rather than

³²⁴ See Table 91. and Table 92. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

³²⁵ See Table 93. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

³²⁶ The hospital's website is <http://www.lucasandreasziekenhuis.nl/> (accessed November 2009).

providing *halal* food. The research suggests that hospital staff's ignorance of dietary restrictions that may be relevant to Muslim patients is only part of the explanation. Stakeholder interviews implied that some hospital officials see the provision of *halal* food as compromising on state secularism and so resist it on that basis. While the hospitals provide kosher meals for Jewish patients, providing *halal* food is perceived by these officials as giving into the demands of "Muslim fundamentalists". As one stakeholder said in an interview in Marseille in 2009:

The people in charge were very embarrassed, when I approached this "*halal* question". I wanted even to launch the idea of a call for tender so that companies can supply meals *halal* to Muslim patients. But they did not really want to hear about it, while the Jewish patients could benefit from kosher meals. The Jewish Consistory of Marseille had even made placard posters on which we could read that it was capable of delivering 13,000 kosher meals every year.

7.7 Chaplaincy Services

Where hospitals provide chaplaincy services, the inclusion of an imam is also an important component of the respect for religion in health care. In the OSI Berlin focus group, there were positive reports about efforts being made by the Christian hospital in Kreuzberg to be sensitive to religious needs. An example given was where a young girl died and the family was asked if it needed an imam.

In France, hospital regulations allow for the creation of chaplaincy services for different religions.³²⁷ Furthermore, the French Patients Charter, in relation to freedom of religion provides that: "Each patient must be able to, as far as possible, follow the obligations of his religion (meditation, the presence of person able to minister to their religious needs, food, freedom of action and expression...). These rights are exercised while respecting the freedom of others. All proselytism is forbidden, whether it comes from a person welcomed into the establishment, a volunteer, a visitor or a member of staff". Compared with other issues like mosque construction or burial, Muslims have mobilised less on access to hospital chaplaincy, and the position differs throughout France. Some departments have developed chaplaincy services more fully than others. There is in fact now a Charter for Muslim Patients, modelled on the French Patients

³²⁷ "...services of chaplaincy, in the sense of the article 2 of the law of 1905, can be set up for every cult which asks for it, according to needs expressed or listed by the concerned hospital, social or medical and social establishment. Whatever is the worship to which they belong, the chaplains are recruited or authorized by the head teachers on proposition of the religious authorities from which they recover according to their internal organization: bishop's palaces, Jewish consistories exchange, regional or local, hospitable national chaplain of the French council of the Muslim cult or the regional councils of the Muslim worship and the national or regional commissions of the chaplaincies of the sanitary establishments." Translation in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Marseille*, from the website http://www.droitdesreligions.net/rddr/aumonerie_hopitaux.htm (accessed November 2009).

Charter, which tries to define more carefully the rights and duties of the Muslim chaplain:

The Muslim chaplain works in collaboration with the staff in the visited department. His task is meant to be coherent with the treatment process. Treatment needs come before religious obligation. The Muslim chaplain must give religious responses which allow the sick Muslim a better hospitalisation such as having recourse to dispensation and relief. This will allow the Muslim patient to be at one with his religious convictions as well as with the prescriptions of the medical team [...]. the very first role of the Chaplaincy is attention to the wellbeing of the person, as an indivisible element, to give heed to everything that can help healing and relieve suffering. It is attentive, listens, and offers friendship to all sick people. The Muslim Chaplain must respond, with discretion, to the spiritual needs of those patients who wish it by supporting them and comforting them, whether through a word or a religious liturgy, or simply by listening to them. They are also available for families of the sick or the hospital staff to offer explanation, accompaniment and help.³²⁸

In 1999, the Mosque in Nasr de La Capelette (10th district of Marseille) set up the first Muslim chaplaincy service in the city's hospitals. They created a small prayer room in the basements of the Timone Hospital next to the Catholic chapel and the synagogue. Initial support for the chaplaincy from the hospital management, however, gave way to greater hostility. According to a former hospital chaplain, the increasing Muslim visibility in the hospital generated resistance from some hospital staff who viewed their presence as religious activism and proselytism. However, a few saw it as a positive development. Interviews with stakeholders suggest that there was also concern from the hospital managers when other Muslim staff began to make use of the services provided by the chaplaincy, as this was viewed as contrary to the religious neutrality of the hospital.

7.8 Communication with Older Migrants

Although there are high levels of satisfaction with health-care services, for older Muslims who are migrants the research suggests that difficulties of communication with medical staff are a significant problem. In many cases, patients rely on family and friends to provide interpretations in their doctor appointments; however, this is more difficult to arrange for hospital appointments, as there is generally less flexibility in scheduling.

When hospitals do try to provide translation services, however, there may be insufficient understanding of the diversity of language and dialects that are spoken across different Muslim communities. In the Antwerp OSI focus group, a Moroccan

³²⁸ The Charter is available online (in French) at <http://aumonerie-musulmane.over-blog.com/article-18547203.html> (accessed November 2009).

woman who works in a health centre recalled her experience of being asked to translate between doctors and patients for Egyptian, Iraqi and other Middle Eastern patients,

For example, in the hospital now, I interpret, and I have made it clear to them that Moroccan-Arabic is not the same as Egyptian or Iraqi Arabic, since they send me off to every foreigner who comes in.... Really everyone, and then I end up asking: “what language do they speak?” What am I supposed to do here” But then you teach them about the difference between cultures and you just get...Because they don’t know anything, they really don’t know anything.

Problems with language can lead to patients feeling disempowered, misunderstood or not taken seriously:

When my mother goes to the doctor’s, she doesn’t speak very good Dutch and it seems like they don’t want to listen. But if I go with her and explain, they suddenly understand. But because she doesn’t really master the language, they want to take the trouble to understand, that’s how it seems to me.³²⁹

Problems with communication mean that consultations often take longer. However, doctors are also restricted in the time they have to see each patient:

There is an additional problem for foreigners. I realise that because of my husband. They have language difficulties and the doctors don’t have the time or the patience to explain. They explain for two or five minutes, the patient doesn’t understand anything [...] they sometimes write something on a paper and say if you don’t understand bring in a translator.³³⁰

7.9 Advice about Health Care

The OSI survey asked a question about whether respondents had sought advice and information on a number of issues – education, employment, housing and health – in the preceding 12 months. The survey found that 860 respondents had sought information on health in the preceding 12 months, 39 per cent of the sample. Of these, 48 per cent were Muslims, 52 per cent were non-Muslims.³³¹

Women were more likely to seek information on health than men (44 per cent of the women compared with 34 per cent of the men).³³²

When gender, religion and country of birth are taken into consideration, non-Muslim women born abroad (48 per cent) are the most likely to have sought medical

³²⁹ OSI focus group, Rotterdam.

³³⁰ OSI focus group, Berlin.

³³¹ See Table 94. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

³³² See Table 95. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

information in the preceding 12 months, while Muslim men born in Europe were the least likely to be seeking medical advice (27 per cent).³³³

University graduates show the highest propensity for seeking out information on health (44 per cent), while those with no formal education show the lowest (32 per cent).

Table 97. In the last 12 months have you sought information on health? (by highest level of education completed) (G20.4)

	Highest level of education completed				Total
	No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	
Yes	32.3%	39.2%	37.0%	44.0%	39.2%
No	67.7%	60.8%	63.0%	56.0%	60.8%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	127	250	1108	704

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, there is no strict correlation between the level of education and the search for health information: the proportion of respondents with primary-school education is greater than that of those with secondary-school qualifications (39 per cent and 37 per cent respectively). The majority of permanently disabled respondents (53 per cent) and those in government training programmes (58 per cent) had sought information on health on the preceding 12 months.³³⁴

Large proportions of part-time employees and retirees also said they looked for information (47 per cent and 45 per cent respectively). Less than a third of stay-at-homes, students, unemployed and full-time employed respondents sought information (33 per cent, 33 per cent, 32 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively).

7.10 Discrimination and Unfair Treatment

Levels of reported unfair treatment on the grounds of religion are low. Only 1 per cent of non-Muslims reported experiences of religious discrimination from hospitals or local doctors. For Muslims the figure was higher, with four per cent reporting discrimination from local doctors and five per cent reporting discrimination from hospitals.³³⁵

³³³ See Table 96. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

³³⁴ See Table 98. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

³³⁵ See Table 99. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Although numbers are small, in the Muslim sample it is noticeable that 1 per cent of Muslim men reported discrimination in health care compared with 6 per cent of Muslim women.

Research in Denmark showed that 12–16 per cent of respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey, Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories had experienced discrimination and adverse and hostile treatment in health care.³³⁶ In contrast, discrimination over social services was among the highest in the different areas covered by the survey. The survey also suggests that a significant minority of Bosnians (16 per cent), Turks (19 per cent), Palestinians (24 per cent) and Somalis (38 per cent) faced racial discrimination during encounters with social services in the municipality.

A closer examination of the 118 respondents who said they had faced unfair treatment over health care found that two-thirds were women (67 per cent) and over half (57 per cent) were born outside the EU. Most of those who had experienced discrimination over health care had secondary education (47 per cent) and nearly a third (31 per cent) had a degree; 14 per cent had no formal education and 9 per cent had primary schooling.

In general, OSI focus group participants were hesitant to define a specific action as racist or discriminatory. Discrimination can take the form of negative attitudes, inattentive body language, neglect or rudeness, and in some cases, verbal abuse. In a few cases, respondents identified situations where they were treated on the basis of stereotypes. Some Muslim focus group participants working in the health-care system criticised the way colleagues approached and treated patients. For example, the following quotation from the focus group in Antwerp concerns the differential treatment of Muslim patients wearing “traditional” clothing.

[Woman:] People are treated very bad, really. Parents come with their children who need to be operated for tubes or something like that and I don't know to what extent doctors always give the same explanation. That really depends on how you are dressed. When they come in djellaba they automatically assume they won't understand much, so they give a simple explanation. They do not explain what happens when you're under the anaesthetic and why it is necessary. So then, I find a worried mother on the hallway of the hospital asking why her child has been sent to sleep. I then ask the doctor and they respond: “You know these kind of people. Low IQ and so on,” when, in fact, the mother is capable of understanding the proper explanation.

I have been at the doctor today. I am new to him. He is my family doctor. He is older. I talk with him and he always has a big surprise in his face. I have been

³³⁶ B. Møller, and L. Togeby *Oplevet Diskrimination* (The Experienced Discrimination), Board for Ethnic Equality, Copenhagen, 1999, cited in Hussain, *Muslims in the EU Literature Review: Denmark*, p. 28.

there the second time. This time I especially noticed this. In the first meeting, I give people a chance and think, that I might have said something wrong. I mentioned for example that I take antibiotics. I think, that I should take additional vitamin B and told him what I eat. He looked strange [...] My interpretation is that he didn't expect it. He expected a stereotyped Turkish society [...] They have this image in front of their eye, Turks don't know anything. They come from Anatolia. How can that be that a person comes and knows such things. I read this question in his eyes.

The context and vulnerability of people in need of medical support can of course intensify experiences of discrimination and heighten perceptions of discrimination. The examples given in focus groups suggest that even though there are few reported experiences of discrimination in the health sector, the vulnerability that arises from illness makes people more sensitive and react more angrily in many circumstances.

Discrimination is not only experienced by Muslims as patients, but also by Muslims working in health care. In Antwerp, a Muslim nurse wearing a headscarf reported how she received negative treatment from patients. However, the incident also showed that hospital staff supported the nurse:

[Woman:] There is a lot of negativity but there are also many positive experiences. A patient was ... I wasn't allowed to go in [her room]. She would rather die than be treated by me. But the whole crew with the director – I work in Hospital X – so the whole crew, director, head of doctors, everybody stood behind me. The family of the patient came to the hospital and said: yes, you have to respect the wishes of our mother and then the head of doctors said: “My staff will not be treated like this. If you don't like it, there is the door. There are other hospitals.” I mean, I don't wear a headscarf but X does wear one. I have a bit, we have a quite pale skin, you know, and even with me you saw this happening.³³⁷

7.11 Access to Health Care

One key debate in health services is the low take-up of services by minorities. A review of the evidence for the take-up of early intervention and preventative services in the UK suggests that the two crucial problems are a lack of information in minority communities about the services that are available as well as the failure to deliver culturally appropriate or sensitive services.³³⁸ A case study of a Luton (UK) social services department for example, found that most South Asian families only came into contact with the support services that were available after referral by another agency

³³⁷ OSI focus group, Antwerp.

³³⁸ S. Ahmad, “What is the Evidence of Early Intervention, Preventative Services for Black and Minority Ethnic Group Children and their Families?”, *Practice*, 17:2, 2005, pp. 89–102.

and once the problems the individuals and families faced had become critical.³³⁹ Even when people are aware of services that are available there may be a reluctance to use mainstream services, where patients feel that their needs may not be recognised or understood. The absence of culturally appropriate and sensitive services is identified as an issue in a review of the practices of eight social services departments in England.³⁴⁰

The importance of culturally-sensitive service delivery to ensure access appears to be behind the success of the Muslim Youth Helpline in the UK, a telephone helpline set up in 2001 by a group of young Muslims, which now receives public support and funding for its work on mental health. Analysis of the client database and discussion with users of the helpline suggest that young Muslims were “reluctant to access mainstream support services for fear of being discriminated and misunderstood”.³⁴¹ The research focused on the importance of a Muslim-led, faith-sensitive service for clients, who experienced a lack of acceptance by both mainstream service providers and the Muslim community. The report suggests that “receiving recognition through the eyes of another Muslim, around issues that are often contentious, was significant” to the helpline’s clients, as it “allowed the holding together of, at times, contradictory conflicting issues in a way that enabled growth and integrative solutions to emerge without fragmenting identities”. Furthermore, “a sense of belonging and connection enabled empowerment and self-authorship. For clients, this was facilitated by seeking support from within the Muslim community; something they had not previously felt able to do”.³⁴²

The OSI research found examples of initiatives taken by health-care professionals to increase take-up of services by Muslims. In most cases, initiatives are not directed at Muslims as a group but at different ethnic groups. Religion is nevertheless relevant to these initiatives. The General Hospital in Slotervaart, Amsterdam, provides special consulting hours for Moroccan diabetes patients. These are led by a Moroccan nurse. In giving advice on fasting it is recognised that fasting with the family is very important to Muslims. Patients tend to ignore advice not to fast. In these sessions, Muslims with diabetes are therefore given advice on how to participate in fasting in a responsible way.

In Amsterdam, the Dutch Intercultural Care Counsellors Foundation, founded in 2003 by a doctor of Turkish origin, provides outreach in health-care information through informal settings, providing information that is culturally sensitive and accessible in terms of language. In Leicester, the health promotion programme “Dil”

³³⁹ T. Qureshi, D. Berridge, and H. Wenman. *Where to turn? Family support for south Asian communities – A case study*, National Children’s Bureau and Joseph Rowntree Foundation, London, 2000.

³⁴⁰ V. O’Neale, *Excellence Not Excuses: Inspection of Services for Ethnic Minority Children and Families*, Department of Health, London, 2000.

³⁴¹ R. Malik, A. Shaikh and M. Suleyman, *Providing Faith and Culturally Sensitive Support Service to Young British Muslims*, National Youth Agency, Leicester, 2008, p. 9 (hereafter, Malik *et al.*, *Providing Faith and Culturally Sensitive Support Service*).

³⁴² Malik *et al.*, *Providing Faith and Culturally Sensitive Support Service*, p. 9.

(“Heart”), whose mission is to improve the understanding of coronary heart disease in the South Asian community, recruits “peer” educators who have access to communities and understand the perspectives and needs of patients. These peer educators were also important in overcoming language and other cultural barriers. Mosques were used to provide information about a campaign for immunisation for the human papilloma virus. The local health body also realised that many Muslim women who were in kitchens preparing food for the end of fasting during the month of Ramadan were listening to Radio Ramadan. The authorities therefore decided to use Radio Ramadan to broadcast information about cervical smears. Stakeholder interviews suggest that in the year the campaign ran, using the radio combined with more targeted information and employment of a Somali receptionist led to an increased take-up of services from 60 per cent to 90 per cent in one doctor’s surgery in the target population.

The I-Psy centre for intercultural psychiatry has a branch in Slotervaart, Amsterdam. These centres offer specialist and easily accessible help to people with mental health problems relating to migration, change of culture and living conditions. The specialists are often from the minority groups and services are delivered in their mother tongues. The service aims to be culturally and faith-sensitive, respecting for example, requests for treatment by same-sex professionals and having single-sex group sessions. There is particular attention paid to the problems encountered by those who have migrated to join spouses.

In the London Borough of Waltham Forest, the prevalence of smokers has been estimated at 30 per cent of the total population, higher than the national average of 27 per cent. In 2004, the council undertook a major media campaign to challenge smoking, advertising in local papers and working with community groups and businesses. It also incorporated an important black, minority and ethnic (BME) component in its outreach, broadcasting infomercials on local radio in a variety of African languages. In the UK, the Department for Communities and Local Government, highlighting the need to actively engage vulnerable groups, has also emphasised the value of working through local community structures, such as mosques and imams, in stop smoking campaigns. Other London boroughs, such as Newham, have channelled some of their campaigns through local imams, for example. The Waltham Forest Faith Communities Forum partnered with the Local Strategic Partnership to implement a system of “health preachers”.³⁴³ The central concept of this programme was to identify and train local religious representatives from the borough’s Muslim, Christian and Sikh communities, to draw on their positions as faith leaders to communicate important messages on health to their congregations.

³⁴³ See the Waltham Forest Faith Communities Forum website at <http://www.faithcommunities.org.uk/7.html> (accessed November 2009).

7.12 Care for the Elderly

One issue of health care that is likely to increase in importance over the next decade is the care provision of older Muslims who are migrants. In many Muslim communities there remains a taboo around the idea an elderly person is being cared for by an “outsider” rather than a family member. In Copenhagen, concern about care was evident in the older focus group discussions on health care. There was a desire for culturally specific care homes, and a fear that Danes would not have the understanding needed to deliver these services. The first German residential home for the elderly, specialising in the needs of Turkish (largely Muslim) elders, has been built in Kreuzberg, Berlin. It includes religious facilities like prayer rooms and meets cultural needs in the provision of food and the languages spoken by the staff. In Hamburg, the HHAP estimates that by 2015, 16 per cent of older people will be migrants. The city identifies access to health care for older migrants as a key challenge: because of language barriers and lack of information, it is necessary to develop a diverse range of services that take into account the various needs of different groups.

7.13 Key Findings

Poverty remains the most significant factor in health inequalities, but both religion and being a migrant have their impact on health. The OSI research found high levels of satisfaction in the health care that individuals receive. Reports of discrimination and unfair treatment are low and most respondents felt that doctors and health clinics respect the needs of people of different faiths. Nevertheless, accommodating the needs of Muslim patients remains an issue that needs to be addressed, in particular the provision of *halal* food and access to imams in those hospitals that provide chaplaincy services. For older Muslims who are migrants, communication with doctors and nurses is a problem. The need for appropriate care services for older migrants is an emerging concern for many Muslims and one that is likely to grow in importance as the Muslims who are first-generation migrants grow older. Across the cities there are examples of service delivery and provision that have been effective because they take the cultural and religious needs of Muslims into account.

8. POLICING AND SECURITY

Feelings of safety and security are an important aspect of social inclusion and integration. The poor social and economic conditions of many Muslims in Europe also mean that many live in areas with a high crime rate, while at the same time lacking the resources needed to protect themselves. While Muslims, like others, rely on the police for protection and maintaining order, the relationship between minorities and the police is not always easy. In several cities, incidents involving the police have been the trigger for unrest and rioting involving young Muslims. Since 11 September 2001, Muslims have come under increased police surveillance and at the same time have faced higher levels of hate crimes and violence directed at them. The chapter begins by looking at experiences of violence and hate crimes. It then examines levels of trust in the police and respondents' satisfaction with policing overall as well as discrimination experienced at the hands of the police. It ends by highlighting some of the initiatives taken in the 11 cities by the police to increase engagement, cooperation and recruitment to their ranks.

8.1 Violence and Hate Crime

Experiencing violence and crime makes a person feel insecure. When violence or crime is directed at a person due to their membership of a vulnerable group, whether based on ethnicity, race, religion or other grounds, this will lead to sensations of marginalisation and exclusion. In our study, 15 per cent of all respondents had been a victim of crime in the preceding 12 months. However, non-Muslim respondents (20 per cent) were more likely than Muslim respondents (11 per cent) to have been victims of crime. In the Muslim sample, European-born Muslim men were more likely than men born abroad or women to have been victims of crime.

Almost a quarter of Muslim respondents (23 per cent) and 17 per cent of non-Muslim respondents interpreted the crime they experienced to be a "hate crime", that is a crime motivated by discrimination. Muslim and non-Muslim respondents differed greatly when it came to reporting hate crimes to the police: 36 per cent of Muslims reported the crime to the police, compared with 59 per cent of non-Muslims.

The need to improve on the reporting of hate crime is recognised in some cities. In Copenhagen, the city council established a website on hate crime on which members of religious minorities are able to register instances of hate crimes.³⁴⁴ By March 2009, it had received over 200 complaints. In the London Borough of Waltham Forest, the council explicitly marks out religious hatred as a hate crime alongside racism and homophobia.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁴ *Politiiken*, 28 March 2009.

³⁴⁵ London Borough of Waltham Forest, "Hate crime: common questions", 2009, available at <http://www.walthamforest.gov.uk/index/safety/hate-crime/common-questions.htm> (accessed November 2009).

8.2 Trust in the Police

The police are a key social institution in the exercise of the state's power over the individual. Trust in the police is therefore important for the legitimacy of police action. High levels of trust are important for encouraging reporting of crime to the police and in ensuring cooperation with them. Analysis of data from the European Social Survey found that levels of trust in the police vary across different European countries and that, in general, "older people seem to have more trust in the police than the young, and that women have more trust in the police than men [...] those working at home have more trust in the police than those in waged work and, correspondingly, the unemployed trust the police less than those in waged work".³⁴⁶ Research from the United States suggests that ethnic-minority groups have lower levels of trust in the police than the general population.³⁴⁷ Research in Belgium, however, shows that once socio-economic background is taken into account, the levels of trust in the police found among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are no different from their Belgian counterparts.³⁴⁸

The majority of respondents (58 per cent) in the OSI survey have either "a lot" (14 per cent) or "a fair amount" (44 per cent) of trust in the police; 31 per cent had very little and 9 per cent no trust at all.

Table 100. Level of trust in the police (F11.1)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A lot	14.1%	12.9%	13.5%
A fair amount	41.3%	47.2%	44.2%
Not very much	33.7%	28.5%	31.1%
Not at all	8.6%	9.6%	9.1%
Don't know	2.3%	1.9%	2.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1088
			2197

Source: Open Society Institute data

³⁴⁶ Juha Tapio Kääriäinen, "Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries: A Multilevel Analysis", *European Journal of Criminology*, 4, 2007, pp. 409–435, p. 424 (hereafter, Kääriäinen, "Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries").

³⁴⁷ Tom Tyler "Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the Police", *Policing Quarterly* 8(3), 2005, pp. 322–324.

³⁴⁸ M. Van Craen and J. Ackaert, *Het vertrouwen van allochtonen en autochtonen in de politie: geen zwart-wit verhaal* (Trust of minorities and majorities in the police: not black and white), Eerste Criminologisch Forum, Gent, 2008 (in Dutch), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

Religion alone does not appear to be a significant variable in relation to trust in the police. Non-Muslim respondents (60.1 per cent) were marginally more likely to feel an overall sense of trust in the police than Muslim respondents (55.4 per cent). However, respondents bearing visible signs of their identity had greater trust in the police than those without.

**Table 101. Level of trust in the police
(breakdown by visible display of religious identity) (F11)**

		Visible signs of religious identity		
		Yes	No	Total
Muslim	A lot	15.9%	13.0%	14.1%
	A fair amount	42.6%	40.5%	41.3%
	Not very much	32.6%	34.3%	33.7%
	Not at all	5.9%	10.2%	8.6%
	Don't know	2.9%	2.0%	2.3%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	408	699	1107
Non-Muslim	A lot	21.7%	12.5%	12.9%
	A fair amount	60.9%	46.4%	47.0%
	Not very much	15.2%	29.2%	28.6%
	Not at all	2.2%	9.8%	9.5%
	Don't know	–	2.0%	1.9%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	46	1038	1084

Source: Open Society Institute data

Among Muslim respondents, the difference was small: 59 per cent of those with a visible religious identity expressed trust the police compared with 54 per cent of those without. The difference was much more significant in the case of non-Muslims (83 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively).³⁴⁹ Neither did levels of trust differ for Muslim respondents according to whether the respondents regarded themselves as actively practising their faith or not.

³⁴⁹ This figure should be treated with caution as the actual number of non-Muslim respondents with a visible religious identity is low.

Both gender and age make a difference to levels of trust.³⁵⁰

Table 103. Level of trust in the police (breakdown by gender) (F11.1)

		Male	Female	Total
Muslim	A lot	11.3%	16.9%	14.1%
	A fair amount	40.1%	42.5%	41.3%
	Not very much	34.6%	32.8%	33.7%
	Not at all	11.1%	6.0%	8.6%
	Don't know	2.9%	1.8%	2.3%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	558	551	1109
Non-Muslim	A lot	13.6%	12.2%	12.9%
	A fair amount	50.3%	44.3%	47.2%
	Not very much	25.3%	31.4%	28.5%
	Not at all	9.6%	9.5%	9.6%
	Don't know	1.2%	2.6%	1.9%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	521	567	1088

Source: Open Society Institute data

Muslim women (59 per cent) are more likely to trust the police than Muslim men (51 per cent). The opposite is true for non-Muslims: 64 per cent of men say they trust the police as opposed to 57 per cent of women. In the Muslim sample, levels of trust in the police increase exponentially with age: 54 per cent of Muslims aged below 20 say they have confidence in the police; for those over 60 the figure rises to 64 per cent.

Trust in the police also differs by employment status.³⁵¹

³⁵⁰ See Table 102. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

³⁵¹ See Table 104. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Among both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, those unemployed or enrolled on a government training programme are among the least likely to trust the police. Muslims working unpaid in the family business are also among the least likely to trust the police. This is consistent with US research, which found that poverty and economic exclusion lead to lower levels of trust in the police.³⁵²

Both Muslims and non-Muslims who have been victims of crime lasting the preceding 12 months are less likely to have trust in the police than those who have not. In the Muslim sample, 50 per cent of those who trust the police said they had been a victim, compared with 56 per cent of those who had not. In the non-Muslim sample, these figures were 50 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. This is consistent with findings from the European Social Survey.³⁵³ Very few respondents indicated whether they were satisfied with the police's response (11 Muslims and 23 non-Muslims) but those who answered "no" were significantly more likely to feel a lack of confidence in the police.

The results of controlling for country of birth and gender are that non-Muslim men born in Europe have the greatest levels of trust in the police (65 per cent); however, Muslim women born abroad were the most likely (19 per cent) to have "a lot" of trust in the police. Muslim men born in Europe have the lowest levels of trust in the police (46 per cent), were the least likely (7 per cent) to have "a lot" of trust and most likely to have "no trust".³⁵⁴

In the OSI focus group discussion in Hamburg, it was suggested that many Muslims who are migrants have a high level of trust in the police in Germany, because they compare German police with the police in their countries of origin, and their expectations of the police are shaped by their experiences there. In particular, those with negative experiences of police corruption in their countries of origin tended to have more positive views of German police as they are not viewed as corrupt. Young male and female Muslims commented: "Most have a migration background and in their home country you cannot really trust the police. They formed a positive opinion of German police officers." Perceptions of Germans as professionals who will do their job according to the rules are also cited as a reason for trusting the police. This is consistent with data from the survey which find that those born abroad (15 per cent) are slightly more likely than those born in the EU (11 per cent) to have "a lot" of trust in the police.

Analysis of the OSI focus group discussions shows that across most cities, perception and experiences of racism and unfair treatment at the hands of the police were cited most often as the basis for distrust of them. The focus group discussion in Berlin suggests that even a single negative incident involving discrimination which goes back

³⁵² J. Frank, B. V. Smith, and K. J. Novak (2005) "Exploring the basis of citizens' attitudes toward the police", *Police Quarterly* 8, 206–228.

³⁵³ Kääriäinen, "Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries", p. 427.

³⁵⁴ See Table 105. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

many years continues to shape such perceptions. The vividness with which such incidents are recalled during the focus group discussions suggests that it will be difficult for any subsequent positive contact to remove the perceptions.

In Marseille, questions of trust in the police are further complicated by the city's relationship to France's colonial past in Algeria. In particular, many *pieds noirs* (former European colonists of North Africa) arrived in Marseille at the end of the 1950s and took up positions in the police and other security-related professions. Among focus group participants over the age of 30, strong memories remain of how some of these police officers from the former colonies directed their anger and feelings of revenge towards North Africans, particularly Algerian migrants, in Marseille:

Regarding the question of the *pieds noirs* officers, actually I have lived in Le Panier for a very long time, near the bishop's palace; its called the "pieds noirs" area, there are bars where the cops go and talk among themselves; always the same ones. I used to drink coffee there. From where I am standing, Marseille is a paradoxical town. Its either very friendly or very racist in the sense that the primary racism is, "he's an Arab, he's almost inferior to me, almost". Because I'm convinced that the people who believe the Arab man to be inferior to them don't even know that this is the definition of racism; one race being superior to another or the very concept of race. I am often asked "what race are you?". In Marseille its "what's your race", "so you're of the Arab race". You would have almost thought that we were animals.³⁵⁵

Table 106. Satisfaction with policing (G1.5)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Very satisfied	7.4%	5.5%	6.5%
Fairly satisfied	35.3%	33.2%	34.3%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	23.5%	27.1%	25.3%
Fairly dissatisfied	18.7%	17.0%	17.8%
Very dissatisfied	11.4%	11.6%	11.5%
Don't know	3.7%	5.6%	4.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1089

Source: Open Society Institute data

³⁵⁵ Stakeholder interview, Marseille, 2009.

8.3 Levels of Satisfaction with Policing

While a majority of OSI respondents trusted the police, only a minority (43 per cent) were either “very” or “fairly” satisfied with policing in their local area; 30 per cent were either “very” or “fairly” dissatisfied, and 24 per cent were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. The views of Muslim and non-Muslim residents did not vary a great deal. The OSI focus group discussions convey that, for some, dissatisfaction centres on the behaviour of police officers, with complaints ranging from claims that they are impolite and rude through to discriminatory behaviours such as verbal insults and in one case physical assault.

However, for other focus group participants, the dissatisfaction concerned the lack of police action on particular issues. The failure of police to address drugs problems in local areas was frequently cited as an issue, as well as the lack of visible policing. When asked what needed to improve, more police on the street was a consistent answer. Others wanted more neighbourhood police officers who had direct contact with citizens. It was felt that this was needed to improve interaction, communication and trust. In London, the dissatisfaction stemmed from feelings that insufficient efforts were being made to deal with crime when it was reported:

We feel that the Police just do their basic duty i.e. come and write the report and that’s it. After that they did not console us, nothing; they said nothing [...] As the burglars were standing on the road before they came in from the front door; they should have asked neighbours if they saw anything because my daughter was not home but they were home. The Police did not do any investigation.

When my house got broken into ... when they come in, they take all the things that they can take, like all the fingerprints or any evidence or anything that they can, but the outcome is, there is no outcome.

8.4 Discrimination

Police discrimination, also called “ethnic profiling”, describes the use by law enforcement officers of generalisations grounded in ethnicity, race, religion or national origin – rather than objective evidence or individual behaviour – as the basis for making law enforcement and/or investigative decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity.³⁵⁶ Ethnic profiling is manifested most often in police officers’ decisions about whom to stop, ask for identity papers, question, search and sometimes arrest. Ethnic profiling may result from the racist behaviour of individual police officers, or from the institutionalised bias ingrained in many police forces. The

³⁵⁶ Open Society Justice Initiative, *Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Discriminatory and Ineffective*, Open Society Institute, Budapest and New York, 2009, available at: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/equality_citizenship/articles_publications/publications/profiling_20090526 (accessed November 2009, hereafter, OSJI, *Ethnic Profiling in the EU*).

result of ethnic profiling may be stopping, searching and even arresting innocent people; overlooking criminals who do not fit the established profile; undermining the rule of law and perceptions of police fairness; stigmatising entire communities; and alienating people who could work with the police to reduce crime and prevent terrorism.

Almost 10 per cent of Muslim (101 individuals) OSI respondents reported suffering discrimination at the hands of the police. Of these, almost a third were from the Antwerp and Berlin samples (17 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively). The city with the lowest proportion of affected Muslims was Leicester, with 3 per cent. Of the 101 Muslims, two-thirds were male and one-third female.

Table 107. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (A4)

	Frequency	Per cent
Amsterdam	7	6.9
Antwerp	17	16.8
Berlin	13	12.9
Copenhagen	9	8.9
Hamburg	9	8.9
Leicester	3	3.0
Marseille	9	8.9
Paris	8	7.9
Rotterdam	10	9.9
Stockholm	7	6.9
Waltham Forest	9	8.9
Total	101	100.0

Source: Open Society Institute data

Table 108. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (breakdown by age and gender) (H8)

Age	Male	Female	Total	
< 20	9.9%	3.0%	12.9%	
20 – 29	30.7%	12.9%	43.6%	
30 – 39	10.9%	11.9%	22.8%	
40 – 49	8.9%	5.0%	13.9%	
50 – 59	4.0%	–	4.0%	
60 +	3.0%	–	3.0%	
Total	Per cent	67.3%	32.7%	100.0%
	Count	68	33	101

Source: Open Society Institute data

There is a clear link between the age of respondents and experiences of discrimination from the police. The majority of those claiming unfair treatment tend to be aged under 30 (56 per cent in total of which 13 per cent are aged under 20 and 44 per cent aged 20–29).

Table 109. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (breakdown by age) (H8)

Age	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
< 20	13	12.9	12.9
20 – 29	44	43.6	56.4
30 – 39	23	22.8	79.2
40 – 49	14	13.9	93.1
50 – 59	4	4.0	97.0
60 +	3	3.0	100.0
Total	101	100.0	

Source: Open Society Institute data

Further analysis showed that the group most likely to report experiences of discrimination from the police are Muslim men aged 20–29 years.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁷ See Table 108. for breakdown of data.

30 per cent of Muslims claiming unfair treatment at the hands of the police carried visible signs of their religious affiliation.

Table 110. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (by display of visible religious identity and gender) (H8)

	Male	Female	Total
Muslim – Hair covering	4.0%	17.8%	21.8%
Muslim – Face covering	0%	1.0%	1.0%
Muslim – Body covering	0%	2.0%	2.0%
Muslim – Beard/Moustache	9.9%	0%	9.9%
Muslim – Religious symbols	2.0%	2.0%	4.0%
None	56.4%	12.9%	69.3%
Total	Per cent	67.3%	32.7%
	Count	68	33
			101

Source: Open Society Institute data

Further analysis showed that the majority of these were women who wore a headscarf (18 per cent). Of the affected respondents, 79 per cent said they actively practised Islam.

Over half (54 per cent) of Muslims who have experienced discrimination at the hands of the police have completed secondary school, while a further 22 per cent have obtained a university degree.

Table 111. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (Muslims, by highest level of education completed) (H8)

	Frequency	Per cent
No formal education	6	5.9
Primary	19	18.8
Secondary	54	53.5
University	22	21.8
Total	101	100.0

Source: Open Society Institute data

Nearly a quarter have few or no formal qualifications. Comparing these results with the average educational achievement of the entire Muslim sample shows that those with primary and secondary education are marginally over-represented in the sample of Muslims discriminated against by the police, while those with a university degree or no qualifications at all fall below their respective averages.

At first glance, Muslims in full-time employment, education or who are unemployed are most likely to be those who say they have experienced discrimination at the hands of the police.

Table 112. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (Muslims, by employment status) (H8)

	Frequency	Per cent
Full-time employee	31	30.7
Part-time employee	2	2.0
Self-employed	7	6.9
Working unpaid in family business	1	1.0
Retired	4	4.0
On government employment or training programme	2	2.0
Unemployed and looking for work	20	19.8
Student	19	18.8
Looking after home or family	6	5.9
Permanently sick or disabled	1	1.0
Other	8	7.9
Total	101	100.0

Source: Open Society Institute data

However, when we compare these statistics with those from the overall Muslim sample, we see that Muslims who are unemployed are significantly over-represented at 20 per cent of the discriminated group, despite being only 11 per cent of the entire Muslim sample.

Table 113. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination by the police (overall Muslim sample, by employment status) (I14)

Entire Muslim sample	Frequency	Per cent	Valid Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
Full-time employee	306	27.6	27.7	27.7
Part-time employee	164	14.8	14.8	42.5
Self-employed	60	5.4	5.4	47.9
Working unpaid in family business	7	0.6	0.6	48.6
Retired	64	5.8	5.8	54.3
On government employment or training programme	21	1.9	1.9	56.2
Unemployed and looking for work	116	10.5	10.5	66.7
Student	156	14.1	14.1	80.8
Looking after home or family	102	9.2	9.2	90.1
Permanently sick or disabled	36	3.2	3.3	93.3
Other	74	6.7	6.7	100.0
Total	1106	99.6	100.0	
Missing	4	0.4		
Total	1110	100.0		

Source: Open Society Institute data

These data support the findings of the Open Society Justice Initiative, in the recent report *Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Pervasive, Discriminatory and Ineffective*.³⁵⁸ Ethnic profiling did not emerge as a post-9/11 response to terrorism. Evidence clearly indicates that police throughout Europe have long engaged in ethnic profiling of immigrant and minority communities. Despite a dearth of quantitative information on policing and ethnicity in most of Europe, the data that exist indicate that ethnic profiling is widespread. Since the 9/11 attacks, interest in and the use of ethnic profiling have grown sharply.

³⁵⁸ OSJI, *Ethnic Profiling in the EU*.

In the UK (the only EU Member State to systematically gather ethnic data on police practices), data show dramatic increases in stops and searches of British Asians following terrorist attacks: stops of persons of Asian descent conducted under counterterrorism powers increased threefold following the 9/11 attacks, and fivefold after the July 2005 London Underground bomb attacks. In Germany, police have used preventive powers to conduct mass identity checks outside major mosques.³⁵⁹ In France and Italy, raids on homes, business premises and mosques – often lacking a basis in specific evidence – have targeted Muslims, particularly those considered religiously observant. Numerous studies since 2001 have documented “a growing perception among Muslim leaders and communities across Europe that they are being stopped, questioned and searched not on the basis of evidence and reasonable suspicion but on the basis of ‘looking Muslim’.”³⁶⁰

In the light of the above data it is not surprising that policing was a particularly heated issue in focus groups with young people, particularly in Antwerp where many participants had had contact with the police in the past few years. They felt harassed and wrongfully accused. As one respondent states: “[As a Moroccan in Antwerp] you are guilty until proven innocent”. Identity checks were a particular bone of contention:

I experienced it myself many times. They just do your identity check [the police stops a person and asks for their identity card which everyone in Belgium is obliged to carry with them on all times]. I don't mind an identity check, this is normal. [But] then you give your identity card and they say: yes, you are up to something. I'm on my way home or to a friend or to my nephew. Then they say: you are up to something, I can see it. They don't even do their job. They can't say: I can see you are up to something. That just isn't police work anymore, that's just showing “I'm the boss here.” I can take you away whenever I want to.

[Interviewer:] But when you say identity control is normal ... how do you mean is normal?

[Man 5:] Yes, I mean it's not so bad when they say give me your identity card. For identification or whatever. But when they say: you are up to something. You have to have some evidence before you can say something like that. You have to think first before you say something.

[Man 4:] You're suspect until proven innocent.³⁶¹

The discussion revealed the way in which identity checks are regarded by young Muslims as a normal part of life: “I don't mind an identity check, this is normal.” During the field research for this project, riots involving young Muslims broke out in

³⁵⁹ Arun Kundnani, *Analysis: The War on Terror Leads to Racial Profiling*, Institute for Race Relations, IRR News, London, 7 July 2004; Vickram Dodd, “Surge in Stop and Search of Asian People After July 7,” *The Guardian*, 24 December 2005, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/dec/24/terrorism.race> (accessed November 2009).

³⁶⁰ EU Accession Monitoring Program, *Monitoring Minority Protection in EU Member States: Overview*, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2002, p. 53.

³⁶¹ OSI focus group, Antwerp.

the Norrebro district of Copenhagen. The riots followed protests by young ethnic-minority people against police harassment; they appear to have been triggered by stories of police manhandling an elderly man in the street. Some of those involved in the disturbance published an article in the daily paper *Politiken* in which ethnic profiling of young people from minorities was identified as a key underlying cause of disquiet with the police. This also emerged strongly in the focus group discussions.

In France, the paucity of ethnic statistical data collected on law enforcement activities makes it difficult to identify institutional racism in the police force. Yet, a recent study by the Open Society Justice Initiative in collaboration with Fabien Jobard and René Lévy, researchers with the National Centre for Scientific Research (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) in France, under the technical supervision of Lamberth Consulting, examined whether and to what extent law enforcement officers stop individuals based on their appearance.

Examining five locations in and around the Gare du Nord and Châtelet-Les Halles rail stations, all important transit points in central Paris that are also the sites of heavy police activity, *Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-Search Practices in Paris*³⁶² gathered data on police stops carried out by national police and customs officers, including information on the ethnicity, age, gender, clothing and bags carried by the persons who were stopped. This study, which generated unique information on over 500 police stops, is the first to gather the quantitative data necessary to identify and detect patterns of ethnic profiling in France.

The study confirmed that police stops and identity checks in Paris are principally based on the appearance of the person stopped, rather than on their behaviour or actions. Persons perceived to be ethnic minorities were disproportionately stopped. The results show that persons perceived to be “black” (of sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin) and “Arab” (of North African or Maghrebian origin) were stopped at proportionally much higher rates than persons perceived to be “white” (of western European origin). Across the five observations sites, blacks were overall six times more likely than whites to be stopped; the site-specific rates of disproportionality ranged from 3.3 to 11.5. Arabs were generally 7.6 times more likely than whites to be stopped, although again, the specific rate of disproportionality across the five locations ranged from 1.8 and 14.8. Follow-up interviews with the individuals who were stopped also suggest that these two groups regularly experience far more police stops than whites.

An equally important determinant of who was stopped by police for identity checks was the style of clothing worn by the individuals in question. Although people wearing clothing typically associated with French youth culture (including “hip-hop”, “tecktonic”, “punk” and “gothic” styles) made up only 10 per cent of the population

³⁶² Open Society Justice Initiative, *Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop and Search Practices in Paris*, Open Society Institute, Budapest and New York, 2009, available in French and English at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/equality_citizenship/articles_publications/publications/search_20090630 (accessed November 2009).

available to be stopped by police, they made up 47 per cent of those who were actually stopped. The study revealed a strong relationship between the ethnicity of the person stopped, the style of clothing worn and their propensity to be stopped; fully two-thirds of the individuals dressed in youth culture clothing were also classified as belonging to an ethnic-minority group. It is likely that police consider both belonging to an ethnic-minority group and wearing youth clothing to be closely tied to a propensity to commit crimes or infractions. Although persons from all ethnic backgrounds reported police behaviour to be generally polite or neutral, those who were most targeted for police stops and identity checks – blacks and Arabs – nevertheless expressed anger and frustration at what they believed was a pattern of being singled out for stops and searches. In the absence of legitimate policing strategies that explain these stops in other than ethnic terms, the behaviour of the French police documented in this study is highly consistent with ethnic profiling.

In Hamburg, a Muslim woman recalled a story about her brother:

He was just finishing gymnasium [high school], was 18, 19 and had a full beard. He was in the underground and forgot his ticket. He came from school with a lot of colleagues and had a rucksack full of books with him. The ticket inspectors asked for his name, because he forgot his pass. The others confirmed his name. He realised that they are afraid of the rucksack. The moment he opened the rucksack, they jumped back and were frightened. He showed them his books, but they didn't believe him and took him to the police station. There he was confronted with insults because of 9/11, the terror attacks, because he has a full beard and he is dark.³⁶³

There are examples of attempts to address prejudice and discrimination in the police force. In France the National Police Force launched specific training for new police officers to give them an elementary and basic knowledge of Islam, the history of immigration and the sociology of the suburbs. During this training sociologists, trainers and policemen recount their personal experiences. This type of training was piloted in early 2000, at the National School of Police of Marseille (School of Sainte-Marthe). In Leicester, community training for new officers includes a day devoted to visiting places of worship so that officers are familiar with the layout and structure of the space and understand the leadership style and governance of such places. Senior officers undergo level-2 training, which includes looking at different schools of thought in Islam. The training is also aimed at ensuring that communities are able to engage more effectively with the diverse communities they serve. In the London Borough of Waltham Forest, the council ensures that all frontline policing staff undertake faith-awareness training.³⁶⁴

³⁶³ OSI focus group, Hamburg.

³⁶⁴ London Borough of Waltham Forest, *Draft: Working Together, Living Together, Being Together – Waltham Forest Community Cohesion Strategy 2008–2011*, 2008, p.8, available at: [http://www1.walthamforest.gov.uk/ModernGov/Published/C00000287/M00001812/AI00009757/\\$9AppendixJuly08CommunityCohesionStrategyv2.docA.ps.pdf](http://www1.walthamforest.gov.uk/ModernGov/Published/C00000287/M00001812/AI00009757/$9AppendixJuly08CommunityCohesionStrategyv2.docA.ps.pdf) (accessed November 2009).

8.5 Police and Community Engagement

Across the different cities, there are examples of policies and initiatives that are seeking to increase community trust and engagement with the police. There are examples of successful partnerships with community organisations and support for community-led initiatives. An example of the latter is the public funding for the “Neighbourhood Fathers” project in the Netherlands. This started out as an initiative of a group of Moroccan fathers in response to concerns about by confrontations between the police and young Moroccan men. The fathers group decided to patrol the streets to prevent further trouble. Despite initial scepticism, there is now state support for this project. In Leicester, there is a Police Advisory Group on Racial Incidents (PAGRI), which was set up to advise senior officers on critical incidents. Members of the advisory board are involved with the police in so-called hydra exercises, in which hypothetical situations are discussed to see how a community scenario might turn into a high-risk incident. Interviews with community groups in the city also suggest that even work that has emerged as a result of policing for counterterrorism has strengthened relationships between community institutions and the police. The London Borough of Waltham Forest has instituted a Youth Independent Advisory Group (YIAG),³⁶⁵ which has devised and delivered stop-and-search training for new police recruits, demonstrating what makes a good search from a young person’s perspective.

There are also examples in several cities of increased collaboration between the police and mosques. The police in Amsterdam, for example, worked with local mosques to disseminate information about their actions after an incident involving a shooting of a Moroccan youth who attacked police with a knife. Police in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam were also active in reducing tensions in the weeks preceding the release of Geert Wilders’ film *Fitna*. In Amsterdam, the police organised a meeting before the release of the film, to ensure that the local Muslim community understood their legal position, including their right to file a complaint about it. In Berlin, contacts between the police and mosque associations have been taking place through the development of “cooperation agreements”. In 2003, the local police in the district of Neukölln, together with the local mosque association, started a programme called “TiK” (Transfer of Intercultural Competencies). This aimed to put mosque and police officers from the different districts into contact with each other and develop national guidelines for the police about how to act in their contacts with mosques and Muslims. The guidelines provide basic knowledge about Islam and Muslim cultural sensibilities, so as to help prevent conflict emerging as a result of misunderstandings.

Growing recognition of the importance of community engagement has led to the development of structures or mechanisms for community based policing. In Hamburg,

³⁶⁵ This is a group of 15 to 21 year olds from across the borough who works in partnership with the police and the Council to proactively identify safety issues in their community and to act as a sounding board on local and national policies.

Muslim roundtable participants referred to their positive experiences with BUNABE³⁶⁶ neighbourhood policing in areas with a high proportion of Muslim and migrant residents, such as Wilhelmsburg, Steilshoop or Billstedt. In the UK, neighbourhood policing teams are attached to local areas, and there is increasing deployment of Police and Community Support Officers (PCSOs). The latter wear uniforms similar to those of the police but do not have the same powers. The London Borough of Waltham Forest council has appointed a Metropolitan Police Faith Officer to engage directly with the Muslim community.³⁶⁷ In 2000, France introduced Security Assistants (AS) and Local Agents of Mediation (ALMS). In the Netherlands, there are neighbourhood directors and “street coaches”. The latter are often kick-boxers or martial arts experts who patrol the area on bikes and are concerned with antisocial behaviour. They report problems to social work home teams who visit individuals at home and in the case of young people talk to the family and parents about their behaviour. The OSI research suggests that individuals from minority groups have a more visible presence in such roles. In Slotervaart, Amsterdam, for example, two of the nine neighbourhood directors are from non-western minorities, as are many of the “street coaches” and the home teams. In Leicester it is reported that a significant proportion of those recruited to work as PCSOs are from ethnic minorities.

The increased visibility and presence of individuals from minorities in these roles is an important acknowledgement that public institutions and services are better able to meet the needs of diverse local communities if their workforce also reflects that diversity. There is, however, a danger that individuals from ethnic minorities become concentrated in roles which are not viewed in the same light as mainstream policing roles and that senior policing positions remain closed to them. Community-based or focused policing roles are important for developing trust but there still remains a need to recruit ethnic minorities into the mainstream police.

8.6 Diversity in the Police Force

Across the different cities, there is recognition of the need for greater diversity in the police force. There are no data on the number of Muslims working as police officers in different cities, but there are data on officers from minority backgrounds, which provides an indication of the extent to which different cities are succeeding in recruiting a more diverse police force. Some cities have been more successful at recruiting from ethnic-minority groups than others. For example, 6.5 per cent of police officers in the Netherlands are from minority groups, while 12 per cent of officers in the Amsterdam Amstelland force are from ethnic-minority groups, and in Rotterdam

³⁶⁶ Short for *Bürgerlicher Beamter*, an officer close to citizens.

³⁶⁷ London Borough of Waltham Forest, *Community Cohesion Strategy Action Plan Year Two 2009/10*, 2009, p15, available at <http://www.walthamforest.gov.uk/cohesion-action-planning> (accessed November 2009, hereafter Borough of Waltham Forest, *Community Cohesion Strategy Action Plan Year Two*).

the figure is 13 per cent.³⁶⁸ This city's aim is to increase this to 20 per cent. In Leicester, 6 per cent of police were from ethnic-minority groups in 2008. In contrast, less than 2 per cent of officers in Hamburg are from ethnic minorities, although in other regions of Germany, like Nordrhein-Westfalen, minorities account for 7.6 per cent of police officers.³⁶⁹ In Antwerp, less than 2 per cent of police officers are from ethnic minorities.³⁷⁰

Various initiatives have been taken to improve recruitment. In Rotterdam, 60 internships have been offered to future police officers at Hogeschool Inholland (HBO) that are targeted at non-native students. In Leicester, careers in policing are advertised through police-organised community sporting events, in community centres (including mosques) and at key community events such as the Hindu Diwali festival and the Caribbean Carnival. The police are also careful to ensure that recruitment posters are placed in areas with high BME populations and show pictures of people from visible minority groups. In Paris, the police created a "security and citizenship" forum in policing schools to encourage and support applicants from minority backgrounds in 2005. In 2007, a police superintendent's exam preparation course was launched. It aims to encourage applicants from low income families by providing extra support preparation for police entrance exams.

Such initiatives, however, cannot succeed when there is a particularly negative view of the police held by young people from minority groups. In Antwerp, for example, a €600,000 advertising campaign resulted in only one recruit from a minority background. A discussion on whether to join the police that took place in a Berlin focus group highlighted the way in which negative stories about experiences with the police shape community perceptions and feelings about joining the police. Thus, even in cities where recruitment rates for ethnic-minority groups are good, this can be undermined if those who join soon leave because of experiences of discrimination.

Stakeholder interviews in Marseille suggest that Islamophobia and racism persists in police unions:

One day I went to the police station. I found myself in front of the trade union notice board. There was a poster of the National Union of Police Officers on which was marked: "No to the Islamisation of the National Police Force!". I found that disgraceful. Basically, it was written: "It is out of the question that Muslim police officers force their mosques onto us inside police stations". They

³⁶⁸ Politie Regio Amsterdam Amstelland, *Jaarverslag, 2007* (in Dutch), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Amsterdam*.

³⁶⁹ Daniela Hunold, *Migranten in der Polizei. Zwischen politischer Programmatik und Organisationswirklichkeit* (Migrants in the Police. Between Political Programmatic and Organisational Reality), Frankfurt, Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2008.

³⁷⁰ J. Meijer, "Antwerpen wil minder maar betere moskeeën" (Antwerp, less but better Mosques), *De Morgen*, 5 May 2008 (in Dutch), cited in OSI, *At Home in Europe: Muslims in Antwerp*.

were attacking their own colleagues with Muslim backgrounds. I had the psychological shock of my life. I said “its not possible”. They were attacking Muslim police officers, saying that it is them who are the infiltrated agents of Islamism, who would like us to build mosques in police stations.³⁷¹

In Amsterdam, for example, it has been suggested that a fifth of police officers from minorities are considering leaving the police force.³⁷² A study by Hamburg University comparing recruitment practices in Germany and the UK recommends establishing an Ethnic Minority Police Association, because it is important for ethnic-minority officers to have support, affirmation and a voice through an official institution within the police force that strengthens their rights.³⁷³ The OSI research in Marseille suggests that the city is proof that a city can change minority groups’ perceptions of joining its police force. During 1970–1980, many North African families saw joining the French national police force as a betrayal of their personal story and their identities (Arabic, Muslim, “resistant” to French colonisation). This is no longer the case; today, joining the national or local police force is a sign of professional success.

8.7 Key Findings

It is critical to ensure accurate reporting and recording of hate crime. The high levels of trust in the police provide a good base from which to develop initiatives to improve reporting. However, it needs to be recognised that the general high levels of trust exist alongside low levels of trust among young European-born Muslim males. This group also appears to experience the greatest amount of discrimination and unfair treatment in the hands of the police. Trust can be lost through a single bad incident that leaves a lasting impression on an individual. At the same time, the experience of Marseille suggests that over time, even the most complex and fraught relations between the community and the police can improve. There are a wide range of initiatives that aim to improve communication and engagement with Muslim communities. Engagement will also improve when the police force begins to reflect the ethnic, religious and cultural diversity of the community it serves. Some cities are developing imaginative ways to improve engagement with communities, as well as effective strategies for recruiting and retaining police officers from minority communities.

³⁷¹ Marseille stakeholder interview, April 2009.

³⁷² “Allochtone agenten twijfelen over baan” (Ethnic Minority Police Doubts About Job), available at <http://www.inoverheid.nl/artikel/nieuws/1105430/allochtone-agenten-twijfelen-over-baan.html> (in Dutch, accessed November 2009).

³⁷³ Karakus, Oksan, “Recruitment of Ethnic Minority Police Officers. Ethnic Minority Recruitment from a Multi-Cultural Perspective in England and Germany”, Hamburg, University of Hamburg, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Departement Wirtschaft und Politik, Institut für Kriminologische Sozialforschung, 2008, p. 65.

9. CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political inclusion can be measured by the strength of identification with political institutions. This can be gauged by the extent to which respondents feel that they can influence decisions affecting their city and their trust in political institutions such as the city council, parliament and government. This chapter looks at civic participation, that is, participation in associations and organisations, examining in particular whether participation in organisations based on individual ethnic or religious identity affects their identification with political institutions. It also looks at participation in formal electoral processes as well as other forms of participation. Finally, the chapter highlights some of the ways in which policymakers and politicians across the 11 cities have responded to attempts by Muslim organisations to become active civil-society partners.

9.1 The Right to Vote

Voting in elections is the most direct form of political participation. In six of the EU states covered by the OSI reports (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden) the right to vote in national elections is limited to those who are citizens of the state. In the UK, the right to vote in national elections extends to Commonwealth citizens and citizens of Cyprus, Malta and Ireland. In these seven states, the right to vote in local elections extends to EU citizens. Furthermore, settled non-EU nationals can participate in local elections in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. However, in France and Germany non-EU nationals are not permitted to vote in local elections. As most Muslims in the 11 cities included in the OSI research are migrants or the descendants of migrants, these restrictions affect the eligibility to vote of many Muslim respondents. Over 80 per cent of Muslims in five cities (Antwerp, Leicester, Rotterdam, Stockholm and London) were eligible to vote in national and local elections. Over 80 per cent were also eligible to vote in local elections in Copenhagen, but only 52 per cent in national elections. By contrast, only 41 per cent of Paris Muslim respondents were eligible to vote in national and local elections, and Muslim respondents in Berlin (51 per cent), Hamburg (57 per cent) and Marseille (66 per cent) also had little eligibility to vote.

City officials and political activists are concerned about the implications for democratic legitimacy of having cities and local areas in which a significant proportion of residents have no right to vote. In Marseille, the exclusion of non-EU nationals from electoral participation, particularly in local elections, is criticised by civil-society activists:

We really long for the extension of universal suffrage, that is to say the right to vote for foreign residents, at least in local elections. We notice that when there are negotiations with the other political partners, this does not become a vital concern.

In my opinion, this question is by nature difficult to tackle outside of the fact that we are nevertheless in a representative democracy which is in crisis. If we

want to evoke the participation of foreigners or immigrants, because in this country, all governments have promised the right to vote for foreigners but have never implemented it. Foreigners are not given the right to express themselves; that corresponds all the same to our parents' generation, we speak about our parents, it isn't nothing! Thus, the feeling of illegality of participation already is the legacy of immigration in France.³⁷⁴

Official data from Hamburg reveal that in the three areas that were the focus of the OSI research, for every 100 persons who were eligible to vote there were 43, 52 and 106 residents who were unable to vote.³⁷⁵ The exclusion from the electoral process of settled non-EU nationals has also given greater weight to votes for far-right parties. In the 2001 Hamburg citizenry elections, the areas with large proportions of disenfranchised foreign nationals had some of the highest levels of votes for the right-wing populist Schill Party.³⁷⁶ This situation can be contrasted with that of Antwerp, where the enfranchisement and political participation of those of Moroccan and Turkish origin (whether Belgian citizens or not) are seen by many as having been crucial to preventing the right-wing Vlaams Belang (The Interest of Flanders) party from gaining the largest share of the vote in the city elections and the office of mayor. It is suggested by some that Vlaams Belang will be prevented from gaining power in Antwerp as the proportion of voters from ethnic-minority groups increases.³⁷⁷

There are attempts to extend the electoral franchise for local elections to non-EU nationals. In Hamburg, the Greens (GAL) have campaigned for the right of long-term resident non-EU nationals to vote in local elections. In 2008, the federal states of Berlin, Rheinland-Pfalz and Bremen launched an initiative at the Federal Council (Bundesratsinitiative) to secure the right to vote in local elections for non-EU-nationals. This was seen as necessary to maintain the legitimacy of democratic processes in areas with large numbers of foreign nationals.³⁷⁸ In Berlin, attempts by Franz Schulz, the mayor of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, to introduce a right to vote in local elections for non-EU-nationals have faced strong political resistance.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁴ Stakeholder interview, Marseille, April 2009.

³⁷⁵ See the website of the Statistische Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein, <http://www.statistik-nord.de/wahlen/wahlen-in-hamburg/buergerschaftswahlen/2008/> (in German, accessed November 2009).

³⁷⁶ In Billstedt the Schill party gained the second highest number of votes (6,027), in Wilhelmsburg the fourth highest number of votes (4,430) and in Horn the eighth highest number of votes (2,971), see http://www.statistik-nord.de/uploads/tx_standdocuments/Bue2001_Stadtteile-abs.xls (accessed November 2009).

³⁷⁷ "Rol Vlaams Belang is uitgespeeld", *De Standaard*, 31 October 2007 (in Dutch).

³⁷⁸ See the press release of the Berlin Senate, "Kommunales Wahlrecht für Nicht-EU-Bürgerinnen und -Bürger" (Communal Right to Vote for Non-EU-citizens), 30 September 2008, available at <http://www.berlin.de/landespressestelle/archiv/2008/09/30/110580/index.html> (in German, accessed November 2009).

³⁷⁹ Interview with Dr. Franz Schulz, district mayor of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.

The mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, considers political participation to be a necessary condition for integration. In 2001, a Citizenship Council of non-European Parisians (Conseil de la citoyenneté des Parisiens non communautaires, CCPNC) was set up by the Mairie to allow the voices and views of non-EU nationals living and working in Paris, who are otherwise ineligible to vote, to be heard. The CCPNC is an advisory committee, composed of 45 women and 45 men from 36 different nationalities, chaired by the mayor of Paris. The committee reflects the diversity of non-EU nationals in terms of nationalities as well as social and occupational backgrounds, and the different Parisian districts. Members, however, are not elected but appointed from among those who apply to join.³⁸⁰ Within the CCPNC, eight commissions were also constituted and each has a specific area of expertise: access to fundamental rights, international social services, cooperation, economic development and training, information and communication, youth, culture and education, quality of life, and equality between men and women.³⁸¹ Advisory councils of this type have also been implemented in arrondissement municipalities, in the 19th and 20th *arrondissements* of Paris.

9.2 Voting in Elections

While the right to vote is an important political right, with the exception of Antwerp there is no legal obligation to vote in the cities covered by the OSI research. The level of voting varies across the 11 cities and between different minority groups. The Amsterdam Citizen Monitor (2007) found that native Dutch respondents were more likely than respondents from Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds to say that they intended to vote.³⁸² By contrast, council data in Leicester found that the highest levels of voting took place in the wards with the largest ethnic-minority groups.³⁸³

Islamic discourses can be used to both support and discourage participation in electoral politics. Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, for example, explore the use of Islamic discourse in the UK by the proscribed group, Al-Muhajiroun, which argued that voting in elections was prohibited for Muslims, and the response from the Imams and

³⁸⁰ The selection of the members does not take into account ideological elements such as the membership to a political party.

³⁸¹ See also: Council of Europe, *The participation of foreign residents in public life at local level: Consultative bodies*, Stuttgart December 2001 (Studies and texts No. 78) (2003).

³⁸² Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek, *De Amsterdamse Burgermonitor 2007 (Amsterdam Citizenship Monitor 2007)*, available at <http://www.amsterdam.nl/bm2007/> (in Dutch, accessed November 2009).

³⁸³ Leicester City Council, *The Diversity of Leicester: A Demographic Profile*, May 2008.

Mosques Council which argued that it was the duty of Muslims to participate in the electoral process.³⁸⁴

Among OSI respondents, of those eligible to vote, participation in national and local elections was higher for non-Muslim respondents (81 per cent and 75 per cent, respectively) than Muslim respondents (73 per cent and 69 per cent, respectively).

Table 114. Did interviewee vote in the last national election? (F2)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Yes		51.0%	69.1%	60.0%
No		49.0%	30.9%	40.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1089	2199

Source: Open Society Institute data

Table 115. Did interviewee vote in the last local council election? (F4)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Yes		51.2%	65.8%	58.4%
No		48.8%	34.2%	41.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1089	2199

There was little gender difference in the voting turnout among Muslim and non-Muslim respondents.³⁸⁵

While a slightly higher proportion of Muslim women who were eligible to vote did so in the last local election than men, the opposite was true for the national elections. Comparing the 11 cities, we see that the difference in voting patterns between Muslim men and women is less than 10 per cent in all cities, bar Hamburg. Here, 79 per cent of eligible Muslim men voted in national elections compared with just 50 per cent of women. Voting in local elections follows a similar pattern: evenly split between the

³⁸⁴ N. Hopkins, and V. Kahani-Hopkins, "Identity construction and British Muslims' Political Activity: Beyond Rational Actor Theory", *British Journal of Social Psychology* 43:39, 2004. See also N. Hopkins, and V. Kahani-Hopkins, "The Antecedents of Identification: A Rhetorical Analysis of British Muslim Activist's Construction of Community and Identity" in *British Journal of Social Psychology* 43:41, 2004.

³⁸⁵ See Table 116. and Table 117. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

genders but with large discrepancies noted in both Berlin (19 per cent difference) and Hamburg (32 per cent difference).

Among Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, a far greater proportion of those born in the state were eligible to vote in local and national elections compared with those born abroad. Foreign-born Muslim respondents who were eligible to vote were, however, significantly more likely to exercise their right to vote than those born in the EU. This may in part reflect the differences in age profile of the two groups.³⁸⁶

9.3 Standing in Elections

Across the 11 cities, individuals with Muslim backgrounds have stood as candidates in mainstream political parties and have been elected into political office at the local, city and national level. Those seeking political office are confronted with questions about their identity. Most respond by emphasising that they are elected to represent their electorate, not a particular ethnic or religious group. They also argue that they are chosen for their political views and do not want to be seen as the representative of a religious or ethnic minority. The views of Samia Ghali, the mayor of Marseille's 8th district, echo those of many elected politicians: "I do not want to be determined by my origin [...] Let's talk about education, remedial courses and housing rehabilitation."³⁸⁷

The strong secular and universalist traditions of many European countries also shape the nature and terms of political participation. Those seeking political office are aware that any sign of religiosity by a politician may lead them to be seen as less objective in the view of the general public. Muslim interviewees who were politically active were also weary of opening themselves up to (unjustified) accusations of "*communautarisme*".

So if you are not religious, you will be considered the most neutral, but if you have religion, be it Islam, Christianity or any other religion, also Judaism, we are not taken as neutral.³⁸⁸

Political parties use a word that cuts any discussion; it is "*communautarisme*". We keep trying to explain that it is not about "*communautarisme*". But all the political parties, including the right-wing one, consider that when two Blacks or two Arabs discuss an issue between them, it is "*communautarisme*", it is the "Fifth Column". This may seem an exaggeration but it is not very far from everyday reality. They accuse you of "*communautarisme*", as soon as there are two persons who have the same concerns and share the same origin. Except that ethnicity doesn't create the

³⁸⁶ See Table 118. and Table 119. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

³⁸⁷ Claude Askolovitch, "La trop longue marche des beurs" (The very long march of beurs), *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 1 November 2001.

³⁸⁸ OSI focus group participant, Copenhagen.

motivation and the determination necessary to get involved in politics. Nevertheless, this type of approach is considered as “communautarisme”.³⁸⁹

While politicians and candidates for elected office resist attempts to be reduced to being representatives of ethnic or religious groups, it is nevertheless noticeable that in cities where voting is based on geographical electoral districts, candidates from minority backgrounds continue to be elected in areas with large minority populations. This pattern can reinforce the perception that political parties’ selection committees think that candidates with minority backgrounds are only electable in areas with large minority populations. As one interviewee reveals, for politicians from minority backgrounds there is a “fear of being a ‘token migrant’”, used to increase the party’s appeal to minority voters. While recognising that political strategies for appealing to minority groups can play a role in the selection of candidates of minority backgrounds, “It is not enough to put candidates in positions where they don’t have a chance to succeed, just to attract the votes. You have to place the people in a way that they have a chance of being successful and implement their politics.”³⁹⁰

Political parties are developing initiatives that aim to increase their appeal to and communication with voters from different minority groups. In Hamburg, for example, a German-Turkish forum was established by the SPD more than five years ago.³⁹¹ Following this example, the CDU set up a German-Turkish Forum (DTF) prior to the 2008 Hamburg election to make the party more attractive for voters with a Turkish background.³⁹² The head of the DTF, Bettina Machaczek, also visited some of the Turkish communities in Hamburg during the election campaign. At the same time, the SPD placed candidates with minority backgrounds, Bülent Ciftlik and Metin Hakverdi, high on their list. They met Turkish merchants in the local hammam and published a pamphlet in Turkish about the new voting system in Hamburg.³⁹³ In Antwerp, the Green Party (Groen!) made a more direct appeal to Muslim voters; after the introduction of a ban on employees of the city council wearing the headscarf, the Green Party launched a poster campaign with the slogan “The city is for everyone (“T Stad is van iedereen”)), which featured a woman wearing a headscarf.

The vast majority of Muslims and those of minority backgrounds who seek political office do so through participation in existing mainstream political parties. Attempts to mobilise religious or ethnic minorities into separate political parties have failed to

³⁸⁹ Stakeholder interview, Marseille.

³⁹⁰ Stakeholder interview, Hamburg.

³⁹¹ See the Norddeutscher Rundfunk website, “Der Kampf um Migrantenstimmen”, http://www1.ndr.de/nachrichten/buergerschaftswahl_hamburg_2008/themen/tuerkischewaehler2.html (in German, accessed November 2009, hereafter NDR, “Der Der Kampf um Migrantenstimmen”).

³⁹² NDR, “Der Der Kampf um Migrantenstimmen”.

³⁹³ The new voting system was established by a struggle between civil society winning a referendum on more democratic participation and the government trying to minimise the influence of the referendum and their outcomes.

gather significant political support among minority voters. In Belgium, the obligation on all citizens to vote may account for the creation of several political parties with a more open Muslim identity. These include the Noor (“The Light”) Party, the Party for Citizenship and Prosperity (PCP), stemming from the Movement of Young Muslims, and the Arab European League. In 2008 a new centre-left MOSLIM (MUSLIM) party was established by former members of the Green Party. The party aims to campaign to overturn the ban on civil servants wearing the headscarf in Antwerp.³⁹⁴ None of these has, however, secured widespread success among Muslim voters.

9.4 Other Forms of Political Participation

In addition to questions about voting in elections, the OSI survey asked respondents about their involvement in three other forms of political participation: attending public meetings, attending demonstrations and signing petitions. More non-Muslims than Muslims had signed a petition; however, a similar proportion of each group was likely to have attended a public meeting or demonstration. Just under a fifth of respondents had also taken part in a consultation meeting about local services or problems in the local area.

The majority of Muslim OSI respondents in all but three cities had participated in at least one political activity in the preceding 12 months. The three exceptions are London, where only 45 per cent of Muslim respondents had engaged in a political event, and Antwerp and Rotterdam, where participation figures stood at 30 per cent and 29 per cent respectively.

9.5 Perceptions of Influence and the Ability to Effect Change

Respondents were asked whether they felt that they could influence decisions affecting the city. Overall, non-Muslim OSI respondents (50 per cent) were more likely than Muslim OSI respondents (40 per cent) to feel that they could.³⁹⁵ For both groups, taking the country of birth into account, those born in the country were more likely than those born abroad to feel that they could influence such decisions. Among Muslim respondents, 46 per cent of those born in the country felt that they could influence decisions, compared with 38 per cent of those born abroad.

Voting

There is, as expected, a strong relationship between voting in city elections and feeling that you can influence city decisions. Among both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, those who are eligible to vote and who did vote are more likely to feel

³⁹⁴ See the website of the Overlegcentrum van Vlaamse Verenigingen, <http://www.ovv.be/page.php?ID=2678> (in Dutch, accessed November 2009).

³⁹⁵ The results combine the answers for those who agree or strongly agree that they can influence decisions affecting the city.

they can influence decisions affecting their city than those who are eligible to vote but did not do so, or those who are ineligible to vote. Among respondents who are eligible to vote, non-Muslims (46 per cent) are slightly more likely than Muslims (39 per cent) to feel that they can influence decisions at the local level. The gap in perception is larger still among those who were eligible to vote and did vote. Among these respondents, the majority of non-Muslim respondents (56 per cent) felt that they could influence city decisions, compared with a minority of Muslims (45 per cent).

Table 120. Can you influence decisions affecting your city (F8)

		Eligible voter	Eligible non-voter	Non-eligible to vote	Total
Muslim	Definitely agree	6.0%	4.7%	3.2%	5.0%
	Agree	38.9%	34.1%	29.3%	35.4%
	Disagree	31.9%	34.5%	31.1%	32.3%
	Definitely disagree	12.2%	16.9%	23.3%	16.1%
	Don't know	11.0%	9.8%	13.1%	11.2%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	565	255	283	1103
Non-Muslim	Definitely agree	10.8%	5.0%	5.4%	8.8%
	Agree	45.3%	41.3%	22.3%	41.6%
	Disagree	30.9%	28.3%	40.8%	31.5%
	Definitely disagree	8.7%	13.3%	22.3%	11.3%
	Don't know	4.5%	12.1%	9.2%	6.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	716	240	130	1086

Source: Open Society Institute data

In contrast, when comparing those ineligible to vote, Muslim respondents were more likely than non-Muslims to feel that they could influence decisions at the local level.

Citizenship

Those who are citizens of the country are more likely than foreign nationals to feel they can influence decisions affecting the city.

Table 121. Can you influence decisions affecting your city (by citizenship) (F8)

		Non-citizen of EU state	Citizen of EU state	Total
Muslim	Definitely agree	4.2%	5.3%	5.0%
	Agree	28.8%	38.4%	35.3%
	Disagree	33.6%	31.7%	32.3%
	Definitely disagree	21.8%	13.4%	16.1%
	Don't know	11.6%	11.2%	11.3%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	354	753	1107
Non-Muslim	Definitely agree	7.7%	9.0%	8.8%
	Agree	29.4%	43.4%	41.5%
	Disagree	35.7%	31.0%	31.6%
	Definitely disagree	21.7%	9.7%	11.3%
	Don't know	5.6%	6.9%	6.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	143	945	1088

Source: Open Society Institute data

This is true of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. Among Muslim respondents, 43 per cent of those who were citizens of an EU state either agreed (38 per cent) or strongly agreed (5 per cent) that they could influence decisions affecting their city, compared with 33 per cent of those who were foreign nationals.

Age

Muslims in the younger age groups are more likely to feel they can influence decision-making at city level than those in older age groups. There appears to be a clear correlation between age and levels of confidence among Muslim respondents in their ability to influence city decision-making.³⁹⁶

For instance, 56 per cent of under 20-year-olds believe they can influence decisions affecting their city; this figure falls to 43 per cent for the 20–29 age group, 35 per cent for the 30–39 age group, 35 per cent for the 50–59 age group and 29 per cent for those over 60 years of age. The only age group which does not fit this pattern is the

³⁹⁶ See Table 122. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

40–49 year age group, in which 42 per cent believe they can influence decision-making at city level.

Education

The higher the levels of qualifications both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents possess, the more likely it is that they feel they can influence decisions affecting the city, as follows.

- 26 per cent of Muslims with no formal qualifications, 32 per cent with primary education, 42 per cent with secondary education and 47 per cent with university degrees believe they can influence decisions at city level.
- 38 per cent of non-Muslims with no formal qualifications, 44 per cent with primary education, 46 per cent with secondary education and 59 per cent with university degrees believe they can influence decisions at city level.
- Muslims with a university degree are 1.8 times more likely to feel they can influence city decisions than those with no qualifications. Non-Muslims with a university degree are 1.6 times more likely to feel they can influence city decisions than those with no qualifications.

However, when we compared the views of Muslim respondents who are university graduates with non-Muslim graduate respondents, we still found that non-Muslim respondents are 1.2 times more likely to feel they can influence city decisions than Muslim respondents. Similarly, non-Muslim respondents with no qualifications are 1.4 times more likely to feel they can influence city decisions than their Muslim counterparts.

Participation in public consultation

Taking part in public consultations positively correlates with Muslims' and non-Muslims' sense of influence over decisions affecting their city.³⁹⁷

Muslims and non-Muslims who participated in public consultations in the past year were significantly more likely to feel they could influence city decision-making. Muslims and non-Muslims who participate in public consultations are both 1.3 times more likely to feel they can affect decisions concerning their city than those who do not participate; 49 per cent of Muslims and 64 per cent of non-Muslims who participated in a public consultation in the past year agreed or strongly agreed that they could influence decisions affecting their city. In contrast, only 38 per cent of Muslims and 48 per cent of non-Muslims who did not participate in a consultation felt the same way.

³⁹⁷ See Table 123. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Visible Religious Identity and Influencing Decisions

There is no significant difference between Muslims with visible manifestations of their religious identity and those without in relation to their sense of whether they can influence decisions affecting the city. Thus, 42 per cent of Muslim respondents with a visible religious identity agreed or strongly agreed that they could influence decision-making at the city level, and 39 per cent of non-visibly religious Muslims felt the same.

9.6 Trust in Political Institutions

Civic and political engagement is likely to be greater where there is a sense of trust in both local and national institutions to be inclusive and to act in the interests of all. The OSI questionnaire asked respondents about the level of trust in relation to five key institutions: the courts, the police, the national Parliament, national government and the city council. Levels of trust were highest for the courts and the police. A majority of both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents trusted the police and the courts.³⁹⁸

Among the political institutions, there was greater trust of the city council than the national Parliament and least trust in the government.

Table 126. Trust in the national Parliament (F11.3)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A lot	6.0%	5.2%	5.6%
A fair amount	26.8%	35.4%	31.1%
Not very much	38.8%	38.4%	38.6%
Not at all	15.3%	13.4%	14.4%
Don't know	13.0%	7.5%	10.3%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1108	1087

Source: Open Society Institute data

³⁹⁸ See Table 124. and Table 125. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

Table 127. Trust in the government (F11.4)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A lot		5.6%	4.7%	5.1%
A fair amount		23.6%	26.4%	25.0%
Not very much		37.3%	41.1%	39.2%
Not at all		24.1%	22.1%	23.1%
Don't know		9.4%	5.7%	7.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1089	2198

Source: Open Society Institute data

Table 128. Trust in the city council (F11.5)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A lot		9.2%	7.2%	8.2%
A fair amount		35.9%	38.8%	37.3%
Not very much		33.5%	33.5%	33.5%
Not at all		10.3%	9.9%	10.1%
Don't know		11.1%	10.7%	10.9%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1088	2197

Source: Open Society Institute data

The views of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents were broadly similar, except over Parliament, where Muslim respondents (33 per cent) had much less trust than non-Muslim respondents (41 per cent). Further analysis found that levels of trust in Parliament were much lower among Muslims born in the country (25 per cent said they had “a lot” or a “fair amount” of trust in Parliament) compared with Muslim respondents born abroad (36 per cent) and non-Muslim respondents.

Table 129. Trust in the national Parliament (breakdown by birthplace) (F11.3)

		Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
A lot		4.3%	6.9%	4.2%	8.1%	5.6%
A fair amount		22.6%	28.9%	36.3%	33.0%	31.1%
Not very much		44.9%	35.7%	39.6%	35.0%	38.6%
Not at all		20.4%	12.8%	15.1%	9.1%	14.4%
Don't know		7.8%	15.6%	4.8%	14.8%	10.3%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	372	736	790	297	2195

Source: Open Society Institute data

Among Muslim respondents, the proportion of those who said they had “a lot” or “a fair” amount of trust in Parliament did not differ significantly between those who were citizens of the state (35 per cent) and those who were foreign nationals (32 per cent).³⁹⁹

Voting, rather than just the eligibility to vote, appears to correlate with greater trust in Parliament. In fact, when levels of trust are compared between those who voted, those who were eligible to vote but did not vote (eligible non-voters) and those ineligible to vote, the results show that eligible non-voters were the group least likely to have trust in Parliament. Only a quarter of respondents in this group (Muslim and non-Muslim) said they had trust in Parliament.

³⁹⁹ See Table 130. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

**Table 131. Trust in the national parliament
(breakdown by voting eligibility) (F11.3)**

		National vote eligibility			
		Eligible voter	Eligible non-voter	Non-eligible to vote	Total
Muslim	A lot	5.7%	5.8%	6.9%	6.0%
	A fair amount	30.2%	19.7%	25.4%	26.8%
	Not very much	42.4%	39.9%	32.0%	38.8%
	Not at all	13.1%	20.7%	15.9%	15.3%
	Don't know	8.7%	13.9%	19.8%	13.0%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	566	208	334	1108
Non-Muslim	A lot	5.2%	2.8%	8.3%	5.2%
	A fair amount	40.1%	22.0%	28.2%	35.5%
	Not very much	37.1%	43.5%	38.5%	38.3%
	Not at all	12.1%	22.6%	9.6%	13.4%
	Don't know	5.6%	9.0%	15.4%	7.6%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	753	177	156	1086

Source: Open Society Institute data

As for trust in the city council, among Muslim respondents, access to the right to vote, whether exercised or not, appears to have a small positive impact on trust in the city council: 47 per cent of Muslim respondents who voted had trust in the city council, compared with 44 per cent of those who were eligible to vote but did not vote and 42 per cent of those ineligible to vote.

Table 132. Trust in the city council (breakdown by local vote eligibility) (F11.3)

		Local vote eligibility			Total	
		Eligible voter	Eligible non-voter	Non-eligible to vote		
Muslim	A lot	9.2%	7.8%	10.6%	9.2%	
	A fair amount	37.9%	35.7%	31.8%	35.8%	
	Not very much	36.2%	27.8%	33.6%	33.6%	
	Not at all	8.5%	13.3%	11.3%	10.3%	
	Don't know	8.3%	15.3%	12.7%	11.0%	
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Count	567	255	283	1105
Non-Muslim	A lot	6.7%	3.8%	15.4%	7.1%	
	A fair amount	40.6%	31.7%	42.3%	38.9%	
	Not very much	34.1%	36.7%	24.6%	33.5%	
	Not at all	9.1%	14.2%	6.2%	9.9%	
	Don't know	9.5%	13.8%	11.5%	10.7%	
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Count	716	240	130	1086

Source: Open Society Institute data

The data do not reveal any clear relationships between age and trust in Parliament, government or the city council. Interestingly, among Muslim respondents, those below the age of 20, compared with other age groups, are the least likely to have trust in Parliament but among the most likely to have trust in the government and the city council.

For Muslim respondents there appears to be a relationship between levels of education and trust in political institutions. In relation to Parliament, government and the city council, those with no formal education or only primary education have higher levels of trust than those with secondary or university education, while those with university education have more trust in political institutions than those with secondary education.⁴⁰⁰

⁴⁰⁰ See Table 133., Table 134., Table 135. and Table 136. in Annex 2 for breakdown of data.

The difference in the levels of trust between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents in relation to Parliament is striking. The qualitative data from the London focus groups found criticism of politicians as incompetent, career-minded and out of touch with people because they were “not genuine enough to deal with the issues”. The scepticism towards mainstream politicians, irrespective of whether people were Muslim or not, reflected the idea that to enter mainstream politics one has to compromise one’s views and beliefs for the party line.

9.7 Civic Participation

The OSI research asked respondents about their participation in other forms of associational activities that they had been involved in the preceding 12 months. A majority of non-Muslim respondents (56 per cent) and just under half of Muslim respondents (47 per cent) had been involved. For both groups, the largest number (165 Muslim respondents and 185 non-Muslim respondents) were involved in activities connected to children’s education or schools. For both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, recreation, sports and hobbies were the third, and youth activities the fourth most popular form of associational activity. The two groups, however, differ in the second most popular form of civic participation. For Muslims, this is involvement in religious activities; 159 Muslim respondents took an active part in running religious activities. For non-Muslim respondents this ranked 10th and involved only 69 respondents. For non-Muslim respondents, the second most popular form of civic participation was involvement in activities related to arts, music and cultural activities; 175 non-Muslim respondents participated in such activities. Among Muslim respondents this was ranked 6th and involved 87 respondents.

With the exception of religious activities, in each type of activity the majority of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents participated through mixed organisations rather than organisations based on their own ethnicity or religion. Involvement in one’s own-ethnic/religious organisation did not differ between those born in the country compared with those born abroad. However, a greater proportion of those born in the country were involved in mixed organisations than those born abroad. Increased education also correlates with increased civic activity and those with a university education were the most likely to be in both one’s own-ethnic/religious organisations as well as be involved in mixed organisations. A quarter of those with university education were involved in an own-ethnic organisation and half were involved in mixed organisations.

Table 137. Respondents' involvement with organisations based on their own ethnicity and mixed organisations (by multiple characteristics)

Characteristics	% who are involved in an organisation based on their own ethnicity/religion	Total (n)	% who are involved in mixed organisations	Total (n)
Religion				
Muslim	23.6%	262	34.1%	379
Non-Muslim	16.0%	174	48.7%	530
Gender				
Male	22.2%	240	39.5%	427
Female	17.5%	196	43.1%	482
Age				
< 20	21.4%	40	50.3%	94
20 – 29	20.4%	126	39.8%	246
30 – 39	18.1%	81	38.6%	173
40 – 49	21.6%	91	44.8%	189
50 – 59	16.2%	44	48.9%	133
60 +	21.3%	53	28.9%	72
Country of birth				
EU country (where person is living)	19.8%	231	46.2%	538
Non-EU country	19.8%	205	35.9%	371
Highest level of education				
No formal education	8.6%	11	11.7%	15
Primary education	18.3%	46	29.4%	74
Secondary education	18.2%	202	39.2%	436
University	25.1%	177	54.3%	383
Employment				
Employed (full/part-time)	19.3%	194	46.9%	472
Self employed	20.7%	30	46.2%	67
Unemployed	22.4%	43	32.8%	63
Other	19.7%	167	35.9%	305
Neighbourhood mainly consists of:				
Relatives	18.4%	14	26.3%	20
Same ethnic and religious background	22.2%	52	32.9%	77
Same religion, different ethnic background	22.7%	29	32.8%	42
Same ethnicity, different religion	18.5%	10	40.7%	22
Different ethnicity and religion	20.6%	58	38.7%	109
Mixture of different backgrounds, ethnicities and religions	19.2%	273	44.8%	638

There is no clear correlation between participation and age. Half of those aged below 20 were involved in mixed organisations, but out of the other categories (middle-aged 40-59, younger people 20–39 or older people 60+) it was the middle-aged group that was found to more likely be engaged in mixed organisations. Participation in own ethnic or religion organisation does not differ by employment status. However, those who are employed or self-employed are more likely to be involved in mixed organisations compared with those who are unemployed or economically inactive.

Table 138. Civic participation and perception of influence over city decision

		Civic participation			
		Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion	Yes, in a mixed organisation	Total	
Muslim	Agree or disagree that interviewee can influence decisions affecting city (F8)	Definitely agree	26 6.5%	61 8.3%	32
		Agree	169 42.1%	321 43.4%	209
		Disagree	115 28.7%	232 31.4%	168
		Definitely disagree	54 13.5%	68 9.2%	67
		Don't know	37 9.2%	57 7.7%	45
		Total	401	739	521
Non-Muslim	Agree or disagree that interviewee can influence decisions affecting city (F8)	Definitely agree	20 7.6%	141 12.4%	57
		Agree	126 47.9%	562 49.5%	291
		Disagree	81 30.8%	272 23.9%	166
		Definitely disagree	27 10.3%	120 10.6%	74
		Don't know	9 3.4%	41 3.6%	26
		Total	263	1136	614

Source: Open Society Institute data

When the views of those involved in mixed organisations are compared with the views of those involved in organisations based on their own ethnic or religious groups, involvement in a mixed organisation appears to have a small positive impact on whether respondents feel that they can influence decisions affecting their city or the country. For Muslims it also correlates with more trust in Parliament and government. However, for both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, involvement in own-ethnic organisations appears to correlate with greater levels of trust in the city councils.

Muslim and non-Muslim respondents who are involved in mixed organisations are marginally more likely to feel they can influence decisions affecting the city and country than those who are involved in own-ethnic/religious organisations.

- 52 per cent of Muslims and 62 per cent of non-Muslims who participate in ethnically-mixed civic organisations agree or strongly agree that they can influence decisions affecting their city. In contrast, 49 per cent of Muslims and 56 per cent of non-Muslims who participate in own-ethnic/religious organisations feel the same way (Table 138.).
- 40 per cent of Muslims and 49 per cent of non-Muslims who participate in mixed civic organisations “agree” or “strongly agree” that they can influence decisions affecting their country. In contrast, 39 per cent of Muslims and 41 per cent of non-Muslims who participate in own-ethnic/religious organisations feel the same way.

Muslim respondents who are civically involved in mixed organisations are marginally more likely to trust Parliament and government than those involved in own-ethnic/religious organisations. However, non-Muslims involved in own-ethnic/religious organisations are significantly more likely to trust Parliament and government than those involved in mixed organisations, as follows.

- 34 per cent of Muslims who participate in mixed civic organisations trust their Parliament, while 25 per cent trust their government. In contrast, 27 per cent of Muslims who participate in own-ethnic/religious organisations trust Parliament and 22 per cent trust their government.
- 48 per cent of non-Muslims who participate in own-ethnic/religious organisations trust Parliament, while 45 per cent trust their government. In contrast, 40 per cent of non-Muslims who participate in mixed organisations feel confident in the Parliament and 25 per cent feel confident in their government.

In both Muslim and non-Muslim groups, respondents involved in own-ethnic/religious civic organisations are significantly more likely to trust their city councils than those involved in mixed organisations: 44 per cent of Muslims and 59 per cent of non-Muslims who participate in own-ethnic/religious civic organisations feel confident about their city council. In contrast, 41 per cent of Muslims and 44 per

cent of non-Muslims who participate in mixed organisations feel confident about their city council.

This may reflect the ways in which city levels officials engage with ethnic and religion-based organisations.

9.8 The Role of Muslim Organisations in Civic and Political Participation

Across the 11 cities, there is a wide range of Muslim organisations and associations, from mosques and madrassas through to women's organisations, youth groups and representative umbrella bodies. Some of these are involved in encouraging and supporting civic and political engagement and participation both for their members and as organisations. In Berlin, for example, the Young Muslim Germans (MJD) group uses religious discourse to encourage young people to become active citizens. The organisation supports integration by developing and strengthening a German Muslim identity. The London Borough of Waltham Forest, through its public support for a "Young Muslim Leaders" programme, appears to recognise the need at times to balance positive civic participation in the public sphere with a strong emphasis on the values and ethos of Islam.⁴⁰¹ The council has also collaborated with local imams⁴⁰² to facilitate political participation that is both communal and confessional, encouraging engagement with other faith groups in the borough while maintaining a distinctly Muslim perspective.

The qualitative data suggest that for some Muslims, active and positive civic participation through Muslim organisations is seen as important in countering the negative stereotypes of Muslims. A young woman in the OSI Berlin focus group recalls her motivation for becoming active in a Muslim youth group:

I want to give a signal to the German society, saying "Yes, I am Muslim, I wear a headscarf, I speak German, and I am educated; and I have achieved this in my life." That has always been my aim, even when I was a child, and even more, when [...] people stared at me strangely on the street or an elder woman almost hit me, because of the sticker on my bag, that said "Islam is peace". That was when I was still 13, and if you experience something like this, your ambition increases.

For city officials a crucial problem arises about the nature and extent of engagement with Muslim organisations. Those who are willing to engage are confronted with the question of which organisations to talk to and how to assess the relevance and

⁴⁰¹ S. Cosgrove, "Waltham Forest: Young Muslim leaders praised by PM", 1 December 2007, *Guardian* website, available at: http://www.guardian-series.co.uk/news/wfnews/1873660.WALTHAM_FOREST_Young_Muslim_leaders_praised_by_PM/ (accessed November 2009).

⁴⁰² Borough of Waltham Forest, *Community Cohesion Strategy Action Plan Year Two*.

importance of the organisation to Muslim communities. In some cities, officials wanted to have a unified single umbrella organisation with which they could work. However, others recognised that this was not possible and that there were differences within and across Muslim groups.

At the local level, the OSI research finds examples of initiatives taken to increase contacts and communications between Muslim organisations and city officials. In 2005, Berlin established an Islamforum. The forum is coordinated by the Commissioner on Integration for Berlin and the Muslim Academy. It provides an opportunity for representatives of Muslim organisations to meet with city officials four times a year. Participants include the Senator of the Interior and the Commissioner on Integration and representatives of the *Verfassungsschutz* (Office for the Protection of the Constitution). Several joint projects between the state and the Muslim community have developed out of the Islamforum meetings. This includes one directed at imams in Berlin that aims to increase their knowledge of the institutional structures of the city and its districts. It was hoped that increased familiarity with the city's institutions would assist imams in their pastoral and social work. Another project provided information and training to members of the Muslim community groups and organisations about the implementation of anti-discrimination laws.⁴⁰³ The Muslim community organisation, Inssan, also suggests that the positive relationships developed through the Islamforum contributed to city officials – especially Senator Erhard Körting – supporting their mosque-building project in the Berlin district of Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, despite opposition from some local politicians and media to both the project and the organisation.

In the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg district of Berlin, a roundtable forum between the district administration and representatives of Muslim organisations was established by the former mayor, Cornelia Reinauer (Die Linkspartei/PDS). The meetings provided an opportunity for Muslim representatives to discuss their needs and concerns with city policymakers. According to Doris Nahawandi, the former Commissioner on Integration of the district, these meetings deepen knowledge and trust between the different parties involved.⁴⁰⁴ Muslim organisations are also involved in the integration advisory board created by the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. The relationship built up in this process paved the way for cooperation between the mayor and Muslim organisations in a European project tackling forced marriages.

The creation of consultation mechanisms does not necessarily lead to feelings of inclusion. In Antwerp, bimonthly consultation meetings are held between Islamic umbrella organisations and city officials. These meetings are seen as important opportunities for Muslim organisations to participate in the political decision-making processes. Despite these contacts, Muslim organisations feel that they are only

⁴⁰³ Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz – General Law for Equal Treatment.

⁴⁰⁴ Expert Interview with Doris Nahawandi, former Commissioner on Integration of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.

consulted after incidents happen. They do not feel they are fully included in the consultation and decision-making processes. City officials suggest that this is the consequence of the fragmented nature of the Muslim community in Antwerp.

In many cases, official contacts between Muslim community groups and policymakers are mainly with older male elites from these communities. The research finds that younger people, particularly women, do not feel represented by these first-generation older Muslim men. The diversity of the Muslim communities undoubtedly creates a challenge for ensuring effective engagement with city officials. There is no single representative of Muslims: the gender, ethnic, cultural, religious and generational diversity is too big. In London, participants in focus groups wanted recognition of the diversity of Muslim communities, and were conscious of the way in which engagement with an individual or organisation by the municipal authorities can confer legitimacy on those they do not feel represent them:

We tend to find that 2 or 3 people are spokesmen for their communities and they simply tick the boxes and say that they have done their bit but communities are more complex than this, especially Muslim communities as they have different schools of thought and are spread in different geographical areas and these things make up the Muslim community.⁴⁰⁵

If you look at our own, again, look at our own community leaders or so-called leaders; what are they doing for us? They're actually self-appointed, egotistic, selfish individuals who have their own agendas, but true representation for us is coming from the non-Muslims unfortunately.⁴⁰⁶

In France the creation in 2003 of the French Muslim Council (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman) also provided the impetus for the development of alternative organisations. Most notably, the former State Secretary for Sustainable Development, Tokia Saïfi, created the French Council of Secular Muslims which aims to facilitate the participation of secular French Muslims in politics.

9.9 Key Findings

The OSI research points towards some encouraging trends as well as persistent challenges to ensuring political and civic participation for Muslims.

Many Muslims who are not EU citizens remain disenfranchised, particularly in Germany and France where they do not have the right to vote in local elections even though many are settled long-term residents. The right to vote is central to political inclusion and empowerment. Those who vote are more likely to feel that they can effect change in their city than those who do not. However, Muslims who vote remain

⁴⁰⁵ Interview with a community activist, London, 2008

⁴⁰⁶ OSI Focus group, London.

less likely than non-Muslims who vote to feel that they can influence decisions affecting their city. On the positive side, young Muslims have greater confidence in their ability to affect local change than the older generations. This appears to coincide with increasing levels of education and familiarity with political institutions. Muslims are active in mainstream political parties. Parties based on ethnic and religious identity have not gained the support of Muslim voters. Increasing numbers are standing for political office, but face additional scrutiny and questions because of their ethnic or religious background.

Muslims and non-Muslims share similar views in relation to their level of trust in the city council and government. Trust in local political institutions is higher than it is in national institutions. The difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in their level of trust in Parliament is significant and should be of concern. Further research is needed to understand the nature and basis of this difference.

Activities involving education, recreation, sport and young people provide important spaces for civic participation by Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, the majority of whom are involved in mixed organisations. Involvement in mixed organisations appears to have a small positive relationship to feeling that an individual can influence local decisions and the levels of trust in Parliament and government. However, religious organisations are the second most important space for civic participation by Muslim respondents. The OSI research finds many positive initiatives taken by officials at the local level to engage with ethnic and religion-based organisations in their city. These initiatives may account for the most striking finding from the OSI survey; that respondents involved in own-ethnic/religion civic organisations are significantly more likely to trust their city councils than those involved in mixed organisations. In engaging with Muslim civil-society organisations, policymakers and practitioners need always to ensure that they include women, young people and others who may be marginalised by existing community organisations.

10. MEDIA

Media consumption, where the purpose is to understand and seek information about issues and events beyond an individual's immediate circle of family and friends, may be viewed as an act of citizenship, because it suggests concern about the local area, the city, the state and internationally. The media therefore both reflect and influence societal attitudes towards Muslims and shape the space in which policies and initiatives to support social, economic and political inclusion take place. A group will feel excluded if its members are invisible in the public space or where public discourse, including representation by the media, is stereotyped and distorted in a way that is demeaning.⁴⁰⁷ The media are not, of course, a monolithic entity but consist of a broad range of producers and consumers, reflecting diverse views and understanding of Muslim communities.

This section focuses on respondents' views of the representation of Muslims in the media and their impact on social cohesion and inclusion. It explores how Muslims have responded to increased media focus on them, and highlights initiatives aimed at supporting Muslims' engagement with the media and increasing their involvement in media production. It also draws on discussions of the media in focus groups and stakeholder interviews and refers to the broader research literature on minorities and the media.

10.1 Representation of Muslims in the Media

Professor Stuart Hall argues that “the mass media”, in particular national print and television news, “play a crucial role in defining the problems and issues of public concern. They are the main channels of public discourse in our segregated society. They transmit stereotypes of one group to other groups. They attach feelings and emotions to problems. They set the terms in which problems are defined as ‘central’ or ‘marginal’”.⁴⁰⁸ Groups can be stereotyped through under-representation, over-representation or misrepresentation. Thus, “a group of people can be marginalised by their portrayal as an unrepresentative minority or denigrated by being presented as abnormal and peculiar, or excluded by only appearing in the media when they present a problem”.⁴⁰⁹

Research on media portrayals of Muslims finds that coverage is generally negative. A study of news press coverage of Islam in the UK revealed that even before 2001 there

⁴⁰⁷ Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*.

⁴⁰⁸ S. Hall, “Black men, white media”, *Journal of the Caribbean Artists Movement* Vols. 9–10, 1974. pp. 18–21, cited in D. Frost, “Islamophobia: examining causal links between the media and ‘race hate’ from ‘below’”, *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* Vol. 28, No. 11/12, 2008, pp. 564–578 at p. 570.

⁴⁰⁹ K. Williams, *Understanding Media Theory*, Arnold, London, 2003, p.132.

was an underlying discourse in which Islam was presented as a threat to British society and its values, and Muslims were seen as deviant, irrational, different and unable to fit into life in the UK.⁴¹⁰ Research in Sweden also found that the majority of television news reports between 1991 and 1995, in which Islam was mentioned, related to violent events.⁴¹¹ Since September 2001, the coverage of Muslims has been dominated by security and terrorism.⁴¹² There is particular criticism of the gap between the scale of coverage given by newspapers to arrests connected to terrorism and the lack of coverage when arrested individuals are subsequently released without charge.⁴¹³ Analysis of Danish news media found that Muslims also face stereotyping through culturalist interpretations of crimes where the perpetrator is Muslim, that is, a tendency to explain crimes committed by Muslims by reference to their religion.⁴¹⁴ A review of British media coverage of Muslims since 2000 found that “the bulk of coverage of British Muslims – around two thirds – focuses on Muslims as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general)”.⁴¹⁵ It noted that 2008 was the first year in which “the volume of stories about religious and cultural differences (32 per cent of stories by 2008) overtook terrorism related stories (27 per cent by 2008)”.⁴¹⁶

There are, however, indications that media coverage of Muslims and Islam is improving. Analysis of Dutch media reporting after the murder of Theo van Gogh suggests that in the weeks following the assassination the focus was more nuanced than the initial reaction, stressing socio-economic issues rather than questions of religious

⁴¹⁰ E. Poole, *Reporting Islam*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2002.

⁴¹¹ Hvitfelt, Håkan, “Den muslimska faran. Om mediebilderna av islam” (“The Muslim danger: On media images of Islam”), Ylva Brune (ed.), *Mörk magi i vita medier* (Black magic in the white media). Carlsson, Stockholm, 1998, pp. 72–84, cited in G. Larsson, *Muslims in EU Cities: Preliminary Research Report and Literature Review – Sweden*, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2007, p. 37.

⁴¹² Hafez, Kai and Carola Richter, “Das Islambild von ARD und ZDF” (ARD and ZDF’s picture of Islam), in Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Hrsg.) (26–27/2007): *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*. (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament). Frankfurt/Main, Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei GmbH, pp. 40–46.

⁴¹³ A. Kundnani, *Analysis: the war on terror leads to racial profiling*, Institute of Race Relations, London, 2004.

⁴¹⁴ R. Andreassen, “The Mass Media’s Construction of Gender, Race, Sexuality and Nationality. An Analysis of the Danish News Media’s Communication about Visible Minorities from 1971–2004”, PhD dissertation, Dept. of History, University of Toronto, 2005, available at <http://www.rikkeandreassen.dk/phd-afhandling.pdf> (accessed November 2009).

⁴¹⁵ Kerry Moore, Paul Mason and Justin Lewis, *Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000–2008*, Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, Cardiff, 2008, p. 21 (hereafter, Moore *et al.*, *Images of Islam in the UK*).

⁴¹⁶ Moore *et al.*, *Images of Islam in the UK*, p. 3.

and cultural compatibility.⁴¹⁷ A poll taken a year after the van Gogh assassination found that negative views of Muslims had not increased, but that among those with a negative view their negative evaluation was more intense.⁴¹⁸ Analysis of German coverage also reveals increased sophistication and subtlety in the coverage of Muslim communities.⁴¹⁹

From the focus groups and stakeholder interviews it is clear that Muslim respondents were very concerned about the representation of Muslims in the media. In focus groups, participants reported feeling overwhelmed by what is perceived to be relentless negative media coverage of Islam and Muslims. The view of one female participant in a focus group in Antwerp is typical of the feelings expressed by many: “Really, I get all worked up over it. The problem is just ... the media, you know. Every newspaper you open: Islam, Islam, Islam. It’s always about Islam.” Another young female participant in the Berlin focus group expressed her anger at stereotypes used in media reports on integration, noting that discussions of integration were often accompanied by pictures of elderly women wearing headscarves and shopping in Turkish markets. She argued that these women represent Muslims and at the same time become symbols of their lack of integration.

The highly selective voices chosen by the media to represent Muslim communities also attracted resentment. In London, members of focus groups felt that the media afforded disproportionate coverage to extremists:

The extremist Muslims are the ones who are in the media limelight, and we need to make sure that they’re the ones who are moved away, and the average Muslim needs to be in the limelight, to basically understand, and it can’t happen if you’re segregating yourself into Asian communities; it can’t happen.⁴²⁰

10.2 Local and National Media

The research found that distinctions were made by stakeholders and focus group participants between the media coverage at the national and at the local level. Respondents felt that the agenda of the local media tended to differ, concentrating on smaller communities of Muslims, rather than approaching them as a homogenous, transnational collective. In Copenhagen, for example, local neighbourhood media are

⁴¹⁷ H.G. Boomgaarden and Claes H. de Vreese, “Dramatic Real-World Events and Public Opinion Dynamics: Media coverage and its impact on public reactions to the assassination”, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 1–13, 2007, p. 9 (hereafter Boomgaarden *et al.*, “Dramatic Real-World Events and Public Opinion Dynamics”).

⁴¹⁸ Boomgaarden *et al.*, “Dramatic Real-World Events and Public Opinion Dynamics”, p. 4.

⁴¹⁹ Sabine Schiffer, “Medien als Spiegel und Konstrukteur gesellschaftlicher Vorstellungen. Der Islam in deutschen Medien“, available at http://www.migration-boell.de/web/diversity/48_1231.asp (accessed November 2009).

⁴²⁰ OSI Focus Group, London.

seen more positively than national media. Local media stations, like Norrebro TV and Kanal Koeknhamn, are seen as objective and providing access to the voices of minority communities in their programmes. Interviews in Leicester found that the local news media were viewed as responsible and fair. There was recognition in the focus groups that this was mainly due to differences in local dynamics:

Local media are somewhat different, and the reason for that is because local media need a clientele, they need the existing people within the vicinity to sell [...] for example, in Leicester we can have the *Leicester Mercury*, so it will be the local paper people buy and hence they need to be that bit more careful as to how they approach the subject.⁴²¹

As further evidence of the sensitivity of local media to the impact of their coverage of local communities, interviewees in Leicester referred to a situation when a Somali man was arrested in Leicester under antiterrorism legislation. According to the interviews, a group of approximately 150 people of largely Somali Muslim backgrounds met senior police officers and city council representatives. At the meeting it was agreed that in light of the risks of exacerbating existing tensions in the city, the ethnicity of the individual arrested would not be mentioned. In subsequent reporting of the incident by the *Leicester Mercury* and BBC Radio Leicester neither the individual's name nor his ethnicity was mentioned.

The focus group participants in London also felt that there was “a big difference” between the national and the local media:

With the local media we do not have any problems and we have a very good relationship with them. They perform their duties very responsibly and ethically. The national media, you know the score.⁴²²

The national media always are portraying us the Muslims as fundamentalists, terrorists and extremists [...] The local media is engaging with us in a very good way and portraying us as it should be, but the national media is the problem.⁴²³

The approach of local papers is also shaped by the profile of their readership. In Berlin, the Commissioner on Integration, Günter Piening, pointed to differences in the representation of Muslims across different sections of the local Berlin media. In his view the Berlin-based tabloid *BZ* often provides a positive coverage of Muslim issues compared with the more upmarket and middle-class Berlin daily, *Der Tagesspiegel*. He suggested this reflects the differences in the nature of the audiences: the readership of the former consists mainly of workers and those in the lower socio-economic classes, and includes large numbers of Muslims, while the latter's readership is found among the middle classes. Piening suggests that *Der Tagesspiegel's* coverage therefore satisfies –

⁴²¹ OSI Focus Group, Leicester.

⁴²² OSI Focus Group, London.

⁴²³ OSI Focus Group, London.

and reproduces – certain reservations towards Muslims and Muslim organisations that seem to be growing.⁴²⁴

10.3 The Impact of the Media’s Portrayal of Muslims

In general, participants in focus groups felt sad, hurt, angry and in some cases alienated by the coverage of Islam and Muslims in the media. One example of the way in which negative stereotyping can foster a sense of alienation emerged during the focus group discussion in Antwerp about the coverage of an incident a few years earlier when a Belgian boy was stabbed at a train station in Brussels. The reporting of this incident (based on eye-witness accounts and video surveillance) suggested that the perpetrators were Moroccan. A journalist in one Flanders newspaper demanded that the migrant community, understood as referring to the Moroccan Muslim community, hand the perpetrators over to the police as a gesture of goodwill to Belgian society:

The murder of Joe van Holsbeeck really was an enormous blow for our community because for those five first days [...] the story was that two Moroccans had stolen an mp3-player and [...] it felt really ridiculous to be Moroccan. It was constantly repeated in the media. Yet one week later they [the attackers] appeared to be Polish [...] But we had all of Belgium against us for a whole week. And when that happens, you don’t really feel like a citizen in Belgium any more. I was born and raised here, but at that moment I really felt foreign in Belgium because of something I didn’t actually do. I kept myself informed of current events a lot and that feeling of guilt was directly due to the media.⁴²⁵

In interviews, officials in the municipal authorities in Amsterdam and Antwerp were critical of the role they felt the media played in increasing or exacerbating tension and for failing to report examples of the good work and initiatives being developed in their cities.

The research also reveals examples of the negative impact of news coverage on local events. In Amsterdam there was particular criticism in stakeholder interviews of the media coverage surrounding the release of Geert Wilder’s film *Fitna*. Some interviewees felt that the focus of the media coverage on the possible reaction of Dutch Muslims to the film’s release created the very tensions journalists were looking for. In Berlin negative media coverage relating to an anti-Semitic comment made on the open forum of the website of the organisation German Muslim Youth (MJD) led to the withdrawal of public funding from the Ministry of Family and Youth for a project that challenged misconceptions about Islam (held by Muslims) and the abuse of Islamic arguments for the justification of hostile behaviour. Although the organisation distanced itself from the comment made on its website and had a track record of

⁴²⁴ Interview with Günter Piening.

⁴²⁵ OSI Focus Group, Antwerp.

working with other religious groups, some press coverage suggested the comment was evidence of anti-Semitism in the organisation and hinted at strong links between the organisation and the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴²⁶

10.4 Responses to Media Coverage of Muslims

The OSI research finds that the negative media coverage has provided a spur for some Muslims to actively engage with the media. The need to respond has led to initiatives from individuals, community organisations and public bodies aiming to increase Muslim participation in media debates and discussion. In Berlin, a female OSI focus group participant said that in response to negative media coverage, “you have to take matters into your own hand and the only way is to publicise articles, to try and keep open the debate in the media and to organise debates.” In London, the campaign group Islam is Peace, which was formed after the 7 July 2005 bombings, ran a publicity campaign in 2007 with posters on London’s buses and in tube stations that featured a range of Muslims, including a policewoman and a scout group leader, accompanied by the slogan, “Proud to be a British Muslim”.⁴²⁷ In the London, the council responded to the concerns expressed by young people about the negative portrayal of Muslims in television drama by supporting them in making a series of short films exploring this issue.⁴²⁸ The young Muslims participating in the project were able to put their concerns to prominent journalists and the scriptwriters of the popular TV police drama *The Bill*.

In Leicester, the *Leicester Mercury*, the city’s local paper, created a Multicultural Advisory Group (composed of community leaders, faith community representative, academics and other stakeholders such as police and council officials) which provides a sounding board for the local media in helping them create an understanding between different communities in Leicester. Stakeholder interviews suggested that the relationships built up through this advisory group ensured that the paper was in a good position to handle news coverage after the 2005 bombings. This meant, for example,

⁴²⁶ The Berlin daily *Der Tagesspiegel* stated the following: Für den Verfassungsschutz steht fest, dass es enge Verbindungen gibt. So sei der Verein im „Haus des Islam“ gegründet worden, einer Organisation, die Mitglied im Zentralrat der Muslime ist. Der Zentralrat wiederum sei eine Dachorganisation, zu der auch die Islamische Gemeinschaft gehöre und die werde von Anhängern der fundamentalistischen Muslimbruderschaft beeinflusst. (The Verfassungsschutz sees it as proven, that there are close connections. The association was founded in the ‘House of Islam’, which is a member of the Central Council of Muslims. The Central Council again is a head organisation, a member of which is the Islamic Community (IGD), which again is influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.); Susanne Vieth-Entus, “Antisemitismus inbegriffen”, *Der Tagesspiegel*, 7 November 2003, available at <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/art270,1973689> (in German, accessed November 2009).

⁴²⁷ BBC News, “Muslim ‘peace’ adverts launched”, 1 October 2007, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7021323.stm> (accessed November 2009).

⁴²⁸ See the Waltham Forest Council website at <http://www.walthamforest.gov.uk/index/social/community-cohesion/cohesion-with-young-people/imuslim.htm> (accessed November 2009).

that the paper was aware of the peace rally held by Muslims a few days after the London bombings.

The benefits of increased contacts between Muslim organisations and the media are also highlighted by research in Berlin. Here, an initiative which began as a research project that brought Muslim community representatives and journalists together for meetings through a media roundtable was found to be sufficiently useful for the meetings to be continued after the project was completed. In fact, the media roundtable was replicated by public officials in other districts.

10.5 Media Production

Muslims and other minorities are active in developing media output that meets the needs of minority groups by, for example, giving voice and narrative to their experiences. In Belgium, public broadcasting time is available for Catholic and Jewish services, but there was a negative response to proposals to give time to Muslims. In Denmark the national state library, the Danish Refugee Council and the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) have recently collaborated to introduce online news in the six major languages of migrant communities. In Germany the radio station Radio Multikulti (part of the local radio and TV station RRB) was founded in 1994 in reaction to racist attacks that had taken place in Molln and other German cities that year. It broadcasts in 21 different languages, the length of airtime given reflecting the size of different language communities in Berlin. As well as the broadcasts themselves, the station has played an important role in training and development of journalists from minority groups. In 1998, Makaria radio station was launched in Berlin. This was the first station in the city to broadcast in Turkish. Since 1999, the Turkish radio station Metropol FM has been broadcasting to Berlin and other areas of Germany.

In France, there have been programmes about Islam primarily aimed at Muslim audiences since the early 1980s. The earliest of these was “Connaître l’Islam” (To know Islam), which was broadcast on Sunday mornings alongside programmes about Christianity and Buddhism. The early 1980s saw the launch in Paris of Radio Orient, initially broadcasting only in Arabic; since 2002 it has included programmes in French. Radio Beur, now Beur FM, was also launched in this period and played a crucial role in 1983 of “les marches des beurs”.⁴²⁹

In the Netherlands, channel AT5 is important at the local level, as is MTNL (Netherlands Multicultural Television) which broadcasts in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague. The programmes, broadcast to a multicultural urban audience, aim to promote inclusion and positive attitudes towards diversity as well as

⁴²⁹ See N. Echchaibi, “Republican Diasporas: Beur FM and the Suburban Riots in France”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, TBA, San Francisco, 23 May 2007, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/0/8/0/p170801_index.html#get_document (accessed November 2009).

providing local news. Young Moroccans have their own Dutch-language websites, such as *maroc.nl*. In addition to programmes on mainstream channels, there are two Muslim broadcasting corporations in the Netherlands. The first, NIO (the Netherlands Islamic Broadcasting Organisation), is the voice of the Netherlands consultative organisation, Muslims and Government (Overlegorgaan Moslims en Overheid). The second, NMO (the Netherlands Muslim Broadcasting Organisation), is an independent broadcasting organisation which aims to represent the diversity in the Muslim community and to support debate and dialogue in the Netherlands, both among Muslims and between Muslims and non-Muslims.

In the UK, the BBC has among its range of radio stations the BBC Asian Network. At the local level, licences are given for community radio stations, including a series of local community broadcasts during Ramadan, often collectively referred to as Radio Ramadan.

10.6 Increasing Ethnic-minority Diversity in the Media

The OSI reports also highlight initiatives aimed at increasing the diversity of those working in the media, in order to include more ethnic minorities. In Germany, adding to the number of people from minorities working in the media is part of the diversity mainstreaming project in the Federal Government's integration plan.⁴³⁰ In Belgium, the public television network, VRT, has signed a diversity charter which states that as a public mass medium it should reflect the diversity of the population. Efforts in increasing the visibility on television of young people from ethnic minorities in Flanders include the programme "Rwina", broadcast on VRT. In the focus groups there was, however, criticism that this show reproduced stereotypes.

10.7 Key Findings

There has undoubtedly been enormous media scrutiny of Muslims in different European countries. Much of this has involved the negative reinforcement of stereotypes and prejudices. However, the research also suggests that the coverage is not undifferentiated. There are signs of complexity in much of the coverage; with Muslims aware of differences between the approach and agenda of different media organisations. The adverse media coverage has also provided the impetus for individuals, and civil-society and public bodies to respond with greater engagement in the media debates and discussions and has focused the need for encouraging and supporting more Muslims to work in the media.

⁴³⁰ German Federal Government, *Der nationale Integrationsplan. Neue Wege – neue Chancen* (National Plan for Integration. New ways – new chances), Berlin, 2007.

11. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following set of recommendations are aimed at the European Union and national and local level policymakers. Whilst aware that a report on integration cannot ignore the role that ethnic minorities, and in this case Muslim communities, play in advancing social cohesion this report does not contain overt recommendations to these groups. Muslim communities across Europe are engaged in combating and correcting prejudice and negative stereotypes directed towards Muslims. A number of efforts are recognised as having had an impact and influence on bringing about some change in respective cities. However, there is a need for continued and more concerted effort. Enfranchising the disenfranchised to participate and engage requires public policies to address fundamental inequalities and address discrimination. At the same time, responsibility lies with communities to initiate actions and efforts which bring about change in policy, practice and behaviour. Recommendations to Muslim communities will be contained in the forthcoming individual city reports of the At Home in Europe project of the Open Society Institute.

TO EUROPEAN UNION POLICYMAKERS

11.1 Recognise that religion is not a barrier to integration for Muslims

Overall, the report reveals positive signs of integration. Both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents felt that their neighbourhoods were ones where people were willing to help and trust each other and where people of different backgrounds got on well together. Muslim and non-Muslim respondents agreed that respect for the law, equality of opportunity and freedom of expression were key values in the country where they live.

1. The OSI data are consistent with existing research which finds that religion is an important aspect of identity for Muslims. Existing research suggests that, religion can, in fact, be an important form of social capital that supports participation and integration. The OSI research found that, in responses to questions on cohesion and belonging, levels of trust or cultural identification with the state, there was little difference between Muslims who displayed a visible religious identity and those who did not. However, prejudice and discrimination against those with a visible religious identity is significant. Prejudice against Muslims is not purely the result of prejudice towards migrants. Existing research finds that the level of prejudice against Muslims is greater than that towards immigrants. The qualitative data from the OSI research point to the persistence of discrimination and prejudice in corroding a sense of belonging amongst Muslim groups. EU Member States should respond to the study's findings that most people are not threatened by visible displays of religion, by focusing instead on the discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping directed by a few against those who visibly display their religious identity.

11.2 Improve efforts to address discrimination

The OSI research suggests that religious discrimination against Muslims remains a critical barrier to full and equal participation in society. The findings of the OSI survey, consistent with other research, suggest religious discrimination directed towards Muslims is widespread and has increased in the past five years.

2. European policymakers should encourage the adoption of principles of equal treatment to cover discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in education, housing, transport and the provision of goods and services. These are all areas where the OSI research finds that Muslims continue to face discrimination.
3. Equality bodies should include promoting good community relations as part of their mandates. The Commission and Council should support European organisations such as Equinet and the Fundamental Rights Agency in championing specific race relations and anti-discrimination work.
4. Work on challenging racism and discrimination being carried out by the EU and by Member States should include a specific focus on challenging prejudice and stereotypes against Muslims. For measures to tackle prejudice and stereotypes to be effective it is important to ensure public support and commitment to the values underpinning the EU's commitment to equality and non-discrimination. This requires developing effective and alternative instruments alongside legislation in the areas of education, media, culture, arts and sports.

Levels of trust in the police are generally high amongst Muslims. The OSI research suggests that discrimination from the police remains a key concern for some Muslims, particularly amongst young Muslim men. Existing OSI research also finds that young people from minority groups are subject to ethnic profiling.

5. The European Commission (EC) and Council should provide guidelines for national data protection, setting out adequate safeguards against ethnic and religious profiling.
6. The European Commission and Council should support, (including through technical guidance and programme funding), the development of anonymous statistical data on ethnicity and law enforcement. Such data are essential to detect, monitor and address ethnic profiling practices at the national and local levels in Member States.
7. There is a need for the EC to provide financial support for pilot projects, research and dissemination of best practices for the recruitment of a more diverse police force.

11.3 Improve and reform policies on integration and minorities

8. The Common Basic Principles (CBPs) provide an important framework for the development of integration initiatives at the national and local levels in Europe. To be effective they need to be understood, embraced and owned at the local and city levels. At the European level, action is needed to increase the profile and awareness of the CBPs amongst civil society and local policymakers. OSI supports the recommendation of EUROCITIES for the Commission to develop a consultation framework with larger cities and their associations to create sectoral dialogue in the field of integration. This is to be done under the umbrella of Territorial Dialogue between the Commission and European and national associations of local and regional authorities.
9. The CBPs define integration as a two-way process. To make integration a genuine two-way process it is important for integration policies to include and address majority communities. The OSI research identifies some of the areas where action involving the wider society is needed. For example, while half the Muslim respondents identify with the country where they live (i.e. they see themselves as Belgian, Dutch, French, etc.), they do not feel that the general population sees them in this way. A majority of non-Muslim respondents feel that people in their neighbourhoods do not share the same values. Members of the general public rather than a particular institutional or professional setting were the most frequent source of religious discrimination. This suggests that efforts are needed to ensure that the general population sees Muslims as part of mainstream society. This could be achieved through increased efforts to ensure greater knowledge and understanding amongst the general population of Europe of the contribution made by Muslims to European values, culture, society and economy. This contribution of Muslims to European society should be a natural part of the narrative of European identity.
10. Robust data are needed to provide a clear and better understanding of the experiences of Muslims in Europe. Few EU countries collect information or data on religious beliefs and identity. Some policymakers assert that race, ethnicity or migration status are more important than religion as an explanation of social exclusion experienced by Muslims. They may be right. However, without data on religion, it is not possible to know whether and when religion may be a significant factor in the experience of Muslims. A valuable contribution to addressing this knowledge gap is made by two EU wide surveys: the European Social Survey (ESS) and EUMIDIS. These surveys should be developed through continued financial support. Consideration should be given to include a booster sample of minority groups in the ESS. EUMIDIS should extend its research to the UK and other countries in Europe currently not covered, but which have a significant or growing Muslim population. Eurobarometer should consider including a question in its survey

on religion, perceptions, and attitudes towards Muslims and other minority groups.

11. The OSI research reveals many good examples of the efforts of those working in the public services across Europe to respond to society's growing ethnic and religious diversity. Much training was developed at a time when there was less acknowledgement and recognition of such diversity. The Integration Fund should prioritise funding in supporting initiatives for improved diversity training for public sector workers, including police and teachers.
12. The Council of Europe and other organisations should continue and expand research efforts, focusing on the impact of media coverage on Muslims, and its effects on social cohesion at the local level.

11.4 Address diversity and discrimination in the workplace

Evidence from the OSI research confirms the central role of labour market participation to integration and inclusion. Amongst Muslim respondents, higher levels of employment, (particularly full-time employment) correlate with cultural identification with the country. The workplace is also the space where Muslims are most likely to have meaningful contact with people from a different ethnic and religious group.

13. Levels of participation in the labour market for Muslims are lower than those of the general population. Labour market participation for Muslim women is particularly low. While some of this is due to religious discrimination other factors are relevant. Greater understanding is needed of the barriers that Muslims, and in particular Muslim women, face in accessing the labour market. At the same time, the OSI research has found examples of initiatives working effectively to address some of these challenges. This includes initiatives that work with Muslim community organisations and civil society in ensuring that advice and information reaches those furthest from the labour market. There are also projects which recognise the need to employ individuals whose ethnic and cultural background reflect and connect to those who employment initiatives are seeking to reach. The European Commission's Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities should compile and share examples of good practice used by European cities to increasing diversity in the workplace.
14. Muslims face higher unemployment and lower employment rates compared to the general population. Some of this disadvantage can be explained by human capital but other factors include a lack of social networks, knowledge and understanding of the labour market and language fluency. There is also evidence to suggest that some Muslims face both an ethnic and religious penalty. Discrimination on the grounds of religion is a particularly a concern for women who wear the veil and the headscarf. The EU is encouraged to

support Member States to establish or maintain city based bodies which monitor and evaluate access to the labour market with a view to increasing Muslim and ethnic-minority economic integration. The bodies should monitor recruitment procedures, the diversity of employees in public services and private enterprises as well as the procedures for the award of public-service contracts.

11.5 Make education more accessible and responsive to a diverse student body

Schools are amongst the first public institutions confronted with the changing demographics in Europe's cities. Many good practices are emerging from the OSI research in the field of education at the local level. The EU should work on developing a forum among cities on the following areas:

15. **Data collection.** Robust data are needed for the development of evidence-based education policies. The OSI research suggests that at the local level, cities are considering different ways in which to collect data which gives a useful picture of the experiences of pupils from different minority groups. For example, in Antwerp the collection of information on languages spoken at home has been adapted to take into account the experiences of the second generation. In Leicester, the city is developing systems for a more accurate and comprehensive system of data collection. The European Commission and Council should support, (including through technical guidance) research and the sharing of best practice in the development of appropriate statistical data on ethnicity and religion in education
16. **Education approaches incorporating cultural heritage.** There are many good examples emerging from the OSI research of schools where the cultural heritage of pupils and their families is used to support and encourage their education and learning. This includes the "Rucksackprojekt" in Berlin, the development of an initiative called CREAM (Curriculum Reflecting the Experiences of African Caribbean and Muslim Pupils) in Leicester, and the use of students' bi-lingual heritage as a positive asset in Amsterdam and Marseille. The European Commission's Directorate General for Education and Culture should explore ways in which schools across Europe can share good models which have effectively utilised the cultural heritage of pupils and have harnessed it into improved learning. A number of international and national organisations have existing projects which contain educational components offering effective support for teachers and policymakers.
17. Low aspirations and discrimination from teachers emerged as an important issue in several cities: there were examples of teachers ridiculing Islam and insensitivity about pupil's religious obligations. For many educational staff, teaching an increasingly culturally and religiously diverse student population is

a challenge for which training and support is needed. This is recognised by the EU, where the Comenius Programme aims to promote intercultural understanding. The programme should include (amongst its priorities) support for teachers in acquiring a greater understanding of the cultural heritage and background of different faith groups, including Muslims. There are many innovative and timely projects run by organisations and civil society which could provide much needed resources to support teachers and students.⁴³¹

TO NATIONAL AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS

11.6 Increase awareness of discrimination

18. Muslims continue to experience racial and religious discrimination. National governments should initiate and support campaigns that raise awareness about anti-discrimination laws. Where necessary they should also ensure legislation covers discrimination in education, housing, policing and access to goods and services. Awareness-raising must be accompanied by support (including access to legal advice) for those seeking redress against religious discrimination.

11.7 Recognise the benefits and challenges of ethnically mixed neighbourhoods

19. OSI research finds that neighbourhoods with a good mix of people from different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds are vibrant and dynamic areas. Both Muslims and non-Muslims enjoy living in and are proud of their mixed neighbourhoods. The majority of people feel that their neighbourhood is one where people are willing to help each other, trust each other and where people from different backgrounds get on well together. But challenges remain. While the OSI research finds that the majority of respondents feel that their neighbours are likely to help each others, they did not feel that people would work together to improve the neighbourhood. The majority of respondents did not feel that people in their neighbourhood shared the same values. This suggests a need for a stronger focus on a shared local identity and policies (including urban regeneration) to encourage collective investment and upkeep of local neighbourhoods.

⁴³¹ See for example: www.maslaha.org

11.8 Recognising Muslim civil-society bodies as legitimate participants in community consultation and engagement

20. The OSI research finds recognition from local policymakers of Muslim community organisations to be a crucial part of the social fabric in their local areas. Where city and district officials have worked with Muslim community and civil society organisations, there has been greater confidence and an increased sense of integration in the city. It highlights examples of local policymakers and Muslim civil society working together in a broad range of areas including employment, health and policing. Muslim civil society bodies are able to support access to parts of the community that public bodies may otherwise find hard to reach, and provide advice and information that ensures the effective and efficient delivery of services which takes the needs of local communities into account. Engagement with Muslim civil society must occur while acknowledging the full diversity of Muslim communities and recognising that no single body or organisation can reflect that diversity.

11.9 Consider reform to definitions of nationality and voting rights for non-citizens

21. Naturalisation should be seen as the goal of settlement (as it is in the USA, Canada and Australia). Where necessary there should be a reform of nationality laws to ensure access to nationality for those who are long-term settled migrants and to those born in the country. At the same time, dual citizenship should be permitted
22. The OSI research finds that local-level policymakers are concerned about the democratic legitimacy of actions taken by city authorities in areas where a significant proportion of long-term settled populations are disenfranchised. This can be addressed by extending the right to vote in local elections to all those who are long-term settled residents in a city.
23. The OSI research points to some encouraging trends, as well as persistent challenges to ensuring political and civic participation. Trust in local institutions is higher than that in national institutions amongst Muslim respondents; however, the perception that they can influence decisions affecting their city is lower amongst Muslim voters than amongst non-Muslims. This suggests a need by city officials to engage in creating mechanisms which can create greater political inclusion, feedback and empowerment.
24. Many non-EU Muslim respondents in the OSI research remain disenfranchised. This is particularly the case with respondents in Germany and France, where they do not have the right to vote in local elections even though many are long-term residents. Political participation can be considered a necessary condition for integration. Recognising this, the City Hall of Paris set

up the Citizenship Council of non-European Parisians (Conseil de la Citoyenneté des Parisiens Non Communautaires, CCPNC) in 2001. This is an advisory committee which reflects the diversity of non-EU nationals in different Parisian districts and offers input into key areas of everyday concern such as housing, culture and education, and quality of life in the district. In the absence of voting rights, local governments should create similar or other mechanisms which allow for the voices and views of third-country nationals to be a key tool for better integration.

11.10 Promote opportunities for interaction

25. There is evidence that increased interaction between varied ethnic and religious groups can lead to a reduction in prejudice and offer opportunities to decrease segregation. Across the cities examined by OSI, research indicates that there is a great desire by Muslim and non-Muslim groups for opportunities and spaces to be created for people of different backgrounds to interact. Muslims in the OSI research did not want to live “parallel” or “segregated” lives. They appreciated living in ethnically mixed neighbourhoods and were concerned about the impact of the “native” population leaving their area. Thus, while the research finds significant levels of interaction between people of different backgrounds in the city and neighbourhood already taking place, there remains a great desire for increased and varied contact. City and district councils can play a facilitating role by examining schools, businesses, and workplaces for opportunities to increase interaction between various ethnic and religious groups within the community.

11.11 Develop and promote inclusive civic identity

26. There is strong sense of belonging to the local area and city. For Muslims, belonging to the local area is stronger than belonging to the city, while non-Muslims felt a more intense belonging to the city compared to the local area. In Amsterdam, for both Muslim and non-Muslim respondents, a stronger sense of belonging to the local area was supplemented by an even stronger sense of belonging to the city. This suggests that the Amsterdam Municipality’s campaigns, that emphasise a common and inclusive city identity, have been effective in increasing cohesion and belonging. Stimulating debate and consultation mechanisms bringing in members of varied faith communities is another effective method of creating greater cohesion and ownership of the city. Leicester City Council, which supports the Leicester Council of Faiths, brings together representatives and members of different faiths from across the city. These examples have succeeded owing to the political will and leadership of the city councils in creating and funding possibilities for interaction and space for different communities residing in the

cities. Municipalities are urged to seek ways to replicate the above and other interesting models outlined in this report.

11.12 Engage with communities to ensure awareness of rights

27. Urban cities in Europe are providing delivery of services to a wide variety of groups and individuals. A diverse and qualified public sector is better equipped to offer culturally sensitive and effective services. At the same time, a diverse public sector can foster a greater sense of trust and confidence in its decision makers. Local policymakers and representatives from Muslim and other minority communities should work together to ensure that public sector agencies and enterprises have staff that reflect the diversity of their city.

ANNEX 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ANNEX 2. TABLES FROM OSI RESEARCH

Table 2. Are people in this neighbourhood willing to help their neighbours? (C10)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Strongly agree		14.5%	14.7%	14.6%
Agree		59.4%	59.3%	59.3%
Disagree		16.1%	14.3%	15.2%
Strongly disagree		4.4%	2.7%	3.5%
Don't know		5.6%	9.0%	7.3%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1089	2199

Table 5. Is this a close-knit neighbourhood? (C10)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Strongly agree		8.4%	5.2%	6.8%
Agree		42.0%	35.9%	39.0%
Disagree		32.7%	38.9%	35.8%
Strongly disagree		7.8%	6.9%	7.4%
Don't know		9.1%	13.0%	11.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1110	1089	2199

Table 8. Interviewee's level of trust in local population (breakdown by age) (C9)

		< 20	20 – 29	30 – 39	40 – 49	50 – 59	60 +	Total
Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	19.0%	14.2%	22.2%	21.4%	22.6%	47.8%	21.4%
	Some can be trusted	47.6%	48.8%	44.4%	45.9%	52.8%	28.9%	45.9%
	A few can be trusted	28.6%	28.0%	28.5%	25.9%	19.8%	20.0%	26.3%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	4.8%	9.0%	5.0%	6.8%	4.7%	3.3%	6.4%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	105	332	239	220	106	90	1092
Non-Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	16.5%	29.2%	27.8%	41.5%	46.6%	50.0%	35.9%
	Some can be trusted	49.4%	51.2%	51.5%	42.5%	32.9%	32.3%	44.0%
	A few can be trusted	29.1%	17.4%	17.7%	13.0%	18.6%	15.2%	17.4%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	5.1%	2.1%	3.0%	3.1%	1.9%	2.5%	2.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	79	281	198	193	161	158	1070

Table 10. Interviewee's level of trust in local population (breakdown by economic status) (C9)

		Full time employee	Part time employee	Self- employed	Working unpaid in family business	Retired	On government employment or training programme	Unemployed and looking for work	Student	Looking after home or family	Permanently sick or disabled	Other	Total
Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	25.4%	18.5%	20.3%	14.3%	41.3%	10.0%	15.7%	18.2%	18.2%	20.0%	20.5%	21.5%
	Some can be trusted	45.5%	46.3%	45.8%	28.6%	28.6%	60.0%	50.4%	49.4%	41.4%	54.3%	46.6%	45.9%
	A few can be trusted	25.1%	29.6%	27.1%	42.9%	22.2%	15.0%	25.2%	24.7%	31.3%	20.0%	28.8%	26.2%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	4.0%	5.6%	6.8%	14.3%	7.9%	15.0%	8.7%	7.8%	9.1%	5.7%	4.1%	6.4%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	303	162	59	7	63	20	115	154	99	35	73	1090
Non-Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	34.3%	40.8%	40.0%	62.5%	45.2%	40.0%	25.0%	29.5%	27.8%	29.6%	33.3%	35.9%
	Some can be trusted	46.0%	42.9%	43.5%	25.0%	33.1%	40.0%	47.2%	50.5%	44.4%	40.7%	46.2%	43.9%
	A few can be trusted	16.7%	15.2%	14.1%	12.5%	18.5%	20.0%	23.6%	16.8%	25.0%	29.6%	16.1%	17.5%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	2.9%	1.1%	2.4%		3.2%		4.2%	3.2%	2.8%		4.3%	2.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	341	184	85	8	124	5	72	95	36	27	93	1070

Table 11. Do people work together to improve the neighbourhood? (C10)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Strongly agree		6.2%	5.6%	5.9%
Agree		30.5%	33.8%	32.1%
Disagree		34.7%	35.5%	35.1%
Strongly disagree		16.4%	10.2%	13.3%
Don't know		12.2%	14.9%	13.5%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1086	2195

**Table 12. Interviewee's level of trust of local population
(breakdown by number of years living in the local neighbourhood) (C9)**

		< 1	1 – 5	6 – 10	11 – 20	21 – 30	31+	Total
Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	15.4%	16.3%	20.3%	23.0%	25.4%	31.7%	21.5%
	Some can be trusted	57.7%	38.4%	47.7%	50.3%	48.1%	36.7%	45.9%
	A few can be trusted	15.4%	35.7%	24.8%	20.9%	24.3%	28.3%	26.2%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	11.5%	9.5%	7.2%	5.8%	2.2%	3.3%	6.4%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	26	263	222	330	185	60	1086
Non-Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	39.5%	30.9%	36.1%	36.6%	38.2%	41.4%	35.9%
	Some can be trusted	48.8%	49.1%	47.0%	40.0%	41.9%	37.5%	43.9%
	A few can be trusted	11.6%	15.8%	16.4%	18.6%	19.9%	19.5%	17.5%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted		4.2%	.5%	4.7%		1.6%	2.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	43	285	183	295	136	128	1070

**Table 13. Interviewee's level of trust of local population
(breakdown by ethnic/religious composition of neighbourhood) (C9)**

		Mainly your relatives	Mainly people from your ethnic and religious background	Mainly people who share your religion from other ethnic backgrounds	Mainly people from the same ethnic background but different religion	Mainly people from a different ethnic and religious background	From a mixture of different backgrounds, ethnicities and religions	Total
Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	28.3%	25.4%	19.2%	20.7%	22.3%	19.9%	21.3%
	Some can be trusted	41.3%	42.8%	46.2%	62.1%	41.3%	47.3%	46.0%
	A few can be trusted	26.1%	28.3%	30.8%	13.8%	28.9%	25.0%	26.3%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	4.3%	3.5%	3.8%	3.4%	7.4%	7.8%	6.4%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	46	173	104	29	121	619	1092
Non-Muslim	Many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted	35.7%	42.1%	40.0%	44.0%	32.9%	35.5%	35.8%
	Some can be trusted	50.0%	43.9%	20.0%	28.0%	38.7%	46.1%	44.1%
	A few can be trusted	14.3%	14.0%	25.0%	20.0%	24.5%	16.2%	17.5%
	None of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted			15.0%	8.0%	3.9%	2.3%	2.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	28	57	20	25	155	786	1071

Table 16. Most important national values of living in the country (breakdown by birthplace) (D8)

	Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Respect for the law	55.0%	69.1%	50.7%	62.8%	1300
Tolerance towards others	39.4%	36.4%	53.1%	41.2%	956
Freedom of speech and expression	44.2%	52.2%	63.8%	55.4%	1217
Respect for all faiths	52.5%	51.2%	26.5%	36.1%	889
Justice and fair play	30.8%	27.7%	38.1%	33.4%	719
Speaking the national language	30.3%	34.3%	30.2%	34.8%	707
Respect of people of different ethnic groups	32.2%	30.7%	27.4%	31.4%	655
Equality of opportunity	47.7%	38.0%	45.1%	41.6%	937
Pride in this country/patriotism	9.7%	7.9%	11.7%	14.5%	229
Voting in elections	20.1%	18.7%	21.0%	22.3%	445
Freedom from discrimination	31.1%	26.1%	28.8%	23.6%	605
Total	373	737	789	296	2195

Table 17. Most important values of living in the country (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (D8)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Respect for the law	56.8%	53.4%	69.7%	68.4%	55.8%	46.0%	70.9%	55.5%	1300
Tolerance towards others	36.7%	41.7%	39.6%	32.8%	54.2%	52.1%	41.8%	40.6%	956
Freedom of speech and expression	37.9%	49.5%	53.7%	50.6%	64.3%	63.3%	56.0%	54.8%	1217
Respect for all faiths	55.0%	50.5%	52.7%	49.4%	27.0%	26.0%	40.4%	32.3%	889
Justice and fair play	33.1%	28.9%	27.5%	27.9%	39.4%	37.0%	29.1%	37.4%	719
Speaking the national language	29.6%	30.9%	28.3%	41.1%	28.3%	31.9%	33.3%	36.1%	707
Respect of people of different ethnic groups	28.4%	35.3%	31.1%	30.2%	24.9%	29.7%	27.7%	34.8%	655
Equality of opportunity	48.5%	47.1%	37.5%	38.5%	45.5%	44.8%	38.3%	44.5%	937
Pride in this country/patriotism	10.1%	9.3%	5.4%	10.6%	13.5%	10.0%	15.6%	13.5%	229
Voting in elections	17.2%	22.5%	18.5%	19.0%	16.1%	25.5%	22.7%	21.9%	445
Freedom from discrimination	37.3%	26.0%	25.7%	26.4%	26.2%	31.1%	21.3%	25.8%	605
Total	169	204	389	348	378	411	141	155	2195

Table 19. How strongly do you feel you belong to the local area? (breakdown by gender and religion) (B4)

	Muslim male	Muslim female	Non-Muslim male	Non-Muslim female	Total
Very strongly	31.7%	24.5%	30.7%	25.1%	27.9%
Fairly strongly	40.9%	44.2%	42.3%	45.6%	43.3%
Not very strongly	18.5%	21.0%	19.7%	21.0%	20.1%
Not at all strongly	6.5%	8.2%	5.4%	6.5%	6.6%
Don't know	2.5%	2.2%	1.9%	1.8%	2.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	558	552	522	566

Table 20. How strongly do you feel you belong to the local area? (breakdown by religion and birthplace) (D4)

		Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
	Very strongly	30.3%	27.0%	29.8%	22.2%	27.9%
	Fairly strongly	44.5%	41.5%	44.2%	43.4%	43.3%
	Not very strongly	17.2%	21.0%	19.1%	23.9%	20.1%
	Not at all strongly	6.2%	7.9%	5.1%	8.4%	6.6%
	Don't know	1.9%	2.6%	1.8%	2.0%	2.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	373	737	791	297	2198

Table 24. How strongly do you feel you belong to this country? (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (D6)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Very strongly	26.6%	25.0%	22.6%	25.0%	41.1%	38.6%	26.1%	25.3%	30.1%
Farily strongly	36.7%	44.6%	34.4%	35.3%	32.1%	36.4%	35.9%	41.6%	36.3%
Not very strongly	23.1%	22.5%	27.8%	24.7%	18.4%	19.4%	28.9%	20.1%	22.8%
Not at all strongly	8.9%	4.9%	11.6%	12.1%	6.8%	3.9%	7.7%	11.0%	8.3%
Don't know	4.7%	2.9%	3.6%	2.9%	1.6%	1.7%	1.4%	1.9%	2.5%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	169	204	389	348	380	412	142	154

Table 27. Do you see yourself as [British,. French, etc.]? (breakdown by interview location) (D9)

	Yes	No
Amsterdam	59.0%	41.0%
Antwerp	55.1%	44.9%
Berlin	25.0%	75.0%
Copenhagen	39.6%	60.4%
Hamburg	22.0%	78.0%
Leicester	82.4%	17.6%
Marseille	58.0%	42.0%
Paris	41.0%	59.0%
Rotterdam	43.4%	56.6%
Stockholm	41.0%	59.0%
Waltham Forest	72.0%	28.0%
Total	Per cent	49.0%
	Count	1105
		1110

Table 28. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.]? (breakdown by religion and birthplace) (D9)

		Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Yes		67.4%	39.8%	88.1%	47.8%	63.0%
No		32.6%	60.2%	11.9%	52.2%	37.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	371	734	790	297	2192

Table 29. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.]? (breakdown by city and birthplace) (D9)

City		[British, French, etc.]?	
		Yes	No
Amsterdam	Born in the EU state	76.7%	23.3%
	Born outside the EU state	52.0%	48.0%
Total	Per cent	59.0%	41.0%
	Count	62	43
Antwerp	Born in the EU state	62.8%	37.2%
	Born outside the EU state	49.1%	50.9%
Total	Per cent	55.1%	44.9%
	Count	54	44
Berlin	Born in the EU state	34.9%	65.1%
	Born outside the EU state	17.5%	82.5%
Total	Per cent	25.0%	75.0%
	Count	25	75
Copenhagen	Born in the EU state	61.9%	38.1%
	Born outside the EU state	33.3%	66.7%
Total	Per cent	39.6%	60.4%
	Count	38	58
Hamburg	Born in the EU state	45.9%	54.1%
	Born outside the EU state	7.9%	92.1%
Total	Per cent	22.0%	78.0%
	Count	22	78

Leicester	Born in the EU state	93.8%	6.3%
	Born outside the EU state	72.2%	27.8%
Total	Per cent	82.4%	17.6%
	Count	84	18
Marseille	Born in the EU state	68.8%	31.3%
	Born outside the EU state	52.9%	47.1%
Total	Per cent	58.0%	42.0%
	Count	58	42
Paris	Born in the EU state	81.8%	18.2%
	Born outside the EU state	29.5%	70.5%
Total	Per cent	41.0%	59.0%
	Count	41	59
Rotterdam	Born in the EU state	68.2%	31.8%
	Born outside the EU state	36.4%	63.6%
Total	Per cent	43.4%	56.6%
	Count	43	56
Stockholm	Born in the EU state	58.3%	41.7%
	Born outside the EU state	35.8%	64.2%
Total	Per cent	41.0%	59.0%
	Count	43	62
Waltham Forest	Born in the EU state	83.7%	16.3%
	Born outside the EU state	60.8%	39.2%
Total	Per cent	72.0%	28.0%
	Count	72	28

**Table 30. Do most other people in this country see you as [British, French, etc.]?
(breakdown by birthplace) (D10)**

		Yes	No	Total
Born in the EU state		38.4%	61.6%	100.0%
Born outside the EU state		17.6%	82.4%	100.0%
Total	Per cent	24.5%	75.7%	100.0%
	Count	270	831	1101

Table 33. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.]? (breakdown by employment status) (D9)

		Yes	No	Total
Full time employee		55.3%	44.7%	100.0%
Part time employee		50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Self-employed		40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
Working unpaid in family business		28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
Retired		34.4%	65.6%	100.0%
On government employment or training programme		42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
Unemployed and looking for work		49.1%	50.9%	100.0%
Student		56.8%	43.2%	100.0%
Looking after home or family		42.6%	57.4%	100.0%
Permanently sick or disabled		44.4%	55.6%	100.0%
Other		39.7%	60.3%	100.0%
Total	Per cent	49.0%	51.0%	100.0%
	Count	540	561	1101

Table 34. Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc]? (D9)

		Yes	No	Total
Actively practice religion	Yes	48.8%	51.2%	100.0%
	No	49.8%	50.2%	100.0%
Total	Per cent	49.0%	51.0%	100.0%
	Count	539	560	1099

Table 35. Do most other people in this country see you as [British, French, etc.]? (D10)

		Yes	No	Total
Visible signs of religious identity	Yes	24.5%	75.5%	100.0%
	No	23.8%	76.2%	100.0%
Total	Per cent	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
	Count	266	829	1095

Table 36. Interviewees who have experienced religious discrimination with a landlord or letting agent (H8)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A landlord or letting agent	7.4%	1.3%	
Total count	81	14	95

Table 39. What is the main barrier to being [British, French, etc.]? (breakdown by birthplace) (D13)

	Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Not speaking the national language/s	21.4%	20.8%	39.6%	20.4%	27.6%
Being born abroad	5.1%	12.6%	4.2%	11.2%	8.1%
Being from an ethnic minority/not being white	27.3%	17.5%	11.1%	18.0%	16.9%
Accent/way of speaking	1.4%	4.0%	2.4%	6.8%	3.4%
Not being Christian	6.8%	5.5%	.5%	.3%	3.2%
There aren't any barriers	7.3%	4.5%	8.0%	4.8%	6.3%
None of these	4.3%	2.7%	7.1%	6.8%	5.1%
Don't Know	3.0%	4.1%	4.6%	3.4%	4.0%
Other	23.5%	28.4%	22.5%	28.2%	25.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	370	732	778	2174

Table 41. Employment status of respondents who identify speaking the national language as an important national value (114)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Full time employee	24.2%	28.1%	26.0%
Part time employee	18.5%	14.7%	16.7%
Self-employed	4.2%	10.3%	7.0%
Working unpaid in family business	0.4%	0.9%	0.6%
Retired	7.3%	13.4%	10.1%
On government employment or training programme	2.3%	0.4%	1.4%
Unemployed and looking for work	8.8%	8.5%	8.7%
Student	14.2%	8.0%	11.4%
Looking after home or family	11.9%	3.6%	8.1%
Permanently sick or disabled	1.9%	1.8%	1.9%
Other	6.2%	10.3%	8.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	260	224
		484	

Table 42. What is the main barrier to being [British, French, etc.]? (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (D13)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Not speaking the national language/s	23.2%	19.8%	18.3%	23.5%	42.9%	36.6%	22.0%	19.0%	27.6%
Being born abroad	5.4%	5.0%	14.2%	10.8%	4.6%	3.9%	12.8%	9.8%	8.1%
Being from an ethnic minority/not being white	31.5%	23.8%	20.1%	14.5%	9.7%	12.3%	17.0%	19.0%	16.9%
Accent/way of speaking	2.4%	.5%	2.8%	5.2%	2.4%	2.5%	5.7%	7.8%	3.4%
Not being Christian	5.4%	7.9%	4.6%	6.4%	0.3%	0.7%		0.7%	3.2%
There aren't any barriers	5.4%	8.9%	3.6%	5.5%	9.7%	6.4%	6.4%	3.3%	6.3%
None of these	1.8%	6.4%	2.3%	3.2%	7.5%	6.6%	6.4%	7.2%	5.1%
Don't Know	4.2%	2.0%	5.4%	2.6%	3.8%	5.4%	4.3%	2.6%	4.0%
Other	20.8%	25.7%	28.6%	28.2%	19.1%	25.6%	25.5%	30.7%	25.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	168	202	388	344	371	407	141	153

Table 43. Comparison of past and current levels of racial prejudice (H3)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Less racial prejudice than there was five years ago		11.2%	15.0%	13.1%
More than there was five years ago		55.8%	43.0%	49.5%
About the same amount		23.0%	34.4%	28.7%
Don't know		9.9%	7.6%	8.7%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1060	1045	2105

Table 44. Groups experiencing racial prejudice (H2)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Arab people	44.0%	37.5%	833
South Asian people (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi)	18.9%	14.3%	339
Black people (Caribbean, African)	45.0%	45.7%	927
Chinese people	6.5%	6.5%	132
Turkish people	26.4%	22.0%	494
White people	1.1%	3.9%	51
Mixed race people	5.2%	5.5%	109
Buddhists	2.3%	1.5%	38
Hindus	3.4%	3.1%	67
Jews	7.6%	9.0%	170
Muslims	59.4%	40.4%	1019
Sikhs	4.5%	2.8%	75
Asylum seekers/Refugees	13.1%	13.5%	272
New immigrants	11.6%	8.3%	203
Eastern Europeans	7.5%	16.0%	240
Other	25.0%	37.1%	635
Total	1020	1023	2043

Table 47. Comparison of past and current level of religious prejudice (H6)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Less religious prejudice than there was five years ago		6.7%	8.6%	7.7%
More than there was five years ago		68.7%	55.9%	62.4%
About the same amount		17.4%	25.4%	21.3%
Don't know		7.2%	10.0%	8.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1053	1019	2072

Table 48. Groups experiencing religious prejudice (H5)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Muslims	97.6%	92.5%	1897
Jews	14.6%	25.1%	393
Hindus	2.9%	3.1%	60
Buddhists	1.6%	1.1%	27
Sikhs	3.9%	3.0%	69
Christians	1.9%	5.7%	74
Catholics	1.7%	3.2%	48
Protestants	0.7%	1.8%	24
Other	5.3%	10.7%	158
Total count	1024	971	1995

Table 49. Current level of racial prejudice (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H1)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
A lot	31.4%	34.3%	25.8%	31.0%	29.2%	32.0%	29.6%	31.0%	30.2%
A fair amount	46.2%	49.0%	43.6%	45.7%	46.6%	46.4%	35.2%	48.4%	45.5%
A little	14.8%	10.8%	20.9%	15.2%	17.6%	16.7%	25.4%	15.5%	17.2%
None	3.0%	1.5%	2.3%	1.1%	2.4%	1.5%	4.9%	1.9%	2.1%
Don't know	4.7%	4.4%	7.5%	6.9%	4.2%	3.4%	4.9%	3.2%	5.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	169	204	388	348	380	412	142	155

Table 51. Current level of religious prejudice (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H4)

		Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
A lot		48.2%	51.0%	37.5%	41.1%	29.7%	28.6%	24.6%	34.2%	36.1%
A fair amount		36.3%	37.3%	37.3%	37.1%	42.6%	42.2%	33.8%	41.3%	39.1%
A little		8.9%	7.4%	15.4%	11.8%	17.6%	18.0%	21.8%	17.4%	15.0%
None		2.4%	1.0%	2.8%	1.4%	4.5%	3.2%	7.7%	2.6%	3.0%
Don't know		4.2%	3.4%	6.9%	8.6%	5.5%	8.0%	12.0%	4.5%	6.8%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	168	204	389	348	380	412	142	155	2198

**Table 54. How often have you experienced religious discrimination
(breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H7)**

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Almost all of the time	4.1%	4.9%	5.4%	5.5%	0.3%	0.5%	3.5%	0.6%	3.0%
A lot of the time	17.2%	19.1%	17.3%	18.1%	2.4%	1.5%	1.4%	3.9%	10.1%
Sometimes	29.0%	34.8%	22.7%	25.3%	4.7%	4.1%	7.0%	11.0%	16.3%
Rarely	21.9%	18.6%	13.1%	12.6%	9.0%	9.2%	11.3%	16.8%	12.9%
Never	27.8%	22.5%	41.5%	38.5%	83.6%	84.7%	76.8%	67.7%	57.7%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	169	204	388	348	379	411	142	2196

**Table 55. How often have you experienced racial discrimination
(breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H7)**

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Almost all of the time	5.3%	2.9%	3.4%	2.3%	0.5%	1.0%	4.9%	3.9%	2.5%
A lot of the time	10.7%	10.8%	15.2%	10.9%	3.2%	2.2%	6.3%	12.3%	8.5%
Sometimes	28.4%	32.4%	24.8%	29.9%	10.6%	11.2%	19.0%	27.1%	21.4%
Rarely	21.9%	21.6%	16.0%	16.4%	13.2%	14.7%	16.2%	14.8%	16.2%
Never	33.7%	32.4%	40.6%	40.5%	72.6%	70.9%	53.5%	41.9%	51.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	169	204	387	348	379	409	142	155

Table 57. Discrimination according to residence (H7)

	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Almost all of the time	1.9%	1.1%	1.5%
A lot of the time	4.8%	4.8%	4.8%
Sometimes	11.5%	14.0%	12.8%
Rarely	14.2%	13.3%	13.7%
Never	67.6%	66.9%	67.2%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1101	1086
		2187	

Table 59. Locations of religious discrimination (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H8)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
A local doctor's surgery	1.8%	6.0%	1.0%	6.6%	1.4%	1.3%	0.7%	1.3%	55
A local hospital	5.3%	4.0%	3.9%	7.8%	1.7%	1.3%	0.7%	0.7%	72
A local school	10.1%	5.5%	3.9%	7.8%	1.4%	1.3%	0.7%	2.6%	85
A local council	1.8%	5.0%	3.9%	6.9%	0.6%	0.5%	1.4%	0.7%	59
A landlord or letting agent	7.7%	7.5%	8.5%	5.8%	0.6%	1.3%	2.2%	2.6%	95
A local shop	9.5%	8.5%	4.7%	5.2%	2.5%	1.8%	1.4%	5.2%	95
Public transport	16.6%	18.9%	7.3%	15.0%	1.7%	3.5%	2.9%	2.6%	174
Airline/airport officials	6.5%	7.0%	9.3%	5.2%	0.8%	0.5%	2.2%	3.9%	93
The courts (Magistrates Courts and Crown Court)	2.4%	2.5%	1.3%	0.6%	0.8%	0.8%	1.4%	0.0%	24
The police	17.8%	6.5%	9.8%	5.8%	2.5%	2.8%	6.5%	4.6%	137
The immigration authorities	1.2%	3.0%	4.4%	4.0%	0.0%	0.3%	1.4%	0.7%	43
From a member of the public	29.0%	42.3%	19.4%	27.7%	10.8%	10.1%	10.8%	15.0%	422
None of the above	44.4%	38.8%	57.3%	50.9%	82.5%	84.1%	79.9%	75.8%	1407
Total count	169	201	386	346	361	395	139	153	2150

Table 61. Locations of religious discrimination (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H8)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
A local school	10.1%	5.5%	3.9%	7.8%	1.4%	1.3%	0.7%	2.6%	
Total count	17	11	15	27	5	5	1	4	85

Table 65. Muslims' highest level of education completed (breakdown by occupation type) (I17)

	No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
Economically inactive	38.5%	20.9%	21.1%	9.6%	19.8%
Modern professional occupations	1.0%	3.5%	8.9%	28.8%	12.4%
Clerical and intermediate occupations		4.7%	19.8%	13.9%	14.1%
Senior managers or administrators	1.0%		1.8%	6.4%	2.6%
Technical and craft occupations	13.5%	7.6%	7.8%	5.0%	7.6%
Semi-routine manual and service occupations	12.5%	15.1%	15.4%	12.8%	14.4%
Routine manual and service occupations	31.7%	43.6%	19.6%	7.8%	21.5%
Middle or junior managers	1.9%	4.7%	4.7%	5.7%	4.7%
Traditional professional occupations			0.9%	10.0%	3.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	104	172	551	281

Table 66. Non-Muslims' highest level of education completed (breakdown by occupation type) (I17)

	No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
Economically inactive	41.7%	13.8%	7.1%	3.1%	6.8%
Modern professional occupations	4.2%	3.8%	16.9%	46.2%	27.1%
Clerical and intermediate occupations	12.5%	10.0%	18.4%	14.6%	16.2%
Senior managers or administrators		1.3%	1.1%	8.5%	3.9%
Technical and craft occupations	12.5%	5.0%	13.0%	1.2%	7.8%
Semi-routine manual and service occupations	12.5%	20.0%	15.9%	5.0%	11.8%
Routine manual and service occupations	8.3%	37.5%	20.1%	5.4%	15.4%
Middle or junior managers		7.5%	5.5%	5.4%	5.5%
Traditional professional occupations	8.3%	1.3%	2.0%	10.6%	5.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	24	80	561	1089

Table 67. Have you been refused a job in this country in last 5 year? (H10)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Yes		30.0%	26.9%	28.5%
No		45.0%	51.0%	48.0%
Don't know		2.0%	1.1%	1.5%
Not applicable		23.0%	21.0%	22.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1108	1088	2196

**Table 68. Have you been refused a job in this country in last 5 years?
(breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H10)**

		Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Yes		33.7%	37.3%	28.9%	25.1%	25.8%	25.1%	27.5%	34.2%	28.5%
No		46.7%	44.6%	49.7%	39.2%	51.8%	51.8%	52.8%	45.2%	48.0%
Don't know		1.2%	2.0%	2.8%	1.4%	1.1%	1.0%	1.4%	1.3%	1.5%
Not applicable		18.3%	16.2%	18.6%	34.3%	21.3%	22.1%	18.3%	19.4%	22.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	169	204	388	347	380	411	142	155	2196

Table 73. For what reasons was interviewee refused a job? (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H11)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Your gender	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%	0.0%	0.8%	0.2%	0.0%	1.3%	0.4%
Your age	0.6%	1.0%	3.6%	2.3%	4.5%	4.4%	4.9%	4.5%	3.4%
Your ethnicity	4.7%	4.4%	4.4%	4.6%	0.3%	0.2%	2.1%	2.6%	2.7%
Your religion	3.6%	7.4%	2.3%	3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%
Your colour	3.0%	2.0%	1.8%	1.4%	.3%	1.0%	4.9%	1.9%	1.6%
Where you live	2.4%	1.0%	0.3%	0.6%	0.3%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.5%
Other	14.2%	14.7%	13.4%	10.3%	14.5%	14.3%	11.3%	16.8%	13.6%
Don't know	5.3%	4.9%	2.6%	2.3%	4.7%	3.6%	3.5%	7.1%	3.9%
N/A	66.3%	64.2%	71.2%	75.0%	74.7%	75.7%	73.2%	65.8%	72.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	169	204	389	348	380	412	142	2199

Table 81. Locations of religious discrimination (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (H8)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non-Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non-Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
A landlord or letting agent	7.7%	7.5%	8.5%	5.8%	0.6%	1.3%	2.2%	2.6%	
Total count	13	15	33	20	2	5	3	4	95

Table 86. Do you like the neighbourhood? (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (C5)

		Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Yes, definitely		54.8%	45.1%	50.1%	50.6%	64.2%	61.6%	53.5%	51.6%	55.0%
Yes, to some extent		38.7%	43.6%	40.6%	37.9%	31.0%	33.1%	36.6%	41.3%	37.0%
No		6.5%	11.3%	9.3%	11.5%	4.8%	5.4%	9.9%	7.1%	8.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	168	204	387	348	377	411	142	155	2192

Table 88. Satisfaction with health services (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (G1.6)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Very satisfied	19.6%	12.3%	17.8%	19.8%	19.7%	15.3%	21.8%	16.8%	17.8%
Fairly satisfied	50.6%	45.6%	46.6%	42.5%	48.4%	49.0%	54.9%	48.4%	47.6%
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	11.9%	21.6%	15.2%	16.1%	13.4%	14.8%	7.7%	9.0%	14.4%
Fairly dissatisfied	11.3%	10.3%	7.7%	8.9%	8.9%	9.7%	6.3%	14.2%	9.4%
Very dissatisfied	6.0%	7.8%	7.2%	9.8%	3.7%	3.4%	2.1%	7.1%	5.9%
Don't know	.6%	2.5%	5.4%	2.9%	5.8%	7.8%	7.0%	4.5%	4.9%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	168	204	388	348	380	412	142	2197

Table 91. Do hospitals and medical clinics respect different religious customs? (G8)

		Male	Female	Total
	Too much	4.4%	3.5%	4.0%
	About right	54.7%	55.2%	55.0%
	Too little	9.0%	12.3%	10.6%
	Don't know	31.9%	29.1%	30.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1080	1118	2198

**Table 92. Do hospitals and medical clinics respect different religious customs?
(breakdown by birthplace) (G8)**

		Born in the EU state	Born outside the EU state	Total
Too much		3.1%	4.9%	4.0%
About right		52.3%	57.9%	55.0%
Too little		9.6%	11.8%	10.6%
Don't know		35.0%	25.3%	30.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1164	1034	2198

**Table 93. Do hospitals and medical clinics respect different religious customs?
(breakdown by highest level of education completed) (G8)**

		No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
Too much		7.0%	6.7%	4.1%	2.1%	4.0%
About right		53.9%	61.1%	55.8%	51.6%	55.0%
Too little		9.4%	9.9%	9.2%	13.5%	10.7%
Don't know		29.7%	22.2%	30.9%	32.8%	30.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	128	252	1111	705	2196

Table 94. In last 12 months, have you sought information on health (breakdown by religion) (G20)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
Yes		37.0%	41.6%	39.3%
No		63.0%	58.4%	60.7%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1106	1085	2191

**Table 95. In last 12 months, have you sought information on health
(breakdown by gender) (G20.4)**

		Male	Female	Total
Yes		34.4%	43.9%	39.3%
No		65.6%	56.1%	60.7%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1076	1115	2191

**Table 96. In last 12 months, have you sought information on health
(breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (G20.4)**

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total
Yes	27.2%	44.6%	33.9%	40.8%	37.6%	44.6%	35.9%	48.4%	39.3%
No	72.8%	55.4%	66.1%	59.2%	62.4%	55.4%	64.1%	51.6%	60.7%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	169	204	387	346	378	410	142	2191

**Table 98. In last 12 months, have you sought information on health
(breakdown by employment status) (G20.4)**

	Yes	No	Total
Full time employee	23.4%	32.6%	29.1%
Part time employee	19.0%	13.2%	15.4%
Self-employed	6.9%	6.3%	6.5%
Working unpaid in family business	0.5%	1.1%	0.9%
Retired	9.6%	7.3%	8.2%
On government employment or training programme	1.9%	0.8%	1.2%
Unemployed and looking for work	7.4%	9.4%	8.7%
Student	11.3%	14.2%	13.1%
Looking after home or family	6.4%	7.9%	7.3%
Permanently sick or disabled	4.2%	2.3%	3.0%
Other	9.3%	4.9%	6.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	591	975

**Table 99. Respondents reporting having experienced discrimination in healthcare
(breakdown by religion) (B1)**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Muslim	95	80.5	80.5	80.5
Non-Muslim	23	19.5	19.5	100
Total	118	100	100	

Table 102. Level of trust in the police (breakdown by religion and age) (F11.1)

		< 20	20 – 29	30 – 39	40 – 49	50 – 59	60 +	Total
Muslim	A lot	15.7%	12.5%	11.6%	15.7%	14.8%	19.8%	14.1%
	A fair amount	38.0%	41.1%	43.4%	39.5%	42.6%	44.0%	41.3%
	Not very much	38.9%	34.2%	34.7%	35.4%	30.6%	23.1%	33.8%
	Not at all	6.5%	10.7%	8.3%	7.6%	9.3%	4.4%	8.5%
	Don't know	0.9%	1.5%	2.1%	1.8%	2.8%	8.8%	2.3%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	108	336	242	223	108	91	1108
Non-Muslim	A lot	12.7%	9.6%	10.2%	11.6%	17.7%	19.1%	12.9%
	A fair amount	32.9%	50.0%	47.8%	50.8%	39.0%	52.2%	47.1%
	Not very much	41.8%	27.7%	27.3%	26.6%	29.9%	25.5%	28.5%
	Not at all	10.1%	9.9%	14.6%	7.5%	12.8%	1.3%	9.6%
	Don't know	2.5%	2.8%		3.5%	0.6%	1.9%	1.9%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	79	282	205	199	164	157	1086

Table 104. Level of trust in the police (breakdown by religion and employment status) (F11.1)

		Full time employee	Part time employee	Self- employed	Working unpaid in family business	Retired	On government employment or training programme	Unemployed and looking for work	Student	Looking after home or family	Permanently sick or disabled	Other	Total
Muslim	A lot	8.6%	13.6%	10.3%		12.7%	6.3%	12.0%	13.1%	16.5%	25.0%	12.2%	12.3%
	A fair amount	42.7%	44.9%	48.7%	33.3%	50.9%	37.5%	30.1%	42.3%	38.5%	43.8%	57.1%	42.8%
	Not very much	37.7%	36.4%	17.9%	50.0%	25.5%	43.8%	44.6%	32.8%	37.4%	18.8%	24.5%	34.4%
	Not at all	9.1%	5.1%	17.9%	16.7%	3.6%	6.3%	8.4%	8.8%	3.3%	9.4%	4.1%	7.6%
	Don't know	1.8%		5.1%		7.3%	6.3%	4.8%	2.9%	4.4%	3.1%	2.0%	3.0%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	220	118	39	6	55	16	83	137	91	32	49	846
Non-Muslim	A lot	13.1%	4.9%	12.7%	37.5%	18.1%		9.4%	13.2%	4.2%		16.7%	11.8%
	A fair amount	53.6%	53.7%	44.4%	37.5%	50.0%		37.7%	38.2%	79.2%	62.5%	27.8%	48.5%
	Not very much	26.2%	28.5%	25.4%	25.0%	27.8%	100.0%	34.0%	39.7%	16.7%	31.3%	33.3%	29.1%
	Not at all	6.8%	10.6%	15.9%		1.4%		15.1%	4.4%		6.3%	22.2%	8.9%
	Don't know	.4%	2.4%	1.6%		2.8%		3.8%	4.4%				1.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	237	123	63	8	72	3	53	68	24	16	54	721

Table 105. Level of trust in the police (breakdown by religion, gender and birthplace) (F11.1)

	Muslim Male born in the EU state	Muslim Female born in the EU state	Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born in the EU state	Non- Muslim Male born outside the EU state	Non- Muslim Female born outside the EU state	Total	
A lot	7.1%	12.7%	13.1%	19.3%	12.9%	12.4%	15.6%	11.6%	13.5%	
A fair amount	38.5%	46.1%	40.9%	40.3%	51.6%	42.7%	46.8%	48.4%	44.2%	
Not very much	37.9%	33.8%	33.2%	32.3%	25.0%	31.8%	26.2%	30.3%	31.1%	
Not at all	13.6%	6.4%	10.0%	5.8%	10.0%	11.2%	8.5%	5.2%	9.1%	
Don't know	3.0%	1.0%	2.8%	2.3%	0.5%	1.9%	2.8%	4.5%	2.1%	
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	169	204	389	347	380	412	141	155	2197

Table 116. Voting in last national election (breakdown by gender and religion) (F2)

		Muslim male	Muslim female	Non-Muslim male	Non-Muslim female	Total
Yes		52.5%	49.5%	66.7%	71.4%	60.0%
No		47.5%	50.5%	33.3%	28.6%	40.0%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	558	552	522	567	2199

Table 117. Voting in last local election (breakdown by gender and religion) (F4)

		Muslim male	Muslim female	Non-Muslim male	Non-Muslim female	Total
Yes		52.0%	50.4%	65.5%	66.1%	58.4%
No		48.0%	49.6%	34.5%	33.9%	41.6%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	558	552	522	567	2199

Table 118. Voting in last national election (breakdown by religion and birthplace) (F2)

	Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Yes	57.4%	47.8%	76.5%	49.5%	60.0%
No	42.6%	52.2%	23.5%	50.5%	40.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	373	737	792	297	2199

Table 119. Voting in last local election (breakdown by religion and birthplace) (F4)

	Muslims born in the EU state	Muslims born outside the EU state	Non-Muslims born in the EU state	Non-Muslims born outside the EU state	Total
Yes	53.4%	50.1%	72.5%	48.1%	58.4%
No	46.6%	49.9%	27.5%	51.9%	41.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	373	737	792	297	2199

Table 122. Can you influence decisions affecting your city (breakdown by religion and age) (F8)

		< 20	20 – 29	30 – 39	40 – 49	50 – 59	60 +	Total	
Muslim	Definitely agree	5.6%	4.8%	5.0%	4.5%	6.5%	4.4%	5.0%	
	Agree	50.0%	38.4%	30.3%	37.2%	28.0%	24.2%	35.4%	
	Disagree	25.0%	32.4%	35.3%	33.6%	34.6%	27.5%	32.4%	
	Definitely disagree	11.1%	14.6%	17.8%	13.9%	17.8%	25.3%	16.0%	
	Don't know	8.3%	9.8%	11.6%	10.8%	13.1%	18.7%	11.3%	
	Total	Per cent	100.0%						
		Count	108	336	241	223	107	91	1106
Non-Muslim	Definitely agree	2.5%	8.9%	6.3%	10.6%	11.6%	10.1%	8.8%	
	Agree	40.5%	44.1%	46.3%	39.2%	42.1%	33.5%	41.5%	
	Disagree	41.8%	28.1%	28.8%	33.7%	29.3%	36.1%	31.6%	
	Definitely disagree	6.3%	10.3%	12.7%	10.6%	11.6%	14.6%	11.3%	
	Don't know	8.9%	8.5%	5.9%	6.0%	5.5%	5.7%	6.7%	
	Total	Per cent	100.0%						
		Count	79	281	205	199	164	158	1086

Table 123. Can you influence decisions affecting your city (participation in local consultation) (F8)

		Yes	No	Total	
Muslim	Definitely agree	8.6%	4.2%	5.0%	
	Agree	40.6%	34.2%	35.3%	
	Disagree	36.4%	31.5%	32.3%	
	Definitely disagree	8.6%	17.6%	16.1%	
	Don't know	5.9%	12.4%	11.3%	
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Count	187	920	1107
Non-Muslim	Definitely agree	12.3%	8.1%	8.9%	
	Agree	51.2%	39.4%	41.6%	
	Disagree	23.2%	33.4%	31.5%	
	Definitely disagree	9.9%	11.7%	11.3%	
	Don't know	3.4%	7.5%	6.7%	
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Count	203	881	1084

Table 124. Trust in police (breakdown by religion) (F11)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A lot		14.1%	12.9%	13.5%
A fair amount		41.3%	47.2%	44.2%
Not very much		33.7%	28.5%	31.1%
Not at all		8.6%	9.6%	9.1%
Don't know		2.3%	1.9%	2.1%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1088	2197

Table 125. Level trust in the courts (F11.2)

		Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
A lot		16.1%	13.9%	15.0%
A fair amount		43.6%	47.1%	45.3%
Not very much		23.4%	24.0%	23.7%
Not at all		6.2%	7.0%	6.6%
Don't know		10.6%	8.1%	9.4%
Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	1109	1089	2198

Table 130. Level of trust in the national Parliament (breakdown by religion and birthplace) (F11.3)

		Non-citizen of EU state	Citizen of EU state	Total
Muslim	A lot	7.3%	5.4%	6.0%
	A fair amount	27.7%	26.4%	26.8%
	Not very much	30.5%	42.7%	38.8%
	Not at all	14.1%	15.9%	15.3%
	Don't know	20.3%	9.5%	13.0%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	354	754	1108
Non-Muslim	A lot	10.5%	4.4%	5.2%
	A fair amount	26.6%	36.8%	35.4%
	Not very much	35.0%	38.9%	38.4%
	Not at all	11.2%	13.8%	13.4%
	Don't know	16.8%	6.1%	7.5%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	143	944	1087

Table133. Level of trust in the national Parliament (breakdown by highest level of education completed) (F11.3)

		No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
Muslim	A lot	9.6%	8.7%	4.2%	6.8%	6.1%
	A fair amount	26.9%	31.4%	24.2%	28.8%	26.8%
	Not very much	31.7%	35.5%	41.0%	39.5%	38.9%
	Not at all	10.6%	12.8%	17.3%	14.9%	15.4%
	Don't know	21.2%	11.6%	13.3%	10.0%	12.9%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	104	172	549	281	1106
Non-Muslim	A lot	16.7%	5.0%	3.8%	6.6%	5.2%
	A fair amount	20.8%	26.3%	33.5%	40.6%	35.4%
	Not very much	16.7%	40.0%	42.0%	34.4%	38.4%
	Not at all	12.5%	21.3%	13.4%	12.0%	13.4%
	Don't know	33.3%	7.5%	7.3%	6.4%	7.5%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	24	80	559	424	1087

**Table 134. Level of trust in the national Government
(breakdown by religion and highest level of education completed) (I11)**

		No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
Muslim	A lot	9.6%	8.7%	4.0%	5.3%	5.6%
	A fair amount	27.9%	26.7%	21.3%	24.6%	23.6%
	Not very much	27.9%	34.3%	40.7%	36.3%	37.4%
	Not at all	17.3%	23.8%	24.2%	26.3%	24.0%
	Don't know	17.3%	6.4%	9.8%	7.5%	9.4%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	104	172	550	281	1107
Non-Muslim	A lot	16.7%	5.0%	3.2%	5.9%	4.7%
	A fair amount	20.8%	18.8%	28.0%	25.9%	26.4%
	Not very much	29.2%	36.3%	41.7%	42.0%	41.1%
	Not at all	12.5%	31.3%	22.1%	21.0%	22.1%
	Don't know	20.8%	8.8%	5.0%	5.2%	5.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	24	80	561	424	1089

Table 135. Level of trust in city council (breakdown by highest level of education completed) (F11)

		No formal education	Primary	Secondary	University	Total
Muslim	A lot	13.5%	12.8%	7.5%	8.9%	9.2%
	A fair amount	37.5%	38.4%	35.6%	34.2%	35.9%
	Not very much	26.9%	30.8%	35.1%	34.5%	33.5%
	Not at all	9.6%	8.7%	11.1%	10.0%	10.3%
	Don't know	12.5%	9.3%	10.7%	12.5%	11.1%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	104	172	550	281	1107
Non-Muslim	A lot	16.7%	8.8%	6.6%	7.1%	7.2%
	A fair amount	37.5%	25.0%	38.1%	42.3%	38.8%
	Not very much	20.8%	41.3%	32.3%	34.3%	33.5%
	Not at all	12.5%	11.3%	12.3%	6.4%	9.9%
	Don't know	12.5%	13.8%	10.7%	9.9%	10.7%
	Total	Per cent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Count	24	80	561	423	1088

Table 136. Civic Participation (breakdown by religion and organisation type) (F10)

		Yes, in an organisation based on own ethnicity or religion	Yes, in a mixed organisation	Total
Muslim	Definitely agree	6.5%	8.3%	32
	Agree	42.1%	43.4%	209
	Disagree	28.7%	31.4%	168
	Definitely disagree	13.5%	9.2%	67
	Don't know	9.2%	7.7%	45
	Total	401	739	521
Non-Muslim	Definitely agree	7.6%	12.4%	57
	Agree	47.9%	49.5%	291
	Disagree	30.8%	23.9%	166
	Definitely disagree	10.3%	10.6%	74
	Don't know	3.4%	3.6%	26
	Total	263	1136	614

ANNEX 3. QUESTIONNAIRE**Social Cohesion, Participation and Identity****A. Preliminary Information**

[To be completed by the interviewer]

A1 Interview Number: _____

A2 Name of interviewer: _____

A3 Date of interview: _____

A4 Location of interview: _____

- | | | | |
|----|----------------|----|-----------|
| 1 | Amsterdam | 6 | Leicester |
| 2 | Antwerp | 7 | Marseille |
| 3 | Berlin | 8 | Paris |
| 4 | Copenhagen | 9 | Rotterdam |
| 5 | Hamburg | 10 | Stockholm |
| 11 | Waltham Forest | | |

A5 Name of the local area/neighbourhood: _____

A6 Duration of the interview: _____

A7 Language interview conducted in: _____

- | | | | |
|---|---------|----|---------|
| 1 | Arabic | 8 | German |
| 2 | Bengali | 9 | Kurdish |
| 3 | Berber | 10 | Swedish |
| 4 | Danish | 11 | Somali |
| 5 | Dutch | 12 | Turkish |
| 6 | English | 13 | Urdu |
| 7 | French | 14 | Other |

B. Profile of the Interviewee

[This page needs to be completed by the interviewer for every interviewee immediately after the interview.]

- B1 Interview Category
- 1 Muslim
 - 2 Non Muslim
- B2 Sex
- 1 Male
 - 2 Female
- B3 Any visible signs of religious identity?
- 1 Yes [*please specify*]
 - 2 No
- B4 Recruitment Source:

C. Neighbourhood Characteristics

This first set of questions is about where you live – your house, neighbourhood, local area, and what you feel about these things.

[Explain that in these questions by ‘local area’ we mean the area within 15-20 minutes walk of where they live and by ‘neighbourhood’ we mean the 3 or 4 street immediately around where they live.]

- C1 Do you own or rent your home or have some other arrangement?
- 1 Own outright
 - 2 Own – with mortgage/loan
 - 3 Part rent, part mortgage (shared equity)
 - 4 Rent public/social housing
 - 5 Rent private landlord
 - 6 Living with parents/siblings
 - 7 Living rent free [*write in why*]
 - 8 Squatting
 - 9 Other [*specify*]
- C2 How many years have you lived in this local area?

C3 What is your main reason for moving to/living in this local area?

- 1 Did not choose
- 2 Cost
- 3 Near work
- 4 Near school
- 5 Near family
- 6 Near shops/other facilities
- 7 Reputation of the area
- 8 People from the same ethnic group as you
- 9 People from the same religious group as you
- 10 Nice area
- 11 Social housing was offered to me
- 12 Liked the house
- 13 Cheap affordable housing
- 14 Close to transport
- 15 Born here/always lived here
- 16 Lived here before
- 17 Parent's house/decision
- 18 Marriage living with partner
- 19 Close to place of worship
- 20 Multi-cultural area
- 21 Other [specify]
- 22 Don't know

C4 Are the people who live in this neighbourhood:

- 1 mainly your relatives
- 2 mainly people from your ethnic and religious background
- 3 mainly people who share your religion from other ethnic backgrounds
- 4 mainly people from the same ethnic background but different religion
- 5 mainly people from a different ethnic and religious background
- 6 from a mixture of different backgrounds, ethnicities and religions

C5 Would you say that this is a neighbourhood you enjoy living in?

- 1 Yes, definitely
- 2 Yes, to some extent
- 3 No [go to C7]

C6 What things do you like about the neighbourhood you live in?

C7 What things do you dislike about the neighbourhood you live in?

C8 What THREE things would you like to see done by the city council to improve your neighbourhood?

- 1:
- 2:
- 3:

C9 Would you say that

- 1 many of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted,
- 2 some can be trusted,
- 3 a few can be trusted,
- 4 or that none of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted?

C10 To what extent you agree or disagree with each of these statements

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
People in this neighbourhood are willing to help their neighbours?					
This is a close-knit neighbourhood?					
People in this neighbourhood share the same values?					
People in this neighbourhood work together to improve the neighbourhood?					

D. Identity and Belonging

We will now ask some questions about your identity, and look at how much you feel a part of and belong to this local area and city.

D1 Suppose you were describing yourself, which of the following would say something important about you? Please identify five options in order of importance, where number one is the most important

- | | | | |
|----|--|----|----------------------|
| 1 | Your family | | |
| 2 | The kind of work you do | 1: | <input type="text"/> |
| 3 | Your age and life stage | 2: | <input type="text"/> |
| 4 | Your interests | 3: | <input type="text"/> |
| 5. | Your level of education | 4: | <input type="text"/> |
| 6 | Your nationality | 5: | <input type="text"/> |
| 7 | Your gender | | |
| 8 | your level of income | | |
| 9 | Your religion | | |
| 10 | Your social class | | |
| 11 | Your ethnic group or cultural background | | |
| 12 | The colour of your skin | | |
| 13 | Any disability you may have | | |

D2 To what extent do you agree or disagree that your local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together?

- 1 Strongly agree
- 2 Agree
- 3 Disagree
- 4 Strongly disagree
- 5 Don't know
- 6 Too few people in this local area
- 7 People in this area are all from the same background

D3 What sorts of things prevent people from different backgrounds from getting on well together in this local area?

D4 How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area?

- 1 Very strongly
- 2 Fairly strongly
- 3 Not very strongly
- 4 Not at all strongly
- 5 Don't know

D5 How strongly do you feel you belong to this city?

- 1 Very strongly
- 2 Fairly strongly
- 3 Not very strongly
- 4 Not at all strongly
- 5 Don't know

D6 How strongly do you feel you belong to this country?

- 1 Very strongly
- 2 Fairly strongly
- 3 Not very strongly
- 4 Not at all strongly
- 5 Don't know

D7 What, if any, are barriers to feeling that you belong to this city?

D8 Which four of the following, if any, would you say are the most important values of living in this country

- | | | | |
|----|--|----|----------------------|
| 1 | Respect for the law | 1: | <input type="text"/> |
| 2 | Tolerance towards others | 2: | <input type="text"/> |
| 3 | Freedom of speech and expression | 3: | <input type="text"/> |
| 4 | Respect for all faiths | 4: | <input type="text"/> |
| 5 | Justice and fair play | | |
| 6 | Speaking the national language | | |
| 7 | Respect of people of different ethnic groups | | |
| 8 | Equality of opportunity | | |
| 9 | Pride in this country/patriotism | | |
| 10 | Voting in elections | | |
| 11 | Freedom from discrimination | | |

- D9 Do you see yourself as [British, French, etc.]? [This question is asking for cultural identification with society rather than legal status]
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
- D10. Do most other people in this country see you as [British, French, etc.]? ['Other people' refers to all other ethnic and religious groups to the respondent in the country]
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
- D11. Do you want to be seen by others as [British, French, etc.]?
- 1 Yes [go to D13]
 - 2 No [go to D12]
- D12. If No to D10, please explain
- D13 Which do you think is the main barrier to being [British, French, etc.]?
- 1 Not speaking the national language/s
 - 2 Being born abroad
 - 3 Being from an ethnic minority/not being white
 - 4 Accent/way of speaking
 - 5 Not being Christian
 - 6 There aren't any barriers
 - 7 None of these
 - 8 Don't know
 - 9 Other [specify]

E. Social Interactions

We now want to find out more about the people that you meet and interact with in this local area. We are interested in ‘meaningful interactions’, ones that involve more than a hello in the streets, that include some exchange of information.

E1 In the last year, how often, if at all, have you met and talked with people from a different ethnic group to yourself, in the following places?

	Daily	At least weekly	At least monthly	At least once a year	Not at all	Don't know
At your home/their home						
At school, work or college						
Bar/club						
Café/restaurant						
Sport leisure activity						
Socially outside work/school						
Child's crèche, school, nursery						
Shops						
Street markets						
Place of worship or other religious centre						
Community centre						
Health clinic, hospital						
On public transport						
Park, out door space						
Neighbourhood group						
Youth group						
Educational evening class						
Other [<i>specify</i>]						
Nowhere						

E2 In the last year, how often, if at all have you met and talked with people from a different religion to yourself?

	Daily	At least weekly	At least monthly	At least once a year	Not at all	Don't know
At your home/their home						
At school, work or college						
Bar/club						
Café/restaurant						
Sport leisure activity						
Socially outside work/school						
Child's crèche, school, nursery						
At the shops						

E3 Do you think more needs to be done to encourage people from different backgrounds to mix together?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

E4 If yes to E3, what do you suggest should be done?

E5 Are there any places in your local area or city that you feel uncomfortable to be in?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No [go to F1]

E6 If yes to E5, what are these places?

E7 If yes to E5, what are the reasons that you feel uncomfortable in them?

F. Participation and Citizenship

We will now ask about your participation in organisations in this local area and your feeling about being able to influence and change what is happening in society.

F1 Are you eligible to vote in national elections?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No [go to F3]

F2 Did you vote in the last national election?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

F3 Are you eligible to vote in local elections?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No [go to F5]

F4 Did you vote in the last local council election?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

F5 In the last 12 months have you been involved in any of the following activities?

	Y	N	How many times in the last 12 months?
Attended public meeting or rally			
Taken part in a public demonstration			
Signed a petition			

F6 In the last 12 months have you taken part in a consultation or meeting about local services or problems in your local area?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No [go to F8]

F7 If yes to F6, please give details about the nature and type of consultation.

- F8 Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting your city?
- 1 Definitely agree
 - 2 Agree
 - 3 Disagree
 - 4 Definitely disagree
 - 5 Don't know
- F9 Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting your country?
- 1 Definitely agree
 - 2 Agree
 - 3 Disagree
 - 4 Definitely disagree
 - 5 Don't know

F10 In the last 12 months have you played an active role in organising any of the following?

Organisation					
Organisation	Y	N	Based on own ethnicity or religion	Mixed	What did you do?
Children's education/schools (e.g. school governor, running an activity club, play group)					
Youth activities (e.g. running a youth club)					
Adult education (e.g. running classes, students' union official)					
Religion (e.g. official in mosque, Sunday school teacher)					
Politics (e.g. local councillor, political party member/activist)					
Social welfare (e.g. adviser/board member in voluntary groups concerned with social welfare)					
Office holders in a community organisation (e.g. cultural centre, community association)					
Criminal Justice (e.g. magistrate, special constable)					
Human rights (community or race relations officer, legal advice worker, worker with asylum)					
Trade union activist					
Housing/neighbourhood group (e.g. Active member of residents / tenants association,					
Organisation recreation, sports or hobbies					
Arts, music, cultural organisation					
Any other [<i>specify</i>]					

F11 How much do you trust the following?

	A lot	A fair amount	Not very much	Not at all	Don't know
The police					
The courts					
The national Parliament					
The government					
Your city council					

G. Experience of Local Services

G1 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with these different types of services?

	Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Fairly dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Don't know
Local primary schools						
Local High School (incl. gymnasiums, middle schools, lyceum, college and vocational schools from ages 11-16/18)						
Social housing						
Street cleaning						
Policing						
Health services						
Services for young people						
Public transport						

- G2 Where interviewees indicate that they were dissatisfied with a service, ask for details of why they were dissatisfied?
- G3 What THREE things would you like to see happen to improve any of these services in your local area?
- 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
- G4 To what extent do you think that schools respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions?
- 1 Too much
 - 2 About right
 - 3 Too little
 - 4 Don't know
- G5 Why do you say that?
- G6 To what extent do you think that employers respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions?
- 1 Too much
 - 2 About right
 - 3 Too little
 - 4 Don't know
- G7 Why do you say that?
- G8 To what extent do you think that hospitals and medical clinics respect the religious customs of people belonging to different religions?
- 1 Too much
 - 2 About right
 - 3 Too little
 - 4 Don't know
- G9 Why do you say that?

- G10 Have you been a victim of crime in the last twelve months?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No [go to G16]
- G11 If Yes to G10, where did this happen?
- 1 Neighbourhood
 - 2 Local area
 - 3 City
 - 4 Elsewhere
- G12 Did you feel that it was motivated by discrimination?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No [go to G16]
- G13 If yes to G12, what gave you this impression?
- G14 Did you report it to the police?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No [go to G16]
- G15 If yes to G14, were you satisfied with the police response?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
- G16 Have you had any contact with the police (about any issue) in the last twelve months?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No [go to G20]
- G17 If yes, did you initiate the contact or did the police contact you?
- 1 Interviewee initiated contact
 - 2 Police initiated contact
- G18 Were you satisfied with the conduct and outcome of that encounter?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No

G19 If no, why were you not satisfied?

G20 In the last twelve months, have you needed advice or information in relation to any of the following issues?

	Yes	No
Education		
Employment		
Housing		
Health		

G21 If yes to G20, can you give some more details? What did you need advice and information about? How did you get it? Who helped and who didn't help?

G22 Where do you get most of your information about what is happening in your local area?

G23 Where do you get most of your information about what is happening in this city?

G24 Where do you get most of your information about what is happening in this country?

H. Discrimination and Prejudice

We will now ask about your experiences and perceptions of discrimination and prejudice.

H1 How much racial prejudice do you feel there is in this country today?

- 1 A lot
- 2 A fair amount
- 3 A little
- 4 None [go to H4]
- 5 Don't know [go to H4]

H2 If 1-3 to H1, which groups do you think there is racial prejudice against?

H3 Thinking about racial prejudice in this country today, do you think there is now...

- 1 less racial prejudice than there was five years ago?
- 2 more than there was five years ago?
- 3 about the same amount?
- 4 don't know

H4 How much religious prejudice do you feel there is in this country today?

- 1 A lot
- 2 A fair amount
- 3 A little
- 4 None [go to H7]
- 5 Don't know [go to H7]

H5 If 1-3 to H4, which groups do you think there is religious prejudice against?

H6 Thinking about religious prejudice in this country today, do you think there is now...

- 1 less religious prejudice than there was five years ago?
- 2 more than there was five years ago?
- 3 about the same amount?
- 4 don't know

H7 Thinking about your personal experiences over the past 12 months, how often, if at all, has anyone shown prejudice against you or treated you unfairly for each of the following:

	Almost all of the time	A lot of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
Gender					
Age					
Ethnicity					
Religion					
Colour					
Where you live					

- H8 Thinking about your personal experiences over the past 12 months, have any of the following shown prejudice against you or treated you unfairly because of your religion?
- 1 A local doctor's surgery
 - 2 A local hospital
 - 3 A local school
 - 4 A local council
 - 5 A landlord or letting agent
 - 6 A local shop
 - 7 Public transport
 - 8 Airline/airport officials
 - 9 The courts (Magistrates Courts and Crown Court)
 - 10 The police
 - 11 The immigration authorities
 - 12 A member of the public
 - 13 None of the above [go to H10]
- H9 What form did this discrimination or unfair treatment take?
- H10 In the last five years, have you been refused or turned down for a job in this country?
- 1 Yes [go to H11]
 - 2 No [go to H12]
 - 3 Don't know [go to H12]
 - 4 Not applicable [go to I1]
- H11 If yes to H10, do you think you were refused the job for any of the following reasons?
- 1 Your gender
 - 2 Your age
 - 3 Your ethnicity
 - 4 Your religion
 - 5 Your colour
 - 6 Where you live
 - 7 Other [specify]
 - 8 Don't know

- H12 In the last five years, have you been discriminated against at work with regard to promotion or a move to a better position?
- 1 Yes [go to H13]
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 Not applicable
- H13 If yes, do you think you were refused the job for any of the following reasons?
- 1 Your gender
 - 2 Your age
 - 3 Your ethnicity
 - 4 Your religion
 - 5 Your colour
 - 6 Other [specify]
 - 7 Don't know

I. Demographics

Finally, we want to ask you some more information about yourself and your personal circumstances

- I1 Age: what was your age last birthday?
- I2 In which country were you born?
- I3 In which region in that country were you born?
- I4 Is that a rural or urban area?
- 1 Rural
 - 2 Urban
- I5 What is your nationality at the moment?
- I6 What would you say your religion is?
- 1 Buddhism
 - 2 Catholicism
 - 3 Hinduism

- 4 Judaism
 - 5 Islam
 - 6 Protestant Christianity
 - 7 Sikhism
 - 8 Other [specify]
 - 9 No religion [go to I9]
- I7 Do you consider that you are actively practising your religion?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
- I8 What are the ways if any, that you meet religious obligations/participate in your religion?
- I9 What is your marital status?
- 1 Single – never married
 - 2 Married – 1st and only marriage
 - 3 Married – 2nd or subsequent marriage
 - 4 Cohabiting
 - 5 Single but previously married and divorced/separated
 - 6 Single but previously married and widowed
- I10 Please tell me which ethnic group/cultural background you feel you belong to.
- I11 What is the highest level of education that you completed?
- 1 no formal education [go to I14]
 - 2 primary [go to I12 and I13]
 - 3 secondary (including gymnasium, lyceum, college, middle schools, or vocational schools from ages 11- 16/18) [go to I12 and I13]
 - 4 university [go to I12 and I13]
- I12 If 2-4 in I11, Where did you obtain this education?
- 1 in this country
 - 2 in another EU state [please specify]
 - 3 in a non-EU state [please specify]
- I13 If 2-4 in I11, how many years of formal education have you had?

- I14 Are you working for pay these days?
- 1 yes, full-time employee [go to I16]
 - 2 yes, part-time employee [go to I16]
 - 3 yes, self-employed [go to I16]
 - 4 no, working unpaid in family business [go to I16]
 - 5 no, retired [go to I15]
 - 6 no, on government employment or training programme [go to I15]
 - 7 no, unemployed and looking for work [go to I15]
 - 8 no, student [go to I15]
 - 9 no, looking after home or family [go to I15]
 - 10 no, permanently sick or disabled [go to I15]
 - 11 other [specify] [go to I15]
- I15 If options 5-11 in I14, have you ever previously worked for pay?
- 1 Yes, in the last five years
 - 2 Yes, over five years ago
 - 3 No [end of interview]
- I16 What is your main or primary job, or the last job that you did if you are not working right now?

I17 Can you choose a category that best describes the sort of work you do in your main job? If not working now please tick a box to show last job.

Modern professional occupations such as: teacher – nurse – physiotherapist – social worker – welfare officer – artist – musician – police officer (sergeant or above) – software designer	<input type="checkbox"/>	1
Clerical and intermediate occupations such as: secretary – personal assistant – clerical worker – office clerk – call centre agent – nursing auxiliary – nursery nurse	<input type="checkbox"/>	2
Senior managers or administrators (usually responsible for planning, organising and coordinating work and for finance) such as: finance manager – chief executive	<input type="checkbox"/>	3
Technical and craft occupations such as: motor mechanic – fitter – inspector – plumber – printer – tool maker – electrician – gardener – train driver	<input type="checkbox"/>	4
Semi-routine manual and service occupations such as: postal worker – machine operative – security guard – caretaker – farm worker – catering assistant – receptionist – sales assistant	<input type="checkbox"/>	5
Routine manual and service occupations such as: HGV driver – van driver – cleaner – porter – packer – sewing machinist – messenger – labourer – waiter / waitress – bar staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	6
Middle or junior managers such as: office manager – retail manager – bank manager – restaurant manager – warehouse manager – publican	<input type="checkbox"/>	7
Traditional professional occupations such as: accountant – solicitor – medical practitioner – scientist – civil / mechanical engineer	<input type="checkbox"/>	8

I18 Is the person or group or organisation that you work for (or if currently not working, last worked for):

- 1 same religious and ethnic background as you?
- 2 same religious but not same ethnic background?
- 3 same ethnic but different religious background?
- 4 different ethnic and religious background?
- 5 other [specify]?
- 6 not applicable?

- I19 Among the people in your workplace, what proportion do you think are/were from the same religious and ethnic background as you?
- 1 more than a half
 - 2 about a half
 - 3 less than a half
 - 4 other [specify number]
 - 5 not applicable – working by myself
- I20 How did you find (get) your current main job (or most recent job for those not working at present)?

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